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ABSTRACT: 
Most cognitive studies of religion adopt a modular theory of cognition. The 
‘space’ that is studied is often the ‘space between the ears’. Culture and 
religion are viewed as by-products of more entrenched features of our brains. 
Although this ‘Standard Model’ explains many intuitive expressions of religious 
belief, it has trouble explaining (a) the variability of religious systems cross-
culturally (b) the uses of material culture (i.e. symbolic structures etc) in 
transmitting religious concepts. The following thesis presents a ‘wideware 
mind’ hypothesis for religious cognition. I urge that while our internal cognitive 
architecture is causally relevant to religious cognition, the material artefacts of 
culture must be viewed as cognitive properties in their own right. Hence any 
causal account of religious cognition must acknowledge the external features 
of minds and how our neurological resources interact with the artefacts of our 
world.  
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Chapter 1:   Introduction 
 
 
1.1.1 Religious Cognition and Material Culture 
 
 This thesis is about how our cultural practices and material 
artefacts function as a support for human cognitive processes. 
Humans operate within an environment whereby material culture 
enables both learning and problem-solving. Most of us employ pen 
and paper to record ideas, events or grocery lists; geographical maps 
provide direction, while arithmetic offers more efficient methods for 
tracking the quantity of units. Learning development, in conjunction 
with cultural devices, presents an abundance of solutions to everyday 
problems and constitutes the technological basis of humankind. 
Cultural environments – on this view - are comprised of properties 
consisting of artefacts and external support for cognitive 
development. Non-biological tools augment our biological limitations 
and make us smarter.  
 
How is it that non-biological artefacts have evolved to support 
religious beliefs and activities? Many of the approaches within the 
cognitive science of religion (while being valuable to understanding 
the psychological motivations underlying religious behaviour), 
emphasizes the internal cognitive systems which form religious 
representations, while excluding the external properties which shape 
the religious mind. This thesis argues that internal cognitive systems 
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are an insufficient explanation for the motivational salience of 
religious beliefs and activities. Instead I argue that a considerable 
portion of human cognitive expertise is dependent upon both material 
culture and the cooperative transmission of information. More 
specifically then, I will examine the intersection between human 
cognition and the cultural artefacts of religion. 
 
‘Religion’ is a difficult term to define. Religious beliefs and activities 
can be broken down into a variety of parts consisting of rituals, 
supernatural representations, cosmologies, institutions, social norms 
(the list goes on). Space is limited, so this thesis does not seek to 
offer a rigorous definition of religion. However, I will say that literature 
on religious cognition often neglects this point, focusing instead upon 
just a single feature of religious behaviour without acknowledging the 
larger network of traits which constitute (what we often call) ‘religion’. 
When using the term religion then, it is difficult to discern the focus of 
analysis without an operational definition. For the sake of clarity 
however this thesis will keep the ‘question of definition’ relatively 
open. Indeed, the problem of classification – as I will show later – 
remains a relevant obstacle for most models within cognitive science 
of religion.  
 
What I will argue however is that the various facets which 
constitute ‘religion’ are in large part the product of a unique co-
evolutionary process between culture and human cognition (if these 
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two domains can indeed be discussed separately). Other models of 
religious cognition however have focused on internal psychological 
traits such as ‘evolved predispositions’ for religion, or ‘cognitive 
biases’ to religious ideas. Alternatively, I argue that the concepts and 
activities that motivate religious behaviour are especially difficult to 
develop without the evolution and use of material culture. Sacred 
cosmologies, rich theological bodies of knowledge, and elaborate 
rituals are aspects of religious behaviour which employ symbolic 
representations. Much like complex mathematical knowledge is 
difficult to comprehend without the use of symbols and artefacts, so 
too is complex supernatural reasoning unlikely without the use of 
culturally evolved technologies (Day 2005). Ritual, material symbols 
and artefacts make these complex religious worlds cognitively 
manageable. It takes the right kind of artefacts to transmit religion, 
but it also takes the right kind of brain also, a cognitive architecture 
that is almost dependent upon developmental learning and culturally 
evolved tools. 
 
The cultural developmental thesis is important because it 
recognises first that religious cognition is not a biologically evolved 
disposition. In other words, the brain is not well-suited for processing 
religious representations. Human cultures have constructed 
environments which support the transmission of religious 
representations. The point of interest here is that external properties 
which produce supernatural thinking and actions are a sought after 
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commodity within societies. This thesis argues that humans have 
constructed these ‘sacred technologies’ for a reason: the complex 
conceptual reasoning associated with religious thought augment 
cognitive abilities. By engaging in the higher level thinking associated 
with abstract representations, humans have devised techniques to 
extend the boundaries of thought, while further developing what 
Merlin Donald has called a ‘theoretic culture’ (Donald 1991; 2001). 
Through the manipulation of symbols, Donald argues that humans 
have established a way of extending the boundaries of memory and 
thought. Yet complex representations - in turn - act back upon the 
manipulator in a kind of cognitive feedback loop. The development of 
external symbolic representations is but one aspect of a theoretic 
culture, as it takes a particular type of cultural intelligence to engage 
with these cultural devices.   
 
It could be said then that the rich symbolic and theological dialogue 
associated with religious thought have augmented cognitive abilities 
in much the same way that mathematical symbols have enabled 
computation and problem-solving. The abstract significance 
consigned to sacred objects and locales, for instance, has enabled 
the development of a collective representational system of value. The 
intrinsic value assigned to sacred objects is an unusual cognitive 
ability, yet it is also a highly motivational force in cultures (Renfrew 
2001; 2008). The symbolic value that individuals place upon sacred 
objects may not have any real utilitarian worth, but these public 
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representations can be effective social organisers for regulating 
collective behaviour (e.g. such as in the case of collective ritual and 
doctrinal social norms based around sacred objects). An external 
symbolic system of value (i.e. the sacred) is but one of the 
representational abilities that has developed alongside religious 
reasoning. But the complexity of religious theology shows that this 
class of knowledge poses cognitive and computational demands. The 
high-informational load that constitutes religious beliefs and activities 
maybe without explanation – if only for its seemingly non-utilitarian 
corollaries - but it is something that will be examined further in this 
thesis.  
 
1.1.2 The Standard Model 
 
Firstly, I will present a critical evaluation of the methodologies 
employed with the cognitive science of religion, particularly what is 
sometimes called the Standard Model and the obvious strengths and 
limitations therein (for definition of Standard Model see Boyer 2005; 
see also Day 2005; Whitehouse 2005).  Secondly, I will present some 
of the theoretical and methodological challenges Standard Model 
within the cognitive science of religion. By way of these departures, I 
wish to offer an alternative to this Standard Model that encompasses 
externalist models of human cognition (i.e. extended mind, hybrid 
mind and cognitive niche construction hypotheses). Religious 
reasoning is not just distinguished by neurological mechanisms, but 
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by the parity between internal and external cognitive properties (Clark 
1997; Clark and Chalmers 1997). 
 
The Standard Model argues that religion, whatever its classification 
(and a fair classification has yet to be determined I believe), remains 
ubiquitous within cultures because our innate psychological systems 
are naturally susceptible to supernatural ideas.  According to the 
Standard Model ‘religion’ appears to be a universal feature within 
human cultures. In addition, a premise upon which the cognitive 
sciences rest is the biological invariable that humans are endowed 
with the same evolved cognitive hardware. Thus, perhaps there 
exists some perennial feature of our mental faculty which predisposes 
us to religious ideas and activities. Indeed many within the cognitive 
science of religion – particularly within the Standard Model – regard 
the capacity to conceive of the supernatural as a ‘habit of the mind’ 
(McCauley 2000). Religion comes ‘naturally’ to us because we have 
the kinds of brains that we do as biological endowment1. 
 
What sets the Standard Model apart from other methodologies 
within the cognitive science of religion is that: Firstly, it assumes that 
a number of our psychological systems are genetically endowed and 
                                                 
1
 For a good introduction to some of the theories and methods within the Standard Model of cognitive 
science of religion, refer to: Scott Atran’s “In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of 
Religion” (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002); Justin Barrett’s "Exploring the Natural 
Foundations of Religion," (in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4: 29-34, 2000); Pascal Boyer’s “Religion 
explained: The evolutionary origins of religious thought” (Basic Books, 2001); E Thomas Lawson, and 
Robert McCauley’s "Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture” (Cambridge University 
Press, 1990); Robert McCauley’s ‘The Naturalness of Religion and the Unnaturalness of Science’ (in 
F.C.Keil and R.A.Wilson [eds], Explanation and Cognition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
pp. 61–85, 2000). 
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for obvious reasons have been subject to evolutionary processes. For 
the Standard Model, then, religion is conspicuous only because it 
persists as a universal feature within human cultures. Consequently 
the Standard Model posits that are correlations between universal 
features of our cognitive architecture and universal features of 
culture. The regular features of our cultural milieu are thus the result 
of internal cognitive regularities. Yet despite this phenomenon 
religious representations are not necessarily assumed to be standard 
features (i.e. inbuilt neurological characteristics) of our evolved 
cognitive systems (Boyer 1994, 2001). Explicit religious 
representations (e.g. ghosts, goblins, faeries and the gods) are 
instead viewed as a natural by-product of the cognitive mechanisms 
that generate these concepts (Boyer 2001). Thus the same cognitive 
processors that deal with practical (adaptive) behaviour are also the 
same processors that deal with the gods.  
 
Secondly, explicit representations (such as Buddha, Christ, 
demons, ghosts etc), aren’t studied comparatively as is so common 
within the anthropological approaches to religion. Instead the focal 
point of study is the implicit motivations underpinning the cultural 
production of these religious representations. Hence an 
understanding of the cognitive systems that constrain 
religious/cultural properties remains central to the study of religious 
behaviour - despite the diversity of religions reflected in the 
ethnographic literature. Thus on the Standard Model view there 
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appears to be present in human culture a limited catalogue of 
supernatural representations that conform to very specific set of 
regularities defined by features of our cognitive architecture (Boyer 
2001): 
 
“Religious notions are products of the supernatural 
imagination. To some extent, they owe their salience 
(likelihood of activation) and transmission potential to 
features that they share with other supernatural concepts, 
such as found in dreams, fantasy, folktales and legends. 
This might be why one finds recurrent templates in religion 
despite many variations between cultures” (Boyer 
2003:119). 
 
Thirdly the Standard Model argues that humans are susceptible to 
these supernatural concepts precisely because we come equipped 
with a specific type of cognitive system (Boyer 1994; 2001). We are 
religious because our brains are vulnerable to religious ideas. 
Researchers within the ‘Standard Model’ recognise this fact that 
human brains seem to be well suited to religious concepts. 
Supernatural representations are therefore relatively user-friendly, 
requiring precious little processing requirements. Like language, 
religion is deemed a naturally re-occurring, pan-human trait (Barrett 
2000; Bulbulia 2005). Certainly, it seems as if religion is a lot like 
language in that it is an intuitively easy thing to be competent with: 
 
“Humans (especially pre-pubescent humans) readily 
acquire and use natural languages... By better 
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understanding how the particulars of our language-
processing systems handle information, we have been 
able to better understand why human languages take the 
forms that they do. Cognition informs and constrains 
linguistic expression. Analogously, many different mental 
tools inform and constrain religious expression” (Barrett 
2007: 769) 
 
 Consequently defenders of the Standard Model argue that, like 
language, religion requires precious little cultural inputs to enable its 
expression. Religion then is constituted by “non-reflective habits of 
mind” (McCauley 2000:63). Thus in-order to think religiously all we 
have to do is to think “naturally” (Barrett 2000). Consequently if the 
cognitive sciences can identify certain native traits (i.e. innate 
behavioural dispositions) then it can also inform us of why religions 
look the way they do. Subsequently it can also inform us of why 
humans engage so readily in supernatural beliefs and practices. 
 
1.1.3. Problems with the Standard Model 
 
The Standard Model assumes that the cognitive apparatus that 
generates religious representations is context-independent. In other 
words, it views the mind as being isolated from the socio-ecological 
context into which it is embedded. Alternatively this thesis will 
demonstrate that religion is constituted by a distributed cognitive 
system comprised of not only minds, but bodies, nervous systems 
and the properties of material culture (Day 2004b, 2005; Whitehouse 
 15 
2004). Within a distributed cognitive model the emphasis is placed 
upon agents and the environment. Thus material artefacts shouldn’t 
be viewed then as disconnected components, but as “cognitive 
properties in their own right” (Hutchins 1995b:266). Artefacts facilitate 
human cognitive expertise.  
 
Thus religion is enabled by distributed cognition – by agents 
engaged with features of their environment. The integration of brains 
and environment might constitute what cognitive neuroscientist Merlin 
Donald calls ‘hybrid intelligence’ (Donald 1991; 2001). Alternatively 
we could view this engagement between artefacts and brains as a 
multi-modal interactive dynamic, or what Andy Clark (2001) calls a 
‘wideware’ cognitive system (whereby the mind is ‘extended’ into our 
environment). Similarly I argue that human cognition is something 
more than individual cognitive processes. Consequently, religious 
artefacts are just as important to an understanding of the ‘religious 
mind’ than that of our internal cognitive architecture.  
 
My second concern is with the Standard Model’s assumptions 
about the motivational machinery that drives religious behavioural 
outputs. Hence within the Standard Model, intuitive inferences 
constrain religious representations first-and-foremost. However, 
Harvey Whitehouse and others observe that the socio-political 
arrangements associated with a religious belief system seem to be 
designed to override normal intuitive inferences (Whitehouse 2004; 
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Bulbulia 2004; Day 2004a, 2004b; Sosis and Alcorta 2003). Though it 
appears to the Standard Model that religious representations are 
engaged with by agents with a relative ease (this is the user-friendly 
argument for religion), the literature seems to ignore the demands 
required by religion, particularly the cognitive and physical costs of 
membership.  
 
Religious reasoning cannot merely be a ‘habit of the mind’. Agents 
within a religious belief system expend a considerable level of time, 
energy and resources to ensure that a complex system of beliefs and 
practices is sustained. Our intuitions aren’t guided by these costs. On 
the contrary, the cognitive and physical demands of religions are 
sometimes harrowing ordeals requiring time, resources and energy 
(intuitively I would prefer to eat rather than fast; or build a home 
rather than a temple). Theological complexity, particularly the costs in 
learning and transmitting religious knowledge, is but one of the many 
informational costs - notable only because a lot of religious 
information is not necessarily adaptive (i.e. if you compare the 
adaptive value of foraging techniques to the value of prayer). 
Consequently, a problem for the Standard Model then is offering an 
explanation for why societies perpetuate these non-intuitive 
demands.  
 
There are indeed cognitive constraints that enable and affect the 
processing of religious information. Memory systems for instance limit 
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the storage and transmission of information. However these systems 
are conjunct with features of a particular context. I will argue that 
artefacts and the developmental environments of a belief system 
should be viewed as the external cognitive resources which support 
religious reasoning. Religious intelligence is enabled by the niche 
environments which humans have constructed in order to support the 
transmission of their beliefs and practices. I argue that without the 
capacity to shape our developmental environments then the 
transmission of religious concepts would be improbable given the 
limits of our neurological resources.   
 
This notion that human enterprises consist of modifying their 
environment to benefit cognitive development is not new. There is a 
popular impression that natural selection favors organisms that adapt 
to environmental pressures. This is undoubtedly true. However, 
organisms have also countered these pressures by modifying their 
environment to suit their own ends and this biological activity is called 
niche construction (Laland & Odling-Smee 2000a). Earth worms 
regulate the chemical properties of soil, spiders spin webs and 
termites build mounds. There are many examples in the animal 
kingdom of organisms engaging in environmental modification. As 
ecological engineers, humans have surpassed other organisms for 
their innovativeness in developing an environment which not only 
provides them with a fitness advantage, but makes them smarter too. 
A pen and parchment, in conjunction with one another, function as 
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cognitive tools for both communication and memory. A message may 
be passed on; or a record of deeds kept. In both cases, individual 
mental processes access and interact with cultural artefacts which 
enable a wider cognitive interface.  
 
 So we inhabit a system of distributed knowledge - a niche 
constituted by information and tools for managing day-to-day living. 
Within the distributed cognition model, aspects of human intelligence 
aren’t limited to just the individual’s internal cognitive processes 
(Hutchins 1995a; 1995b). Instead, knowledge is ‘distributed’ by the 
attributing of cognitive properties to tools, artefacts and other 
individuals in the environment. Thus knowledge is stored and shared 
within human environments. Agents learn and teach others’ how to 
utilize cognitive tools for living. We are creatures of technology, 
because we are also highly pro-social as well and without the 
cooperation associated with human sociality this mode of 
transmission would be impossible (Sterelny 2007). 
 
1.1.4 Minds and Artefacts 
 
Religious information is not just the product of basic brain activity.  
Instead religious information is actively external within the cultural 
environment. By this I mean that information is both external and 
actively utilized in the transmission of beliefs and practices. As 
Matthew Day (2004b) points out: if we view cognition as purely 
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‘internal’ phenomena we subsequently overlook a rather crucial 
feature to the study of the religious mind, that the rich array of 
religious belief systems benefit significantly from external/cultural 
material properties also. Thus if we can additionally embrace the 
notion that brains are extended into the world, we must also perhaps 
ask why and how minds work in conjunction with material artefacts. 
The distinguishing of minds from the cultural network where minds 
take cognizance can be tricky especially if only fragmentary 
explanations can be offered in which differing levels of organization 
within a biological system take precedence over others. As Karola 
Stotz and Paul Griffiths (2000) observes:  
 
“Part of the rationale of the traditional idea of human 
nature was to isolate features that do not depend on 
culture. These ‘biological’ features represent our true 
nature – the naked ape stripped of its cultural clothes. It 
seems to us that this traditional project is as misguided as 
seeking to investigate the true nature of an ant by 
removing the distorting influence of the nest! Human 
beings and their cultures have co-evolved as surely as ants 
and hives or dogs and packs” (Griffiths and Stotz 2000:44-
45). 
 
Similarly, the cognitive science of religion should seek 
explanations for religious behaviour at differing levels of organization. 
However, this includes recognising: a) cognitive flexibility in human 
development; and b) how artefacts extend religious reasoning and 
thought. In order to gain a more comprehensive view of religious 
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cognition we additionally have to take into account why it is that 
“many species-typical features of human psychology may depend 
critically on stably replicated features of human culture” (Griffiths and 
Gray 1994:302). Thus, a comprehensive picture requires a multi-level 
explanation for religious cognition.  
 
Harvey Whitehouse argues that in order to establish more robust 
explanations within the cognitive science of religion we must first be 
able to carve the “… subject matter at the joints” thus laying bare “the 
mechanisms that shape religious thinking” (Whitehouse 2004:15). 
However, the causal explanation offered by the Standard Model 
depends upon demarcating features that are more relevant than 
others. For instance, the Standard Model highlights brains over socio-
ecological factors. However Whitehouse proposes that there is still 
room for a more “rounded” picture within the cognitive sciences 
incorporating a variety of characteristics – both internal and external - 
which shape the religious mind.  
 
1.1.5. An Overview: 
 
In the next chapter I will review some of the more common 
approaches within the field of Evolutionary Psychology. It is within 
these theories and methods that the Standard Model has established 
itself within the cognitive sciences. The evolutionary and biological 
sciences once applied to the cognitive sciences has made a 
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significant impact on the study of religion within the Standard Model 
and set out a foundation for a research agenda underpinned by what 
is often dubbed ‘nativist’ thesis, sometimes also called the massive 
modularity hypothesis (MMH) (Samuels 1998; Sterelny 2003). 
Psychological nativism holds that certain behavioural traits or skills 
are inbuilt as biological endowments.  
 
The ‘modularity’ thesis holds that there are specialised cognitive 
and neurological resources devoted to dealing with certain tasks. For 
instance, cognitive psychologists have identified certain behavioural 
characteristics that develop in children almost independently of 
environmental influences such as an innate understanding of physical 
dynamics such as solidity (Spelke, 1990; 1998), gravitational 
dynamics such as weight (Schilling & Clifton 1998) and language-use 
(Chomsky 1988). Evolutionary Psychology (a particular branch of 
psychological nativism) has extrapolated this observation in support 
of a model highlighting evolved psychological traits. 
 
Following an outline of some of the conceptual approaches to an 
understanding of human cognition within Evolutionary Psychology, 
the third chapter will review the Standard Model. This will begin with 
an overview of the theories and methods offered by cognitive 
anthropologist Pascal Boyer who has been at the forefront within the 
field of religion and the cognitive sciences. Boyer is notable as the 
chief purveyor of what is now called the Standard Model. Though 
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Boyer recognises that religious behaviour is both a pan-human 
quality and naturally acquired by individuals, he’s convinced that 
religion is not in our genes per se. We are not biologically endowed 
with an identifiable religious trait, nor is religious cognition an evolved 
adaptation. Instead our brains are naturally predisposed – or 
susceptible – to religious ideas. Thus while being natural to us, 
religion is certainly not a natural feature of our biological make-up 
according to Boyer. In addition, I will review Robert McCauley’s 
definition of naturalness and the “naturalness of religion” hypothesis, 
which argues that religious beliefs and practices are an intuitive 
behavioural program only because our brains are well suited for 
accepting ‘religious’ explanations for worldly phenomena.  
 
The fourth chapter will outline some criticisms against the orthodox 
conception of Evolutionary Psychology. In particular, this chapter will 
focus on Merlin Donald’s argument against Evolutionary Psychology 
and its theoretical shortcomings. Here Donald argues that we 
shouldn’t view the neuro-cognitive equipment as a system comprised 
of specialised domains, instead our brains are far more integrated. 
Above all our cognitive system should be viewed as being constituted 
by neurological properties and external/cultural properties also. In 
addition, the fourth chapter will review some of the relatively new 
evidence for a wideware model of mind (Clark 2001). It is here that I 
will present four models which share some commonalities with one 
another: hybrid mind (Donald 1991; 2001); distributed cognition 
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(Hutchins 1995a; 1995b); extended mind (Clark 1997; Clark and 
Chalmers 1997); and cultural niche construction models (Laland and 
Odling-Smee 2000a, 2000b; Sterelny 2003). These models all share 
key conceptual similarities: they view the external environment as a 
causally relevant factor in the development of cognitive expertise. 
These models mutually support an understanding of cognition as 
being a product of internal (neurological) and external (cultural/socio-
ecological) resources. The common features of these models 
constitute what Andy Clark (2001) has classified as a wideware 
understanding of cognition.  
 
The fifth chapter introduces the concept of symbolic storage and 
the evolution for the capacity to extend into the environment symbolic 
representations in the form of material culture. It is here that Merlin 
Donald specifies within his hybrid mind model the triadic development 
of mimetic, mythic and technologically supported culture which has 
produced - within a co-evolutionary process – ‘modern’ human 
cognitive expertise. I will show that the cognitive niche is additionally 
constituted by symbolic properties which condition agents to their 
cultural context. Indeed if we view the symbolic world which agents 
inhabit as – what Chris Knight (1998) calls - a ‘collectively 
perpetuated fiction’, then we maybe able to conclude that cultural 
worldviews (particularly religious worldviews) are additionally shaped 
by learning development within this symbolic niche. The symbolic 
worlds in which individuals are embedded shape beliefs and 
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practices, but in turn these activities perpetuate a shared context. 
Development and context thus conditions individuals to function 
within the reality of these symbolic worldviews. 
 
The sixth chapter will concentrate primarily on Harvey 
Whitehouse’s views. Whitehouse critiques the standard model’s 
conception of the religious mind outside of the context into which 
agents are embedded. Whitehouse is also critical of the cognitive 
regularities that the standard model offers as being more significant 
to the production religious representations. He instead proposes that 
human religiosity is best explained as produced within a wider 
cognitive system: the socio-ecological milieu. While Whitehouse 
offers a cultural selectionist model within the transmission of religious 
representations, he nevertheless argues that human societies have 
created beliefs and practices that conform to either what Whitehouse 
calls imagistic or doctrinal modes of religiosity.  
 
I conclude this chapter by explore some archaeological theories 
relevant to the emergence of human religiosity. Archaeological data 
will be a crucial element in the presentation of the theoretical material 
discussed regarding the wideware approach. The culturally evolved 
features of human socio-ecologies should be indicative of both the 
beliefs and activities of cultures, but they should also reveal how the 
modified socio-ecology influenced the habits of those individuals 
occupying the niche itself. There are many problems in considering 
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this kind of evidence only because interpretations of the scarce data 
are disputed. But if both Whitehouse's model of human religiosity 
(and subsequently the wideware model) is to gain any foothold, then 
it is archaeology that is going to provide us with any clues as to why 
and how cultural practices and artefacts enable supernatural 
cognition.  
 
 After reviewing these alternatives to the Standard Model, I relate it 
to the theoretical models discussed in chapters four and five. An 
important task for my thesis will be identifying compatible features 
within these models in order to ensure their application. The 
theological worlds of religious agents are indeed comprised of 
symbolic properties, but these are by no means a consequence of 
religious beliefs and activities by the producer and product of a belief 
system. Religious beliefs and practices are an example of our 
cognitive capacity to construct complex, interwoven symbolic 
environments. The relationship between minds and symbolic 
properties - this cognitive interdependence - thus determines a 
religious context whereby a system of beliefs is transmitted. The 
religious niche is arranged in such a way as to pass on information 
that would not normally be available without the use of external 
cognitive devices such as material symbols. This understanding of 
the religious mind being extended into the environment and confluent 
with the cultural properties of the religious requires a novel approach 
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to the evolutionary study of religion – one that is lost on the Standard 
Model.  
 
 Following this I review Steven Mithen’s extended mind approach 
to archaeology (Mithen 1996a, 1996b; 2001). It is in this section of 
the final chapter that some of the approaches associated with co-
evolution and the wideware model are illustrated within the study of 
material culture and the development human cognitive expertise.  
Again archaeology remains important to the co-evolutionary 
dynamics that have led to modern human intelligence, because 
material culture has played a role in how humans think and behave. 
We not only depend upon the artefacts around us for survival, but 
artefacts also support our intellectual capabilities also. Mithen states 
that material culture has acted and currently acts as a cognitive 
“anchor” enabling a robust interface between a variety of domains, 
including internal cognitive processes and external cognitive 
properties. Religious material culture in particular, Mithen argues, has 
enabled the transmission of supernatural concepts. Supernatural 
ideas, he suggests, are far too cognitively demanding without the use 
of symbolic artefacts. 
 
The religious niche exists as an environment comprised of factors 
encompassing the socio-ecological (e.g. demographic, institutional), 
and the technological (e.g. symbolic artefacts). Though niche 
environments do have a profound affect upon the organisms that 
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inhabit them, humans are unique in that they modify their own niche 
environments to meet their purposes (Laland and Odling-Smee 
2000a, 2000b). In turn, these environments are inherited by current 
and future generations who are considerably shaped by their adapted 
milieu. A cultural (or cognitive) niche significantly influences the 
beliefs and actions of the agents who inhabit them. If it can be shown 
that supernatural representations require the use of cultural 
technologies, then it demonstrates that humans have sought to 
develop and create a cognitive niche comprised of properties to 
produce religious beliefs and activities - and consequently these 
beliefs and activities have shaped the religious niche. Indeed 
individuals and societies actively engage in the maintenance and 
construction of religious worldviews via the use of material culture.  
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Chapter 2:   Evolutionary Psychology: An Overview 
 
 
2.1.1. Introduction 
 
Supporters of the Standard Model view religion as a product of 
cultural transmission. Yet characteristics unique to our cognitive 
machinery serve a regulatory function, particularly with how these 
cultural representations are processed in the brain. Religious 
behaviour is seen as a perennial feature of human behaviour.  
According to the Standard Model, belief systems look similar cross-
culturally due to universal features within our cognitive architecture. 
The contents of religious representations are similar in their 
expression because we uniformly process information about the 
world via certain innately bound cognitive sub-systems. For example, 
the prevalence of ‘anthropomorphic beings,’ within religious belief 
systems, may be due to certain innate cognitive features of the 
human mind.  Subsequently, identifying the evolved neural correlates 
which determine the characteristics associated with religious 
behaviour remains important to this Standard Model. 
 
This chapter will describe a model of mind that has influenced the 
theories and methods employed by the Standard Model. 
Psychological nativism looms large in the literature associated with 
the Standard Model and it is Evolutionary Psychology (EP) which has 
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had the most profound influence. Cultural representations are 
transmitted between brains. Consequently brains regulate the 
processing of cultural representations in particular ways. EP argues 
that because our neuro-physiology is the result of evolutionary 
processes, then the cognitive constraints which regulate the 
processing of information are due to inferences surrounding natural 
selection. As a simple example, our general fear of spider’s maybe an 
adaptive trait inherited from our Pleistocene ancestors living in the 
wild. Further, behavioural trends such as xenophobia maybe due to 
innate brain function. Beginning with a general overview of cognitive 
anthropological approaches to cultural transmission, the following will 
outline what has now become the more orthodox model of EP.  
 
2.1.2. Cognitive Anthropology 
 
Dan Sperber (1985) notes that the division between anthropology 
and the cognitive sciences is commonly founded upon by a 
disagreement over the facts regarding explanations for and 
interpretations of cultural phenomenon. Within anthropology the 
causally relevant features of culture are defined by the collective 
distribution of external/symbolic properties. Whereas within 
psychology the causally relevant features for culture available for 
explanation remain as purely psychological facts. Within anthropology 
it is assumed that the content and organization of cultural 
representations should be viewed as an “autonomous level of reality” 
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existing as features outside the cognitive processes of the individual 
mind (Sperber 1985:76). Thus traditional anthropology views any 
attempt to develop an explanatory psychological model for the causal 
efficacy of cultural properties as mistaken. On the other hand, 
psychological explanations have typically argued that it is purely 
mental properties that make the expression of culture possible. Thus 
on this view psychological facts are more relevant to an 
understanding of human cognition than are cultural facts.  
 
However Sperber sees the distinction between the external and 
internal processes that constitute cultural representations as 
misguided. Both brains and environment cannot be assumed as 
ontologically distinct categories of study. For Sperber, anthropology 
fails to address minds - whereas psychology fails to address 
environments. Indeed on Sperber’s view: “Cultural phenomena are 
ecological patterns of psychological phenomena” (Sperber 1985:76). 
The question for researchers should then be: why is it that we see 
certain cultural representations as being widely distributed within a 
population more so than others? Sperber believes an explanation can 
be found by merging the two disciplines: psychology and 
anthropology.  
 
The spread of certain cultural representations can be explained on 
Sperber’s view as being caused by an interaction between minds and 
environment. Sperber argues then that our cognitive architecture is 
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likely to be vulnerable to the transmission of certain cultural properties 
over others. Because psychological facts will inevitably determine the 
frequency and spread of representations Sperber offers an 
‘epidemiological’ model of culture. Analogous to the spread of viruses, 
the successful spread representations will inevitably depend upon the 
mode of transmission i.e. an organism’s susceptibility to the contagion 
and its transmissive frequency within a population will inevitably 
determine its virulence.   
 
However, Sperber distinguishes between two forms of cognitive 
processing: mental representations that are intra-subjective and 
internal to the information processing device; and public 
representations – which are inter-subjective and external to the 
device. Private (mental) representations are hence dependent upon 
only thought and memory. Whereas public representations require 
individuals to actively modify their environment in order for them to 
become shared. Once representations are public they can be inferred 
by others and made available for abstraction.  
 
However there is no guarantee that the cognitive processes which 
enable the transmission of cultural representations from agent-to-
agent will ever be accurate. A mental representation of publicly 
represented data will more than likely be subject to the cognitive 
“filters” which normally regulate psychological inferences. Thus the 
successful spread of a public representation will depend upon the 
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capacity to induce a particular type of mental representation that is 
accurate enough in order for it to be transmittable. Indeed on 
Sperber’s view inferential processes inevitably shape the cultural 
topology of a collective. Consequently the transmissive frequency of a 
cultural representation remains dependent upon information being 
able to be processed successfully and passed on. This thesis 
supports the core (and mainly correct) features of this model, 
particularly the notion that minds do indeed regulate the processing of 
information.  
 
2.2. Evolutionary Psychology 
 
On Sperber’s view, the stability of culture and the universal features 
underlying cultural features can be explained primarily by an appeal to 
our cognitive architecture (Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004). As an 
anthropologist, Sperber is obliged to recognise the range and 
variation of cultural traditions as reflected in the ethnographic 
literature, while as a cognitive scientist Sperber pays adequate 
recognition to the nativist position, which holds that certain 
behavioural traits are inbuilt as biological endowments. Arguably 
though - on the surface -there appears to be a great deal of diversity 
within societies and cultures, yet the constraints that cognition 
provides ensures that a considerable number of cultural categories 
remain comparable in their expression. Thus Sperber acknowledges 
the importance that our evolved cognition plays in the transmission of 
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cultural traits. Indeed Sperber remains the first of many evolutionary 
psychologists whose examination of culture has been notably shaped 
by the Fodorian modularity thesis2 (Fodor 1983).  
 
Within Evolutionary Psychology [EP] however the brain is viewed as 
being comprised of domain-specific psychological mechanisms that 
have evolved to solve adaptive problems faced by ancestral lineage. 
Hence, cultural representations will inevitably be constrained to some 
degree by innate, adapted features of mind. This framework for EP 
however is founded upon the observation that a great deal of our 
“learning” is non–empirical (i.e. not learnt via first-hand exposure to 
the appropriate developmental resources). This is mainly an 
explanatory problem, as EP has observed that a significant number of 
our behavioural traits are underdetermined by social and cultural 
learning. Hence there is a ‘poverty of the stimulus’ in learning 
development which explains the existence of dedicated learning 
systems – dedicated learning systems which have genetically 
inherited.  
 
 The argument for the poverty of the stimulus emerged most 
prominently by way of Noam Chomsky’s (1955 / 1975; 1988) models 
on linguistic nativism. Chomsky proposed that localized language 
abilities are functionally independent, comprised of what Chomsky 
                                                 
2
 Though it must be recognized first-and-foremost that the Fodorian thesis on Modularity has been quite 
influential to Evolutionary Psychology it is still quite different in its approach. EP’s emphasize 1) the 
importance that evolution has on selecting for certain traits (psychological mechanisms), whereas 
Fodor has examined theoretical framework only sparsely. And 2) EP endorses domain specific 
psychological mechanisms that are modular, whereas Fodor argues for a central processor that 
integrates these epistemically bound perceptual systems which are much more encapsulated.  
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calls a language-specific “mental organ”. His argument rests on the 
notion that a child’s cognitive development in regards to language-
learning is supported by an innate universal grammar (or the product 
of a generative grammar). In regards to language, children command 
an infinite generative faculty that emerges from informationally 
impoverished environments incapable of bestowing its rich and subtle 
intricacy.  
 
Subsequently, researchers within EP suggest that this cognitive 
“division of labour” should apply on par to all other information 
processing systems in our cognitive architecture. Consequently, 
generative grammar which supports the notion of a dedicated faculty 
for language-learning has influenced a view of the mind as being 
comprised of other specialised systems which produce tacit 
behavioural traits.  For EP Chomsky’s picture of a language faculty 
should inform an explanatory framework for identifying further content-
rich systems in the brain also. Indeed the orthodox models within EP 
view the mind as being comprised of functionally independent 
modules.   
 
Committing to the view that natural selection has played a role in our 
evolved cognitive architecture supporters of EP are additionally 
committed to the position that these domain-specific processing 
systems or devices are innate and universal. Thus our brain like any 
organ in the body is viewed in Evolutionary Psychology as being 
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shaped evolutionary processes (See Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby 
1992; Pinker 1997 for overview). Domain-specific “modules” are 
viewed as innately specialized, content-rich psychological 
mechanisms that are adapted to process and manage specific 
classes of problem-solving. EP claims that this is why humans - 
especially during early development - display a rich intuitive level of 
competence in certain behavioural domains over others.  
 
Hence evolutionary psychologists’ John Tooby and Leda Cosmides 
(1992) have proposed that the mind should be seen as a kind of 
computational juke-box with numerous songs in its repertoire (Tooby 
and Cosmides 1992:116). Subsequently, any song played at any 
given time is determined by the location, time and stimuli the jukebox 
encounters a particular cue in its environment. Agent’s who are 
exposed to certain stimuli will respond in a certain way. This they 
propose illustrates that:  
 
“[The] generation of this distinctive, culture-like pattern 
involves no social learning or transmission whatsoever. 
This pattern is brought about because like humans, the 
juke boxes (1) share a universal, highly organized 
architecture that (2) is designed to respond to inputs from 
the location situation” (Tooby and Cosmides 1992:116). 
  
Hence Cosmides and Tooby argue that generation of “culture-like” 
patterns “involves no social learning or transmission whatsoever” 
(Tooby and Cosmides 1992:116). On this view then culture is evoked. 
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Further, the argument for domain-specific psychological mechanisms 
versus a “general purpose” problem-solving system is that human 
agents tend to be very adept at a restricted class of tasks. A brain 
with domain specific algorithms would have the luxury of their 
information processing systems being routinely activated when in 
range of a specific class of problem. Cosmides and Tooby (1987; 
1994) suggest that a domain general system would be too 
computationally sluggish in any given task domain. A domain-general 
system would be burdened with having to evaluate all alternatives 
potentially available to a problem solving class. Indeed a domain 
general lacks “content”, or the in-built knowledge (i.e. algorithms) 
required to guide an organism within a specific task-solving domain.  
 
2.2.1. Folk Cognitive Systems 
 
Thus EP suggests that the reliability and relevance of the 
information being available to an agent’s prediction-and-control 
system depends on the information-processing system’s level of 
specialization. According to EP the algorithmic processors 
underpinning certain cognitive traits are going to be more robust than 
others. For instance our naïve or folk understanding of natural world 
dynamics EP argues can be attributed to a content-rich system that 
intuitively registers the world and guides perception. Outlined below 
are some of the traits associated with this expertise:  
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Naïve/Folk Physics: Cognitive psychology has observed that 
even at a very young age, children understand intuitively the 
physical dynamics of continuity and solidity (Spelke, 1990; 
1998). They also require a minimal amount of learning to 
understand the physical relationship between gravity and 
weighted objects (Schilling & Clifton 1998) and infants can 
manipulate physical objects quite adeptly in goal oriented tasks 
(Povinelli 2000) [See above for discussion]. The ‘native’ 
algorithm for interpreting the physical world generated by our 
evolved cognitive architecture puts human agents at an 
advantage over other non-human primates whose ‘physical 
assumptions [about their world] are grounded in [their] 
perceptual generalizations’ (Boyer 2005:109). Daniel Povinelli 
(2000) and colleagues have demonstrated the clear advantage 
that human infants have over chimpanzees in solving tool-use 
problems. Their experiments show that human infants were not 
only capable of intuitively acting on their conception of the 
physical world successfully, but they were also much more 
flexible when the problems faced were modified.  
 
Naïve/Folk Biology: Children at an early age can recognize 
the ontological difference between biological and non-biological 
objects and can rationalize in distinctly different ways about 
them (Keil 1986).  Moreover, Scott Atran (1998) has suggested 
that we possess the capacity at an early age to distinguish 
various taxonomic categories: “Humans everywhere think about 
plants and animals in highly structured ways. People have 
similar folk biological taxonomies composed of essence-based, 
species-like groups and the ranking of species into lower- and 
higher-order groups. Such taxonomies are not as arbitrary in 
structure and content, nor as variable across cultures… These 
structures are routine products of our ‘habits of mind,’ which 
may in part be naturally selected to grasp relevant and 
recurrent ‘habits of the world’” (Atran 1998:547). Thus there is a 
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folk sense attribute to living and non-living things. Our intuitive 
understanding of biological categories is “essence” driven to 
the extent that humans can intuitively distinguish between 
natural categories – an intuitive taxonomic categorization 
system. Humans by default organize living things into 
identifiable order and ranking groups i.e. plants and animals are 
living things, but they are naturally categorized as different 
groups of living things.  
 
Naïve/Folk Psychology: False-belief tests have 
demonstrated that children after the age of four reliably 
understand others as possessing belief and desires (Leslie 
1987; Leslie and Frith 1987). False belief tests usually assess 
the ability of children to distinguish the epistemic differences 
between their own beliefs and the beliefs of others’3. Children 
natural attribute immaterial substances, beliefs and desires, to 
the minds of those around them.  They understand that others 
may be mistaken about the world, and develop a robust 
distinction between private and public knowledge. For example, 
as false-belief tasks have illustrated seemingly universal 
constraints in the development of our interpretive capacities 
(Scholl and Leslie 1999; Baron-Cohen, et al 2000; Perner, 
Leekam, & Wimmer 1987).  Moreover Deborah Keleman has 
shown that young children understand the world in a 
teleological mode constituted by intentionality (Keleman 2004). 
Indeed the developmental data points clearly in the direction of 
rich innately structured knowledge of other minds. (Baron-
Cohen, et al 1997). Put simply, mature humans deploy tacit 
assumptions about the inner- cognitive states of others in real-
                                                 
3
 Versions of false belief tests differ, but the most common one consists of a child observer watching 
someone (let’s call her Mary), putting a doll inside of a box. When Mary leaves the room, however, 
someone enters and moves the doll from the box to the cupboard. When Mary re-enters the room the 
child observer is asked where they think Mary thinks the doll is. Children under the age of 4 usually 
answer that Mary thinks the doll is where it was moved to last – the cupboard. More mature children 
between the ages of 4-5 recognise that Mary thinks the doll is still in the box. They know that Mary 
has a ‘false-belief’ regarding the whereabouts of the doll.  
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time and accurately because we possess the information 
processors necessary to do so (Pinker 1997: 329-333).  
 
2.3 The Disembodied Computer 
 
The EP paradigm has significantly shaped the cognitive science of 
religion. Religiosity is currently studied via the evolutionary sciences 
as a uniquely human cognitive trait, especially since it appears to be 
ubiquitous to all cultures. Yet before providing a broad overview of the 
cognitive science of religion it would be prudent to sum-up some of 
the principles associated with EP: Firstly, EP sets out to identify the 
unique selection pressures which have caused the unique cognitive 
traits that Homo Sapiens possess. EP highlights those particular 
cognitive traits that supported the inclusive fitness of the hominine 
ancestral lineage, thus evolutionary processes should be viewed as 
fundamental to our understanding of human nature and culture.  
 
Secondly, thought processes and culture is evoked. In other words, 
cultural representations are a product of the information processor 
that has evolved to respond to a variety of environmental cues. For 
instance, according the Standard Model cultural artefacts don’t extend 
the capacity for religious thought. Instead they are used to trigger 
certain innate mental inferences: “More generally, religious concepts 
too constitute salient cognitive artefacts, whose successful cultural 
transmission depends on the way they activate our inference systems 
in particular ways” (Boyer 2002:153-154). Lastly, the cognitive 
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modules which have evolved to respond to these cues are adapted to 
specific task-solving domains. Consequently, certain behavioural 
traits are reducible and considered universal cross-culturally.  
 
It is important to recognise then that because EP views the brain 
as being suited to a particular environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness [the EEA] that the information processor that has 
evolved remains preset to this statistically probable time and location. 
Thus, despite the human cognitive architecture’s operation in a 
variety of contexts, this ‘disembodied computer’ remains a priori to the 
agent’s current socio-ecology. This paradigm is sometimes view as a 
representationalist theory of mind, as it tries to explain “how 
disembodied ‘internal’ ideas can represent ‘external’ physical objects 
and events” (Johnson and Rohrer 2006:17). In other words, its 
explanatory target is driven by an understanding of how brains (the 
inner world) regulate representations of the external world.  
 
Though this is not necessarily a mistaken view of human cognition 
it does however tend to advocate a Cartesian understanding of brain 
and body. Indeed the brain-as-computer remains disembodied within 
its cultural setting. These dualist models often view the properties 
associated with cognition as ontologically distinct from the 
environment where the agent is situated (see Johnson and Rohrer 
2006 for overview of debate). Thus the brain-as-computer is viewed 
as operating within a set of “universal logical rules that govern the 
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manipulation of ‘internal’ mental symbols, symbols that are 
supposedly capable of representing states of affairs in the ‘external’ 
world” (Johnson and Rohrer 2007:19). As a result it is often assumed 
that the cognitive processes which govern “manipulation of internal 
symbols” can be regarded as detached from the environment/context 
where cognition emerges. 
 
The computational metaphor has underpinned EP models. It is 
proposed then by EP that the cognitive system that has been shaped 
by the EEA functions under a set of logical rules which are genetically 
embedded. Thus the behavioural output of agents is adapted to a 
specific time and place in our evolutionary history. The predetermined 
nature of our cognitive capabilities are seen by supporters of EP then 
as detached from the current set of circumstances that human beings 
find themselves in. This is only partly true and what follows will be an 
evaluation of this premise. I will argue in chapters 4 and 5 that the 
scope and nature of cognitive development is not only functionally 
plastic, but dependent on the recruitment of non-genetic resources 
(i.e. cultural artefacts) for mental reasoning and thought. Indeed 
culture is not just epiphenomena - nor is it evoked. Instead the 
neurological resources - that are genetically inherited - are 
additionally supported by culturally inherited resources.  
 
But before proceeding with this evaluation of EP (in Chapter 4), I 
will first introduce the reader (in Chapter 3) to what is regarded as the 
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Standard Model within the cognitive science of religion (see Boyer 
2005; see also Day 2005; Whitehouse 2005). So far I have focused 
on some of the key concepts upon which the Standard Model is 
founded. For instance, the theoretical concepts highlighted by the 
authors in the next chapter converge with Cognitive Anthropology and 
Evolutionary Psychology primarily in two ways: Firstly, cultural 
representations are transmitted between agents. Nevertheless these 
representations are subject to the regularities of our native cognitive 
processes. Hence, a causal explanation for the recognition of 
persistent cultural patterns will involve identifying features of our 
cognitive hardware that determines cultural selection.  
 
Secondly, humans are equipped with unique cognitive systems 
which allow us to track the world in a particular way. These 
specialised “folk” systems have evolved as adaptations and constitute 
our perception of the world, yet they also influence and determine the 
transmissive frequency of cultural representations. Standard Model 
supporters argue that while religions across the world may appear to 
be differentiated, they are nevertheless comprised of common, 
underlying features. These universal patterns of culture can be 
explained, it is argued, with an appeal to innate cognitive systems.  
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Chapter 3:   The Standard Model  
 
 
3.1. Implicit versus Explicit Religious Representations 
 
The Standard Model (SM) of religious cognition is partly motivated 
by an explanatory concern. The phenomenological facts that 
constitute religious representations cannot necessarily inform how 
those representations are processed in the minds of individuals. Thus 
explicit representations (i.e. the kind of “god” one believes in) are not 
so much the focus of explanation as the cognitive machinery that 
generates them. Though a religious agent maybe able to rationalize 
their belief or experiences in a certain way, it is assumed that this 
rationalization is the result of certain cognitive rules governing the 
expression of religious representations. Implicit or intuitive constraints 
regulate explicit forms of religious reasoning.  
 
For instance, in experiments conducted by Justin Barrett and 
Frank C. Keil (1996) participants were read a narrative whereby a 
deity responded to the prayers of a person in need. They were also 
asked if this particular deity was omniscient and omnipresent. Those 
who answered ‘yes’ to this question also recounted the story in a way 
that contradicted their conception of an omniscient being. An example 
of one of the narratives (in short form) went like this: God is playing 
scrabble with an angel. A woman in Brazil is in trouble and she prays 
to god for help. God stops playing scrabble with the angel and 
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answers the woman’s prayer, then returns to the game of scrabble. In 
explicit reports of god’s actions during the narrative it was made clear 
to Barrett and Keil that individuals – despite believing in god’s 
omniscience – tended to recall that god made two actions. He 
stopped playing scrabble then answered the woman’s prayers. 
Consequently Barrett and Keil found that religious representations 
are processed by employing the normal cognitive resources 
associated with everyday (or folk) inferences online. Though god 
maybe viewed as having supernatural qualities, the participants 
nevertheless processed the narrative version of god as having natural 
properties: the ‘god’ character conformed to a spatial and temporal 
location.  
 
Studies such as these have been used to illustrate that despite a 
believer’s conceptual understanding of a supernatural being (say their 
omniscience), there nevertheless exists an inferential constraint on 
how agents relate cognitively with their perceived belief in a god or 
gods. Hence agents still tend to conceive of omniscient gods with 
anthropomorphic properties for instance (i.e. as though they are 
human agents) (Barrett and Keil 1996). Barrett argues then that 
theological concepts - such as a god’s omniscience, or afterlife 
concepts - are often too computationally difficult to manage online, 
despite our capacity to communicate an explicit understanding of a 
god’s properties in a symbolic sense (see Barrett 1999).  
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This perspective suggests that religious reasoning operates at two 
different levels of cognitive processing: implicit and explicit. Though 
individuals express their beliefs and practices in a variety of ways, 
underlying this behaviour are specific psychological regularities. 
Explicit forms appear to be ruled by implicit constraints. The Barrett 
and Keil experiments show that religious reasoning is constrained by 
default inferences. Though a belief in an omniscient god may be due 
to the relevant exposure to during development, religious agents 
nevertheless intuitively recall the properties of their god or gods as 
conforming to natural rules. Essential to the SM view is that there 
exist innate cognitive systems which regulate religious 
representations. Subsequently, underlying religions cross-culturally 
are universal characteristics which are constant.  
 
The SM model not only agrees that there are recognisable 
consistencies within religions, but the SM has also set out to offer a 
causal explanation for these patterns. For instance, why are the 
majority of gods, deities, spirits, demons etc anthropomorphic in their 
appearance? Why do they often possess ‘super’-natural powers? 
Why do supernatural beliefs persist despite the secularization of 
modern societies? And fundamentally: are humans predisposed to 
engage in religious beliefs and practices? The SM is motivated 
particularly by the last question. Researchers within the cognitive 
science of religion have often defined the focus of their research by 
arguing that the reason why we see commonalities across religions is 
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because all humans share something in common: biologically 
endowed features of our cognitive architecture. 
 
3.2.1 Pascal Boyer: religion as a cognitive by-product 
 
 One of the leading figures within the SM is Pascal Boyer (1994, 
2001)4. Boyer takes seriously the claim made by EP that human 
cognitive architecture is comprised of functionally independent 
systems traditionally called “intuitive” or “folk” domain-specific 
processors (see above). The cognitively impoverished environment 
that infants are raised in suggests that the inference engines that 
guide behavioural output must be to varying degrees innately driven. 
Subsequently Boyer argues that the learning and absorption of 
information is regulated via inferential processes governed primarily 
by our cognitive machinery. In addition, Boyer notably suggests that a 
universal feature of religious belief systems is that they are comprised 
of representations that are salient and thus memorable to our native 
cognitive architecture.  
 
Similarly to his teacher Dan Sperber, Boyer argues that certain 
representations will be more prevalent than others due to inborn 
perceptual biases that are regulated by our evolved cognitive 
architecture. Hence on Boyer’s view: “to explain religion is to explain 
a particular type of epidemic” (Boyer 2001:53). Indeed Boyer asserts 
                                                 
4
 For a comprehensive yet straightforward introduction to Boyer’s theoretical approach see Religion 
Explained: The Human Instincts That Fashion Gods, Spirits and Ancestors [2001]) which establishes 
itself within a cognitive anthropological model and EP [see above]). 
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that human cognitive architecture is highly susceptible to religious 
ideas and beliefs and establishes his epidemiological model of 
religious cognition with an appeal to EP’s examination of our innate 
folk perceptual biases (i.e. folk psychology, folk biology, folk physics 
[see above]). Our cognitive architecture is comprised of domain 
specific algorithms that guide and direct our interpretations of the 
world.  
 
For Boyer, then, supernatural concepts appear relevant and 
exciting to our cognitive architecture precisely because religious 
ideas normally run “counter” to any real-world data that our folk 
systems have evolved to track. Indeed Boyer assumes that our 
natural inference engines constitute a robust foundation for the 
epidemiology of religious representations.  It is because religious 
ideas stimulate a number of innate ontological categories that they 
possess a selective advantage over other competing cultural 
representations. Accordingly, because religious representations are 
“counterintuitive” to our common-sense perception of the world their 
cross-cultural success is explained by our mind’s propensity to be 
aroused by these “exciting” concepts. 
 
3.2.2. Minimally Counterintuitive Concepts 
 
Importantly for Boyer and others who endorse the ‘Standard 
Model’ [SM] there is no natural place for religion in the brain, nor is 
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there any dedicated cognitive system for religious behaviour. Instead 
religious representations are normally viewed as a by-product of 
other evolved cognitive features (i.e. religion is a mental spandrel5). 
Put simply, because religiosity does not serve any adaptive function it 
is viewed as derivative of other evolved features. For example, my 
nose is not adapted to holding the glasses I wear upon my face, yet it 
serves this purpose anyway. For religion however, it is argued, that 
certain cultural representations are more exciting to our native 
cognition because they break with certain ontological conventions 
making them more appealing. Thus it is precisely the counterintuitive 
features that make religion salient and memorable to us. Indeed 
Boyer argues that supernatural representations are counterintuitive 
because they are comprised of conceptual properties that are: 
 
Counterintuitive to folk psychological inferences: The gods are 
normally interested in what we do and think, thus on Boyer’s 
view the gods are often represented as “Full Access Strategic 
Agents” (Boyer 2001). Indeed a supernatural entity’s “strategic 
access” runs counter to our understanding of mentality, as our 
normal intuition or understanding of minds is that they are 
private and inaccessible. 
 
Counterintuitive to folk biological inferences: Conceptually, 
supernatural representations run counter to our natural 
inferences regarding biological categories e.g. the gods are 
immortal, and can embody sacred animals or people.  
 
                                                 
5
 See S. J. Gould & R. Lewontin, "The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A 
Critique of the Adaptationist Programme," Proc. Roy. Soc. London B 205 (1979) pp. 581-598  
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Counterintuitive to folk physical inferences: Supernatural 
concepts run “counter” to our natural inferences regarding the 
physical dynamics of the world e.g. the gods inhabit the sky, or 
are omniscient. 
 
However, while Boyer recognizes that supernatural concepts are 
counterintuitive to our inferential machinery they are nevertheless 
only “minimally” counterintuitive.  They violate one or a few tacit 
assumptions, but not many.  This feature enables religious concepts 
to be cognitively tractable, salient, and memorable. Pile on the 
violations, and religious concepts will cause a mental gridlock. For 
Boyer supernatural representations conform to a minimally 
counterintuitive [MCI] basin of attraction in two ways: 
 
Firstly, explicit MCI concepts are comprised of minor breaches 
on intuitive knowledge. Thus ancestor spirits are both people as 
they possess intentionality (i.e. beliefs and desires) yet they do 
not conform physically to our intuitive expectation of what 
people do: the ancestors are invisible and can inhabit sacred 
places and objects. In addition, the ancestors are alive while 
being dead, thus violating our intuition regarding properties 
associated with our folk biological inferences.  
 
Secondly, MCI concepts are constituted by a transfer between 
folk domains. Ontologically, the gods can be both people and 
inanimate objects at once - both a psychological property and a 
physical property.  
 
In addition physical items (such as sacred alters or totems) can 
embody counterintuitive properties also. Yet religious artefacts 
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additionally conform to the physical constraints that an inanimate 
object is naturally subject to. However, a sacred object can appear 
intentional in respects to our folk psychological inferences as well. 
For example, healing rocks may appear to have an intentional quality 
to them - their purpose is to cure sickness. Indeed healing rocks may 
conform to an intuitive notion of agency, as they are often perceived 
as humanly significant to the lives religious actors6.  
 
For Boyer then the epidemiology (or dominant spread) of certain 
representations are contingent on two properties constituting an MCI 
concept. MCI concepts are a violation of expectations (i.e. the 
transgression of normal ontological categories), plus MCI concepts 
are also constituted by some non-violated assumptions that are tacitly 
activated (i.e. supernatural concepts remain grounded still in a 
relevant ontological category). In short, religion is the familiar made 
strange – but not too strange. 
 
Pascal Boyer and Charles Ramble (2001) have tested this 
hypothesis on subjects who were asked to read narratives containing 
                                                 
6
 This cross-networking of intuitive domains is currently being supported by research into the learning 
development of children. Deborah Kelemen (2004) for instance has pointed to evidence that 
suggests that children from a very early age have a tendency perceive non-biological objects as 
purposeful and endow them with intentionality. Keleman has demonstrated that children during early 
development have a “promiscuous teleological” tendency, in that they possess a preference for 
intentional explanations regarding natural phenomena over-and-above explanations that refer to a 
autonomous evolutionary process (i.e. natural selection). Keleman observed that children are more 
likely to define natural phenomena as having a purpose, such as pointy rocks are purposefully 
designed for animals to scratch there backs with (Kelemen, 1999c; but see Keil, 1992). Further, 
children possess a preference for explanations that entail a sort of “creationist” or designer bent. She 
cites studies performed by E. M. Evans on American children both religious and non-religious who 
mostly preferred creationist explanations for species over and above evolutionary stories (Evans 
2000). She suggests that these intuitive tendencies make it more likely that children will be more 
susceptible to religious concepts from their own culture and hence establish intentional inferences in 
relation to animate and inanimate properties.  
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counterintuitive at differing levels of complexity (i.e. extremely 
minimal in their content to maximally counterintuitive concepts). In the 
experiments conducted on the memorable features of certain 
narratives it was the MCI concepts that individuals could recollect 
better over the other counterintuitive concepts. Predominantly when 
readers were expected to recount the narrative of certain stories, the 
MCI concepts were better recalled by participants. From this both 
Boyer and Ramble (2001) have constructed a model that aims to 
predict the relative success of religious concepts.  Optimal concepts 
contain: 
 
[1] A pointer to a particular domain or concept 
[2] An explicit representation of a violation of intuitive expectations 
either: 
[2a] A breach of relevant expectations for the category, or 
[2b] A transfer of expectations associated with another category; 
[3] A link to (non-violated) default expectations for the category  
 
Hence: [1] can be a pointer category to an agent or artefact. For 
instance, agents such as ghosts typically run counter to our common-
sense assumptions regarding physical properties (they can walk 
through walls and solid objects). This constitutes a breach of relevant 
expectations [2a]. Whereas an artefact may exploit our intuitive 
expectations of embodiment: hence a statue of the Virgin Mary who 
can hear others’ prayers constitutes a transfer of psychological 
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agency mapped onto a physical property (i.e. the cross-networking of 
two distinct ontological categories). Hence artefacts that conform to 
this mould would typically match [2b].  
 
 While there is a counterintuitive element to both these examples, 
there are properties that still remain grounded within an ontological 
category. Hence [3]: a ghost conforms, or is grounded in, our folk 
psychological understanding of other people. However, while an 
artefact conforms to our understanding of both: a) ordinary physical 
properties and b) psychological properties, its counterintuitive status 
is defined by the cross-transference of ontological categories. Thus 
the “gods” for Boyer appear to conform to an intuitive concept of 
some ontological category (providing a conceptual comprehension) 
while transgressing common-sense inferences of the world in other 
domains (providing it with a mnemonic advantage).  
 
3.3. The Naturalness of Religious Cognition 
 
Because our cognitive architecture is seemingly more susceptible 
to MCI concepts it is assumed within the SM that religious cognition is 
consequently a rather natural cognitive bias. Those within the 
cognitive science of religion who endorse this position tend to reduce 
this “naturalness thesis” down to a learnability factor (See Barrett 
2000; McCauley 2000). Similar to the nativist conception of linguistic 
competence (or generative grammar), which argues that language 
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skills are an inbuilt competence, religiosity is seen as being a natural 
feature of human development and emerges somewhat 
independently of learning. However the development of religious 
behaviour occurs despite the fact that – unlike language abilities – 
religiousness is not viewed by supporters of the SM as being the 
product of an inbuilt and specialised cognitive system, but as a by-
product of other evolved features in the brain.  
 
Boyer’s argues that we should expect counterintuitive concepts to 
conform to these rules cross-culturally. The basic properties that 
motivate our intuitive inferences and ensure the efficacy of a god in 
one cultural setting will in all likelihood make them interesting in 
another. Thus we should view the transmission religious 
representations within the SM as being necessitated by a ‘cognitive 
optimum’. On this view, religious representations should have a 
selective advantage due to their counterintuitive qualities. However 
supernatural concepts that gain a greater transmissive frequency will 
also be less computationally intensive. Thus the supernatural 
concepts prevalent in religions are both “interesting” while being 
cognitively easy:  
 
“In this framework, a religious idea would be described 
as cognitive & optimal if (i) it contains an explicit violation of 
commonsense thinking and (ii) it makes implicit use of the 
intuitive principles of commonsense knowledge” (Boyer 
1992:45).  
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In short, our evolved brain constrains the appearance of cultural 
traits. Religious belief systems are subject to the cognitive processes 
that regulate their expression. Again, religions are cross-culturally 
similar according to this view because our minds remain preset and 
attracted to certain concepts over others. So despite the required 
cultural inputs, religious representations are governed by innate 
cognitive rules that determine their expression. Hence supporters of 
the SM suggest that religious belief systems - despite their variability 
- can be reduced to a certain number of properties (see Boyer 
above). Yet the “naturalness-of-religion” hypothesis proposes that the 
basic profile of human cognition makes “religion” rather intuitive and 
easy (Barrett 2000). Like language then human cognitive hardware 
seems well suited to generating religious ideas. As Justin Barrett 
(2000) has pointed out:    
 
“Much as language is naturally acquired as a result of 
cognitive preparedness plus exposure to a typical 
sociolinguistic environment, ordinary cognition plus 
exposure to an ordinary environment goes a long way 
towards explaining religion” (Barrett 2000:29 [emphasis 
added]). 
 
One may come to the conclusion then that religion is constituted by 
a ‘natural’ disposition to view the world religiously (in some respects). 
Religious information is not only easier to process and comprehend - 
our perceptual bias for religion indicates that it would be difficult for 
individuals to anything but religious according to this naturalness 
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thesis. Thus we are not only predisposed to religious “ideas”, the very 
classification of religion is defined by our innate predispositions and 
the manner in which it tracks the world.  
 
3.3.1. McCauley’s Comparison 
 
Similarly, Robert McCauley (2000) makes a comparison between 
both “natural” and “unnatural” properties of culture by illustrating the 
differing ontological and epistemic qualities of religion and science. 
He suggests that we are far better suited for processing religious 
information than scientific information.  Science is difficult to process, 
requires substantial training and discipline, and contrasts in many 
ways to our intuitive picture of the world.  On the other side, religion is 
virtually inevitable – a kind of mental plaque.  In light of this 
comparison McCauley raises two methodological questions: Firstly, to 
what extent are cultural arrangements the cause of the behavioural 
patterns typical to a particular characteristic; and secondly to what 
extent we can explain cognitive traits via “normal” cognitive 
processes independent of cultural factors:  
 
“Some cognitive capacities seem to turn neither on any 
particular cultural input nor, as in the case of face 
recognition, on any peculiarly cultural input at all. Children's 
proclivity to acquire language and nearly all human beings’ 
appreciation of some of the basic physics of solid objects, 
their assumptions about the mutual exclusivity of 
taxonomic classes in biology, and their abilities to detect 
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and read agents' minds are just some of the proposed 
candidates for human cognitive capacities that arise 
independently of any particular cultural input” (McCauley 
2000:63). 
 
Whether religion is natural or unnatural for McCauley will depend 
upon its mode of expression - relative to certain cultural inputs. 
Indeed McCauley argues that since religion is a historically pervasive 
phenomenon, whereas as scientific institutions are not, then religion 
probably requires precious little social, cultural and technological 
support for its presence: 
 
“In calling religion "natural" and science "unnatural" in 
this second sense, I am suggesting two things. First, the 
elaborate cultural institutions surrounding each play a far 
more integral role in the generation and persistence of 
science than they do in the case of religion… Second, 
most of the cognitive activity underlying religion concerns 
cognitive processes that rely far less on particular cultural 
input, particular forms of cultural input, or even peculiarly 
cultural input than is the case with science” (McCauley 
2000:64).  
 
Elaborating this claim further, McCauley argues that the institution 
of science remains potentially fragile to our natural cognitive biases, 
which are normally inclined to view the world according to predefined 
frames. Thus, according to McCauley’s comparison, science requires 
a greater level of socio-cultural learning and support in order for it to 
be sustained. Within scientific enterprises the requirement is that: “(1) 
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scientists develop explanatory theories that challenge received views 
about empirical matters and, (2) their critical assessment of those 
theories highly values evidence born of empirical tests” (McCauley 
2000:69). Yet in order to develop explanatory models not 
underdetermined by the evidence, scientists must lean heavily on 
concepts that often run counter-to their normal perceptual biases.  
 
Non-intuitive concepts like scientific ones are always vulnerable to 
corruption from ideas that are easier to learn and comprehend such 
as religious explanations for natural phenomena. In order to override 
the competitive advantage that religious concepts have over scientific 
ones, McCauley suggests that a greater concentration of institutional 
presence is required. Hence scientific institutions are unique to a 
particular historical context precisely because of the selective 
advantage that religious representations have over scientific 
concepts. In contrast to science:  
 
“Religion dates from our prehistoric past. Both the 
archaeological record and the anthropological evidence 
shows that human religious activities do not depend on 
keeping chronicles or on inventing writing or even on 
establishing fixed settlements…Thus neither the birth nor 
persistence of religion critically depends on any special 
cultural conditions” (McCauley 2000:74).  
 
Beyond its difficulty, McCauley notes that science searches “for 
accounts of reality that are more comprehensive and discerning for 
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which the production of evidence requires progressively more rarefied 
circumstances” (McCauley 2000:71). Again, this claim is made in 
contrast to religion which is less theoretically demanding and less 
critical of its explanatory concepts: “Religious truths are primarily to 
be retained and transmitted rather than reflected on and challenged. 
The crucial point is that neither comprehension nor retention of 
religious materials requires development or possession of any sort of 
specialized intellectual skills on which both the acquisition and the 
progress of science depend” (McCauley 2000:76). Finally, McCauley 
urges that science is more intellectually demanding of its adherents 
than religion is:  
 
“The acquisition of scientific knowledge is a painstaking 
and laborious process… Not only is scientific knowledge 
not something that humans acquire naturally, its mastery 
does not guarantee that someone will know how to do 
science. After four centuries of astonishing 
accomplishment, science remains an overwhelmingly 
unfamiliar activity, even to most of the learned public and 
even in those cultures where its influence is substantial” 
(McCauley 2000:71).  
 
For McCauley religion is intellectually much easier in comparison 
to the intensive knowledge-base requirements for scientific enquiry: 
“Acquiring the knowledge necessary to participate in a religious 
system is much more like acquiring a natural language than it is like 
mastering the knowledge and skills necessary to do serious science. 
Acquiring religious knowledge requires little, if any, explicit 
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instruction” (McCauley 2000:80). Thus McCauley echoes Barrett’s 
earlier statement when he says:  
 
“Like natural language religion exploits cognitive 
dispositions, which seem to arise early in human 
development. Because so many pivotal religious 
conceptions have so little theoretical depth, possessing 
everyday concepts prepares people for the acquisition of 
religion in a way that does not prepare them for the 
acquisition of science” (McCauley 2000:80). 
 
On McCauley’s view religiosity as a behavioural domain consists of 
a structured system relative to individuals’ commitment towards 
culturally postulated superhuman (CPS) agents (similarly Boyer calls 
supernatural beings counterintuitive concepts of agency). 
Representing and acquiring CPS agents, is a relatively basic ability 
once one recognizes the innate cognitive mechanisms that produce 
supernatural concepts. Firstly, by the time we have reached a stage 
in early childhood we have become seasoned ‘anthropomorphizers’ 
(See Guthrie 1993). Even at an early age our default position is to 
perceive human agency in non-human and inanimate events and 
artefacts. This natural compulsion to project agency appears to 
influence our tendency to perceive the gods as person-like despite 
the theological position to the contrary.   
 
Secondly, our overactive capacity to “mind-read” within a social 
context (i.e. make inferences about the intentional states of other 
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agents) ensures that the attribution of psychology agency - where 
there is none - remains more likely. Subsequently, humans will tend 
to make inferences about our natural world as being humanly 
significant (e.g. a famine is god’s punishment for our sins). Thirdly, 
narratives relative to religious systems are usually imbued with the 
ontological status of their CPS agents, making them easier to 
remember and transmit. Narratives concerning the beliefs, desires, 
thoughts and actions of CPS agents have a “mnemonic advantage” 
because of their content and structure. But they also provide 
individuals with the chance to make the theological properties of a 
CPS agent more relatable to agents. Myths and narratives thus 
attribute a god or gods’ ontological status with a life history, 
substance and an explanation for their existence and purpose.  
 
Finally, on McCauley’s view, religion provides individuals cheaper 
information, or more particularly, explanations about the world which 
adhere to our cognitive biases. Religious systems render to 
individuals seemingly coherent information about the natural world 
that would normally be inaccessible without extensive cultural support 
(such as in the case of scientific explanations). It is easier to ascribe 
intentionality to, say, seasonal change (i.e. the god of winter) than it is 
to understand that the weather patterns exist independently of our 
tendency for teleological modes of thought (See Keleman 2004). 
Thus in contrast to science McCauley asserts that religious 
information doesn’t really challenge our natural intuitions about the 
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world. It maps very easily on to our natural perceptual systems and 
subsequently our default ontological understanding of our world.  
 
McCauley argues that religion is far more natural than other 
“unnatural” cultural knowledge domains like science. Science, 
McCauley argues, is more “counter-perceptive” than religion is due to 
the abstract nature of its concepts. However our competence with 
religious information requires precious little cultural knowledge, as we 
appear to be well suited to managing a ‘supernatural’ dialectic with 
the world. Yet McCauley’s premise adheres to the more pervasive 
assumption within the SM: that we do not necessarily possess a 
functionally independent system for processing religious information 
(i.e. a dedicated religion ‘module’ if you will).  
 
3.4 Summary and Conclusion 
 
I started off this chapter with an explanation for the difference 
between implicit and explicit religious representations - that there is a 
distinction between how religious concepts are explicitly represented 
and how they are represented in the minds of individuals. A lot of 
religious concepts, it is argued, are too computationally difficult to 
process (i.e. in the case of god’s omniscience). Barrett and Keil’s 
experiments show that the qualities of a particular god or gods, are 
not always represented in the mind as being supernatural (Barrett 
and Keil 1996; Barrett 1998). On the contrary, we often represent 
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gods as ordinary people within a fixed temporal and/or geographical 
location. The supernatural qualities of a god seem to be relatively 
easy to recall when individuals discuss them or rationalize their 
beliefs, but these supernatural are lost on the subjects they looked at 
when they were forced to recount them in a narrative.  
 
The SM approaches the psychological processes associated with 
religiosity by its examination of our evolved psychological 
architecture. Yet instead of viewing religion as a cognitive adaptation, 
supporters of the SM categorise religious behaviour as a by-product 
of other evolutionarily functional cognitive mechanisms. For the SM, 
religion is a pan-human trait precisely because we have evolved 
features in the brain which makes us more predisposed to certain 
cultural representations over others. Pascal Boyer argues that 
supernatural representations spread and are transmitted more 
prominently because they excite our native inferences regarding 
natural categories, because they are counterintuitive. We all come 
with the same cognitive hardware, it follows that we are all naturally 
susceptible to religious representations. For Boyer, religious ideas 
spread in an epidemiological sense because of the kinds of minds we 
possess. In Darwinian terms, religious representations have a 
selective advantage over other concepts, thus they are more likely to 
predominate within cultures due to this cognitive bias.  
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However, the SM argues that while religious concepts are in some 
respects ‘counterintuitive’, they are only such to the extent that 
religious concepts meet particular conditions. Supernatural 
representations cannot be too counterintuitive (i.e. maximally 
counterintuitive as in the case of Robert McCauley’s comparison with 
scientific concepts [McCauley 2000]), otherwise they would too 
cognitively difficult to process. Neither can they be under the 
threshold of what is deemed ‘unnatural’ otherwise they would not 
excite normal inferences. They must violate expectations, without 
causing a cognitive gridlock. A religious concept is constituted then 
by minimally counterintuitive properties. In other words, religious 
representations conform to a ‘cognitive optimum’. As a result, 
religious beliefs are viewed by the Standard Model as intuitive and 
easy.  
 
Robert McCauley holds a similar view: that religious information is 
cheap only because we appear to be well suited to providing 
explanations about our world in a ‘religious’ sense. In McCauley’s 
comparison between religious and scientific concepts he showed that 
- historically – religious ideas have persisted and been more 
prevalent than scientific ones because we have a cognitive bias for 
religious worldviews. McCauley puts this down to the fact that science 
requires a considerable level of enculturation and cultural knowledge 
in order to be established, whereas religion does not. Both Boyer and 
McCauley then subscribe to a ‘naturalness-of-religion’ hypothesis: the 
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view that the supernatural persists in cultures because our minds 
require little or no cultural learning to understand these ideas. Thus 
the epistemic load required to be religious is not all together 
burdensome. All that is required to be religious are the standard 
features of our cognitive hardware.  
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Chapter 4:   Co-Evolutionary Models  
 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction: Cognitive Scaffolding 
 
The broader focus for researchers within the SM has been 
identifying pan-human regularities which govern the expression of 
religious belief. From what we know about the functional properties of 
the human brain, plus what we know about ‘religion’, researchers can 
form an explanation for why religion seems to be a cultural habit. In 
order to establish how human behavioural habits arise and persist, 
many have focused on the intersection between psychology and 
evolutionary biology. Evolutionary Psychology (EP), for instance, has 
chosen to focus on a probable time and location in hominin history 
during which these evolved traits became genetically entrenched (i.e. 
the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness, or EEA). 
Consequently, the properties of human cognition can be explained, 
according to EP by looking at the selection pressures which it 
subsequently adapted to. According to this view we possess a suite 
of specialised systems which have evolved to solve specific adaptive 
problems efficiently and effectively.  
 
It will be argued that the domain-specific systems theory is 
overemphasized in EP. This chapter will present some alternative 
models of mind which challenge to the more orthodox perspectives 
within EP. Not only is the notion of genetically inherited psychological 
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mechanisms an over-represented concept in cognitive nativism, it 
also under-represents some of the relevant cognitive processes and 
properties that are culturally inherited. Though it may be the received 
view that speech-language faculties are a standard biological feature 
amongst humans, it doesn’t necessarily follow that the same is true 
for all of our cognitive and behavioural traits.  
 
The received view within the SM is that religious behaviour – while 
not an adaptation – is a ‘natural’ disposition nonetheless. This 
chapter looks at other possible explanations for these cognitive 
processes and properties. I argue that the cognitive sciences have, 
for the most part, ignored research which has sought to explain the 
efficacy of agent-environment interactions. Instead of viewing agents 
as engaging with external artefacts as cognitive resources, the 
cognitive science of religion has traditionally sought to focus on 
representationalist computation. I argue that cognition emerges out of 
a particular interaction between internal cognitive resources and a 
modified environment. These modifications, in which agents adapt 
their environment to suit their own ends is sometimes called cognitive 
‘scaffolding’ (Clark 1997; Sterelny 2003). The term scaffolding is 
employed within the cognitive sciences to describe the structured 
interaction between learning agents and the support for learning 
within their socio-cultural environment. We should view scaffolding as 
being a component in hybrid cognitive interactions.  
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In the same way that a ‘scaffold’ is considered a supportive 
mechanism for construction purposes, human cultural environments 
are structured in a way to support the transmission of information for 
learning purposes. Indeed on this view agents inhabit a cultural niche 
comprised of “complex social structures that scaffold the individual by 
means of artefactual, linguistic and institutional devices” (Griffiths and 
Stotz 2000:45). For instance, coordinated interaction between agents 
and an external environment is the salient characteristic in 
developmental learning. Parents employ language, attentional 
activities, repetition and other structured teaching methods while 
educating their children. The same is true for most - if not all – forms 
of informational transmission.   
 
Our learning environments are thus scaffolded in a sense that they 
are structured and include support mechanisms for development. For 
example, reading and arithmetic is a recent cultural invention in 
human history and is only available under certain environmental 
conditions. Reading and arithmetic occurs only when a learning 
environment enables the interaction between the naked brain and 
cultural practices. Humans are producers, reproducers and are 
subsequently produced by a scaffolded learning environment, in 
which the presence of external cognitive tools enables our day-today 
cognitive processes. The authors discussed below will contest 
cognitive nativism and endorse a cognitive ‘constructivist’ paradigm of 
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sorts. It is argued that human cognition has co-evolved alongside the 
properties of culture which support hominine intelligence.  
 
We do not depend upon internal cognitive resources alone. Instead 
our cognitive functions are enmeshed in a scaffolded learning 
environment whereby learning is facilitated by the artefacts of culture. 
We are indeed, as Andy Clark (2003) has stated, cyborg creatures 
that utilize the tools and devices of culture in order to support 
cognitive development. Part biological organism, part technology, the 
capacity to create tools that functionally support and augment our 
cognitive abilities is apparent in daily routines. My capacity to input 
encoded symbols into this document is not a genetically inherited 
trait, but a culturally inherited one. Typing is dependent upon me 
having the appropriate technological - and developmental learning - 
resources are available. 
 
4.1.1. Dumb Brains, Smart Environments: Wideware cognition  
 
Andy Clark (1998; 2001a) has made a considerable impact within 
philosophy and the cognitive sciences with a representational theory 
of mind which he calls the 'extended mind' hypothesis. Clark 
recognises the vital role that external cognitive devices have had in 
the cumulative cultural evolution of human intelligence. Hence 
material culture is assumed as having as much parity to minds, as 
nervous systems have to brains. For Clark, the cognitive processor is 
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not locked into the space between our ears, but actively external in 
the world beyond the cranium. Thus cognition within the extended 
mind model is seen to be a “continuous with processes in the 
environment” (Clark and Chalmers 1998:10). Material culture though 
deemed separate and measurable, is nevertheless actively 
incorporated with our cognitive expertise. Yet it is not our external 
world that is “smart” necessarily, but it is our tendency to lean on 
external media or external tools in order to get by. Thus Clark notes 
that while it is possible to numerically formulate simple mathematical 
problems, such as “1 + 1 = 2”, most of us when faced with long 
multiplication problems such as “8675 x 7694” revert to cognitive 
devices such as pen and paper, or a calculator. 
 
Thus the extended mind hypothesis holds that the organism 
functions within a modified environment that is constantly being 
innovated to suit the requirements of problem solving. On this view, 
extended cognition is an emergent property, whereby there are “no 
ontological gaps between the different levels of an organism’s 
functioning” (Johnson and Rohrer 2006:24). Thus a critical 
observation made by researchers who adopt this model is that the 
adaptive responses that are employed by organisms emerge from the 
interactive coordination between features of the environment and an 
organism’s patterns of behaviour. Hence an extended mind 
hypothesis assumes no separation of brain, mind and environment 
necessarily “for it is always a series of bodily activities immersed in 
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the ongoing flow of organism-environment interactions that 
constitutes experience” (Johnson Rohrer 2006:22).  Put simply the 
mind is embedded within the context of its external knowledge-world 
whereby culturally transmitted information is an interactive property.  
 
The qualities that emerge from this interaction between the 
properties of what Clark often calls the 'naked brain', bodily 
movements and external cultural media. Cognition is not in the 
cranium but a combination of various biological, ecological, cultural 
and technological features which he considers to be a 'wideware' 
cognitive system (Clark 1998; 2001a). The best way to think of it is to 
imagine a computer with its peripherals. The various additions which 
we attach to our machine enhance its functionality. It has a 'wider' 
breadth of capabilities as a result: 
 
“Let us coin a term, ‘wideware’, to refer to states, 
structures or processes that satisfy two conditions. First, 
the item in question must be in some intuitive sense 
environmental: it must not, at any rate, be realized within 
the biological brain or the central nervous system. Bodily 
aspects and motions, as well as truly external items such 
as notebooks and calculators, thus fit the bill. Second, the 
item (state, structure, process) must play a functional role 
as part of an extended cognitive process: a process 
geared to the promotion of adaptation success via the 
gathering and use of knowledge and information, and one 
that loops out in some non-trivial way, so as to include and 
exploit aspects of the local bodily and environmental 
setting (Clark 1998:273) 
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Merlin Donald (1991) anticipated similar views and has offered a 
unique perspective on the evolution of hominine cognition that 
reflects Clark’s extended mind model. Crucially, human intelligence 
according to Donald is only partly attributed to ‘brain’ evolution. 
Donald argues that hominines have overcome the cognitive 
limitations beset by their biological constraints, not by content-rich 
modules, but by the use of external cultural tools such as symbol-use. 
Donald recognizes the considerable impact that co-evolutionary 
processes have had in the cognitive development in hominines (i.e. 
the co-evolving dynamic between cultural environments and 
biological properties).  Thus he disputes the claim that the evolution 
of human cultural traits remains the result of the biological 
preconditions endorsed by EP (whereby the evolution of content-rich 
cognitive architecture preceded hominine cultural intelligence). 
Instead cultural properties and hominine cognition have had evolved 
together in an interdependent, or hybrid process.  
 
Donald argues that hominine representational ability, such as the 
use of symbols, is in all probability the result of a large-scale 
“integration within the nervous system, and the integration with the 
cultural environment” (Donald 1995:1093). He suggests that human 
intelligence then has the capacity to integrate a wider variety of 
cognitive domains both internally and externally. Donald argues then 
that Homo Sapiens appears to possess what he calls a ‘hybrid mind’. 
Much like the notion of scaffolded intelligence, and Clark's extended 
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mind approach, the hybrid mind hypothesis rests upon the premise 
that cultural inventions make us smarter. Both Clark and Donald 
recognise two additional premises to their models: a) the voluntary 
control of bodily movement has led to greater breadth of learning and 
development; and b) our learning environments are constructed in 
order to support cognitive expertise (Donald 1991, 1995; Clark 1998). 
 
Avital Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb (2005) have also shown that 
we not only pass on language systems that allow for the 
communication of representations and referents, but we also inherit a 
comprehensive symbolic system whereby these discrete 
representations are “self-referential” within a larger whole (Jablonka 
and Lamb 2005:199). For instance the “religious” worlds that people 
inhabit are comprised of context-dependent signs and symbols that 
are situated within a comprehensive structure of meaningful 
representations. The imagery associated with the Christian Eucharist 
with its concept of “flesh” and “blood” as being representative of 
“spiritual” fulfilment is recognizable as such within larger integrated 
context. Hence Christians normally interpret these rituals within “a 
shared framework of religious or artistic practices in which they have 
a role or function” (Jablonka and Lamb 2005). So for Jablonka and 
Lamb (2005) symbols aren’t just token signifiers, mapped on to a 
referent. Symbols are context-dependent, or self-referential within a 
larger system of meanings and signs. Yet they are also actively 
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engaged with by agents, whose interaction shape and reproduce 
these representations. As Jablonka and Lamb point out: 
 
“We can say that signs… become symbols by virtue of 
being a part of a system in which their meaning is 
dependent upon both the relations they have to the way 
objects and actions in the world are experienced by 
humans, and the relations they have to other signs in the 
cultural system” (Jablonka and Lamb 2005:200). 
 
Thus the meanings of a symbol can be interpreted in a variety of 
ways, yet the symbol itself has a place in a broader system of 
knowledge and culture. A picture of the Crucifix may warrant a 
different interpretation for a Hindu, yet it is still part of a larger 
integrated system constituted by other symbols and meanings for 
Christians. Thus we must careful when making the assumption that 
there exists fixed a nature both materially and symbolically. Symbols 
are information certainly, however: “…the process of acquiring 
information is an active one that involves the reconstruction and 
transformation of the information” (Jablonka and Lamb 2005:205). On 
this view, Jablonka and Lamb see symbols as mutable structures. 
Conceptual reasoning is borne out of engaging with ever-changing 
external symbolic artefacts. But discrete symbolic representations are 
dependent the symbolic context which supports the meaning-making 
process. This symbolic environment is, on their view, inherited from 
one generation to the next.  
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4.1.2. The Cognitive Niche  
 
Individuals and societies inherit cultural environments that have 
been built by previous generations. These environments are 
subsequently improved upon and then passed down (Tomasello 
1999; Sterelny 2003).  For instance, technologies from previous 
generations have benefited from innovative improvements, which are 
then handed on to the next generation (and so forth). This dynamic, 
within cultural evolution, as been dubbed by Michael Tomasello as a 
“ratchet effect” which Tomasello offers as an explanation for the 
process of cumulative cultural evolution (Tomasello 1999). Cultural 
invention, on his view, is ‘racheted up’ with each innovation providing 
a platform for further innovation and transmission (no matter how 
small), resulting in the accumulation of information and technology 
over time. Cultural technologies improve our cognitive abilities – take 
writing and literacy for instance – and subsequently lead to a greater 
breadth of skill and expertise. Like Clark's notion of wideware, the 
niches that humans inhabit seem to be cognitive system as well as an 
ecological one.  
 
Thus such models seem to support a cognitive niche construction 
hypotheses (Laland and Odling-Smee 2000a; Sterelny 2003). 
Traditionally within the biological sciences niche construction has 
been viewed as a form of “ecological engineering” whereby 
organisms actively modify their environments for fitness advantages. 
 77 
While these changes have noticeable effects on the environment and 
other species (beaver dams, termite mounds and spiders webs are 
common examples of this), they also have a fitness advantage if 
organisms can modify the environment to suit their own needs. Kevin 
Laland and John Odling-Smee (2000a) have described this process 
more simply as organisms making a living via a symbiotic relationship 
with their environments. Thus organisms often: “...choose their own 
habitats, mates and resources, construct important components of 
their local environments, such as nests, holes, burrows, paths, webs, 
dams and chemical environments, and choose, protect and provision 
"nursery" environments for their offspring” (Laland 2004:316). During 
these processes the environment is altered, further altering the 
behavioural patterns of the organisms inhabiting these engineered 
ecologies.  
 
In addition, subsequent generations are able to take advantage of 
the ecologically engineered environment built by previous 
generations. For instance, earthworms despite having anatomy and 
physiology designed for freshwater environments: “are able to survive 
in soil by physiology, through activities such as choosing the optimal 
soil horizon, tunnelling, exuding mucus, eliminating calcite, and 
dragging leaf litter below ground” (Laland 2004:321; Turner 2000). 
Earthworms inevitably alter their environment making it habitable for 
themselves in virtue of their behavioural patterns, while creating a 
heritable living environment for future generations. Thus niche 
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construction processes allow for the non-biological (non-genetic) 
inheritance of ecologically engineered habitats.  
 
But these niches - particularly in the case of humans – are 
epistemically engineered environments also (i.e. information-rich, or 
knowledge environments). Thus while material properties are passed 
on from generation-to-generation, these material properties often 
embody valuable informational resources. As Daniel Dennett (2000) 
has observed, a tool has a two-way function: it is both purposeful in 
its instrumental value and a blueprint for the manufacture of future 
tools. Hence a tool acts additionally acts as memory device (Dennett 
2000), while language and imitation allows for valuable information to 
be pass on to downstream generations, such as the case in learning 
skills.  
 
Indeed, the cognitive niche is an important area of focus in the 
evolution of hominines. A discernible feature of Homo is their 
exploitation and use of material culture. The success of early Homo 
was not necessarily dependent upon fitter genetic traits, but 
additionally dependent upon our capacity to construct and reconstruct 
fitter environments. Yet Donald and others (Clark 1997; Donald 1991; 
Mithen 1996a; Sterelny 2003; Tomasello 1999) infer a connection 
between external and internal cognitive worlds. Again, a hybrid mind 
facilitates the cross-networking of cognitive domains (both internal 
and external). Yet these domains can mutually reinforce the 
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development of more sophisticated cognitive traits such as social 
intelligence (see Sterelny 2003), symbolic abilities (Deacon 1997; 
Donald 1991), moral decision-making (Clark 1996), or even religious 
cognition (Day 2004; Mithen 1996a, 1996b).  
 
Learning and development is greatly enhanced by the cognitive 
properties of our cultural niche. Kim Sterelny (2003) posits that Homo 
Sapiens do indeed inherit more basic perceptual modules as standard 
features of our cognitive architecture. However, these modules 
(previously linked to stereotyped action typical to our primate ancestry 
[see Cheney and Seyfarth 1992]) operate within a developmental 
learning environment coactively. And so sensitive is this 
developmental plasticity to environmental learning that our 
computationally limited “basic brain” can be enhanced “and ratcheted 
up to greater precision” (Sterelny 2003:223; See Tomasello 1999). 
Indeed within the wideware model of cognition human intelligence is 
not solely composed of genetically entrenched informational 
resources. On the contrary – hominine intelligence has evolved to a 
degree whereby our cognitive expertise is supported within a 
“cognitive niche” comprised of non-genetic informational resources. 
Thus, the repertoire of skills available to an agent often depends upon 
a dialectical relationship between brains and environment7. Humans 
                                                 
7
 By ‘dialectical’ it is assumed that agents are informed by their social-cultural environments, and by 
interacting with that information agents thus transform or modify their circumstances - further 
modifying the epistemic environment of others. Richard Lewontin, et al (1984) describe the dialectical 
approach to behaviour: “Dialectical explanations… do not abstract properties of parts in isolation from 
their associations in wholes but see the properties of parts as arising out of their associations. That 
is, according to the dialectical view, the properties of parts and wholes codetermine each other… It 
follows, then, that dialectical explanation contrasts with cultural or dualistic modes of explanation that 
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are unique among primates because our dependence upon socio-
technological resources remains crucial to our survival.  
 
Researchers have inferred then that hominines have co-evolved 
with the niche-constructed environment they have created. Within co-
evolutionary models cultural processes and properties are viewed as 
having a significant selective pressure on the evolution of hominine 
intelligence.8 This alternative view To EP suggests then that culture 
has played a “co-active” role in the evolution and development of 
modern anatomical Homo. Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz (2000) 
describe a similar co-evolutionary scenario: 
 
“… Modern humans owe a good part of their capacity to 
develop cognitive powers to the successful replication of 
earlier developmental systems which included a range of 
social and cultural resources. Humans are born into 
intentional surrounding as part of a lineage which has co-
evolved with environments in which intentionality and 
representation exist in other subjects and in objects and the 
context-of-use of these objects” [Emphasis added] (Griffiths 
and Stotz 2000:45)  
 
                                                                                                                                             
separate the world into different types of phenomena – culture and biology, mind and body – which 
are to be explained in quite different and non-overlapping ways” (Lewontin et al 1984:11). 
 
8
 The Baldwin effect offers a theoretical approach to ontogenetic biological processes, whereby 
prolonged behaviour has a noticeable effect on the evolution of certain traits. Instead of genetically 
entrenched biological features, Baldwinian selection is enabled by more open learning and 
developmental flexibility whereby new skills are learnt which have a salient effect on the inclusive 
fitness of organisms. See also, material on Baldwinian evolutionary processes: M. J Baldwin, A New 
Factor in Evolution. The American Naturalist, Vol. 30, No. 354 (Jun., 1896), 441-451. And also for a 
good overview of the debate see: K. Sterelny (2004) The Baldwin Effect and Its Significance: A 
Review of Bruce Weber and David Depew (eds) Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect 
Reconsidered; MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass 2003, pp x, 341. To appear in: Evolution and 
Development. 
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Cognitive niche construction and co-evolutionary models challenge 
the view that hominines have been purely passive observers in their 
own evolution. The inferences surrounding the ancestral history of 
humans seem to suggest that we have been co-actively shaping the 
environment to suit our own ends. However, this inherited 
environment has had noticeable effects upon downstream 
generations leading to dramatic neuro-physiological changes also.  
 
4.2. The Co-Evolution of Human Intelligence: Evidence from neuro-
psychology 
 
As I mentioned Merlin Donald (1991; 1995) offers an examination 
of human cognition within the scope of neuroanatomical research, 
focusing on the evolution and enlargement of the pre-frontal cortex in 
hominines. Importantly Donald suggests that EP is underdetermined 
by the neuropsychological data. Indeed neurophysiologists would 
expect to find the most recent developments in human cognition (i.e. 
those modules that made us more intelligent) to be canalized and 
content-rich. But Donald says this is notably untrue of the human 
brain:  
 
“The newest parts of the brain do not constitute a fixed 
instrument whose adult functional arrangement is static 
and largely innate, but rather a dynamic system in constant 
flux, with shifting boundaries and malleable internal 
linkages” (Donald 1995:1093).   
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Indeed the most recent neural developments in Homo Sapiens 
evolution are within the frontal region of the brain (particularly the 
tertiary cortex), which “by definition less fixed in the functional 
linkages of inputs and outputs than primary cortical regions” (Donald 
1995:1093). Having no immediate functional linkages to these areas, 
the most recent neo-cortical regions (particularly the tertiary regions) 
remain functionally plastic. Hence while there may be modular 
cognitive properties, these modules are hierarchically organized and 
highly dynamic in their connectivity.  According to Donald then this 
capacity to representational such a way is more than likely due to 
increased neural plasticity in hominin evolution, not specialised 
cognitive systems. Instead, our capacity to learn skills through the 
voluntary coordination of our actions ensures a greater breadth of 
responses to a variety of cues (Sterelny 2003). 
 
Similarly others such as Kim Sterelny (2003), Clark (1997), Terrence 
Deacon (1997) and Steven Mithen (1996a; 2001) have endorsed a 
comparable approach to Donald’s. For instance, Sterelny (2003) says 
that what makes Homo Sapiens an exceptional species is our capacity 
for “higher-order” thinking - such as the ability to think outside of the 
immediate context (Sterelny 2003)9. Sterelny observes that humans 
                                                 
9
 Through the co-regulated repetition of tasks between teacher and learner, infants begin to adopt the 
self-regulatory movements required for autonomous, decoupled action (Clark and Grush 1995). 
Thus, eventually, instead of imitating directly the movements of others, infants become more adept at 
watching (visual stimuli) and subordinating that visual cue into other motor productions. Thus a child 
might watch how to kick a ball (input), and then attempt to do the same task by controlling and 
regulating the bodily movements necessary to achieve this. But the child while learning is constantly 
monitoring and regulating the output necessary to achieve this imitative task. Once this skill is 
learned, however, a child can then apply the same movements to other contexts or situations 
(kicking leaves or sand for instance). Thus the cortical control of movement allows for the higher-
order of associative relationships of learning whereby one learned task can be subordinated to 
 83 
possess the ability to “decouple” cues from stereotyped actions (i.e. 
actions that aren’t typical to single-cue, single responses). For instance, 
humans are highly flexible when it comes to learning and voluntary 
movement. The complex processing associated with planning, preparing, 
and subsequently acting autonomously requires a certain class of 
information processing effectively disengaged from any immediate cues 
in the environment. Sterelny calls this capacity to think ahead and act - 
based upon the information provided - “decoupled representations” 
[Sterelny 2003:95-96]). Our representational ability is thus not cued to 
any single connection in the world. Instead humans function with a 
remarkable level of self-control over the motor nervous system.  
 
Stereotyped action within the biological sciences is usually seen as 
being cued to a particular type of detection system in the animal, thus 
actions in response to contingencies often remain limited to single-cue / 
single-response actions (Sterelny 2003). Most herbivores such as sheep 
or cows are predisposed to evade certain proximate cues such as an 
approaching movement. Humans, however, make decisions and act 
upon them based upon the information provided. Subsequently if agents 
manage to track their world accurately (i.e. generate adaptive decisions) 
then decoupled representations become, what Sterelny and Peter 
Godfrey-Smith, call “fuels for success” (Sterelny 2003; Godfrey-Smith 
1996). In light of this examination, it is often criticized that the ‘fast and 
automatic’ system implied by EP (see ‘juke-box’ analogy above in 
                                                                                                                                             
another context or task (Deacon 1997). Thus humans will inevitably have a better capacity to learn 
and adopt divergent strategies in a variety of contexts.  
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Chapter 2) is perhaps an insufficient explanation in light of this capacity10. 
Indeed Sterelny proposes that cognitive constraints would be impractical 
for enabling such cognitive flexibility. Information, plus cognitive flexibility 
allows for a greater breadth of action. Consequently our cognitive 
expertise remains dependent upon our learning development.  
 
Donald (1997), Clark (1997) and Deacon (1997) have observed 
that a significant level of human cognitive development is “activity-
dependent”. That is, learning development is not solely derived from 
normal/biological maturation processes alone, but by an active 
engagement with the cognitive world of ‘externalised’ culture. As a 
result the modular view of the brain as being comprised of content-
rich “mental organs” has been called into question. The cognitive 
development of human beings is seen now as being shaped by 
environmental influences, which subsequently affects the structure of 
our neural-circuitry. Put simply, there is a great deal of 
interdependence between our functionally ‘plastic’ neurological 
resources and the cognitive resources of our cultural environment.  
 
Neuroscientist Steven Quartz (Quartz 1999; Quartz and Sejnowski 
1997) has presented similar research (mainly as an alternative view 
to the EP model of domain-specific intelligence). Instead of the brain 
as being as massively modular - with sophisticated genetically 
                                                 
10
 Although for an update on EP’s approach to open developmental programs see: L. Cosmides & J. 
Tooby. (2000). Consider the source: The evolution of adaptations for decoupling and 
metarepresentation. In D. Sperber (ed). Metarepresentations: A multidisciplinary perspective. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
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entrenched traits - Quartz endorses “hierarchical” model of human 
neural and cognitive development. Quartz argues that despite their 
being primary sensory and motor cortical areas which mature earlier 
and are more activity-independent, a large number of neural networks 
additionally participate in “the postnatal construction of neural circuits” 
(Quartz 1999:51). Quartz’s “constructivist” view of neuropsychological 
development posits that the brain interacts with the learning 
environment thus structuring the actual neural circuitry required for 
learning. This includes the growth and number of synaptic 
connections, axonal processes and dendritic arbors which become 
progressively denser as learning development increases. Yet this 
does not indicate a greater capacity to process informational inputs. 
What it indicates - according to Quartz - is a kind of 
developmental/canalization process that embeds neural devices 
required for learning.  
 
This research agenda is not new. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) has 
previously endorsed a similar approach to Quartz in which she 
elaborates on the processes of automated cognitive routines, with 
modularization being considerably determined by learning 
development. Karmiloff-Smith suggests that during learning 
development knowledge becomes applicable for non-specialized 
purposes across different motor routines. She calls this process 
‘representational rediscription’ whereby cognitive traits while 
becoming automated and more entrenched overtime, subsequently 
 86 
are made available to other task-solving cognitive regions. Indeed 
learning becomes decoupled from context-dependent situations. For 
human primate cognition, learning how to carve bone into a spear for 
instance means that such a skill can potentially be subordinated to 
other contexts also (e.g. a symbolic context - by applying the same 
technical skill to carving symbolic representations or stylised motifs).  
 
This suggests to Karmiloff-Smith that we can employ stably learnt 
skills and establish “perceptual links” to other behavioural outputs. 
Thus while earlier more primary cortical areas - such as basic 
sensory and motor areas such as bodily coordination and attention - 
appear to be mature at birth, the protracted length of cortical 
development, coupled with an extended juvenile dependency, 
suggests that these areas of the brain develop via epigenetic 
processes, of which these cortical structures appear to be the most 
evolutionarily recent addition to the human brain. In addition, the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC) in particular is the most malleable. The PFC 
lacks any direct peripheral connections to other cortical regions 
facilitating the capacity for its integration with other areas of the 
brain11.  
 
Because the prefrontal areas develop later in maturity, the region’s 
dependence upon environmental stimuli suggests its inherent 
                                                 
11
 Earl Miller (2000) sums up the function of the prefrontal cortex well in his review of research into this 
debated region of the brain: “The prefrontal cortex is an interconnected set of neocortical areas that 
have a unique, but overlapping, pattern of connectivity with virtually all sensory neocortical and motor 
systems and a wide range of subcortical structures. This provides an ideal infrastructure for 
synthesizing the diverse range of information needed for complex behaviour” (Miller 2000:59) 
 87 
plasticity. Put simply, the prefrontal cortex is able to accommodate 
input pathways while being functionally integrative of other cortical 
areas. As Terrence Deacon (1997) has observed, the prefrontal 
cortex is potentially larger than the motor and pre-motor cortical areas 
relative to our body size, meaning that the prefrontal area is far less 
operationally uniform, and subsequently less determined by primary-
peripheral connections (See Quartz 1999:54). Thus humans have 
developed the capacity to employ a greater breadth of attentional 
control to areas associated with primary sensory and motor cortical 
areas.  
 
4.2.1. Primate Intelligence and the Cognitive Niche 
 
This process of learning for facilitating other, more complex 
cognitive skills has been illustrated in research on Bonobo 
chimpanzees’ symbolic associations using lexigram keyboards. In 
experiments by Savage-Rumbaugh and colleagues (1986; 1994), a 
chimp named Kanzi and two other chimpanzees were trained in the 
use of visual lexigrams comprised of visual pictures of objects 
associated with actual words. What they found was that not only 
could the chimps pick out symbols on the lexigram keyboard and 
communicate to the researchers (e.g. “I want food” by pointing to a 
picture of an apple), but Kanzi in particular was able to hear a spoken 
word and accurately choose the corresponding symbol on the 
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lexigram board. Kanzi’s success rate was 100% without any explicit 
prompting.  
 
Savage-Rumbaugh and colleagues reported that the cross-modal 
and sensory-modal integration of auditory cues to symbolic visual 
correspondences thus were not only limited to the human species, 
but to bonobo chimps also via cognitive devices. Yet this required a 
specific type of enculturation similar to the human cognitive niche. Yet 
the reason why Kanzi was a particularly unique case in comparison to 
the other chimps (Sherman and Austin) was that Kanzi appeared to 
have an implicit knowledge of symbol-use at a younger age. Savage-
Rumbaugh et al (1994) attributes this more advanced capacity to 
Kanzi’s implicit training via the mother’s lexigram training (who 
continued to struggle with learning the rules of communication 
through this tool). Kanzi instead, by just being exposed to his 
mother’s learning at an early age, had a superior facility with symbol-
use (See Deacon 1997:124-127).  
 
 Unusually Kanzi possessed the ability to voluntarily concentrate 
his attention within the context of communication with the lexigram 
board, while other chimps had to be told what to pay attention to 
(Deacon 1997:127). This illustrated Kanzi’s ability to cortically control 
his movements, his intentions and attention to symbolic 
representations. Thus Kanzi began to use the lexigram board to 
signal his intention to others, but also use his body as a 
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representational device for indicating his intentions (i.e. with gestures 
and pointing etc). What the Kanzi example shows, however, is that 
encultured chimps are more capable of imitation than mother-reared 
chimps (Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh and Kruger 1993). Put simply 
culture can release in Bonobos their “latent communicative potential” 
(Donald 1995:1097). 
 
4.2.2 Towards a Co-Evolutionary Model for Hominines 
  
Despite Kanzi’s ability, however, it is improbable that Kanzi would 
ever develop the capacity to use a complex system of language 
comparable to humans (Donald 1991:136). Though Kanzi could 
initiate novel combinations of representations including gesturing, he 
never went beyond two-word, sometimes three word combinations. 
Yet Deacon (1997) and Donald (1995) argue that Kanzi’s capacity for 
symbolic behaviour is an indication of proto-language skills, a 
capability that our Australopithecus ancestors may have possessed. 
According to Deacon this proto-language ability had almost certainly 
developed into a more sophisticated system of communication by the 
time Homo Erectus arrived on the scene (See Deacon 1997:340-
349).  
 
Thus the accumulative processes associated with cultural 
transmission fuelled physiological changes in the hominine lineage -
which inevitably fuelled further cultural development, which in turn 
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selected for further cognitive elaboration. Somewhere in our ancestry 
(Deacon cannot really infer when or how) the transition from 
Australopithecus to Homo Symbolicus was first initiated by 
externalized representations and artefacts enabling hominines to 
cross the threshold from a cultureless species to a cultured species.  
 
The socio-ecological pressures then that led to hominines adopting 
tools and symbolic representations further selected for 
neurophysiological changes. Thus as verbal language slowly became 
a more efficient means for communication selection acted on the 
cortical control of the mouth, jaw, lips and tongue for speaking 
including the unusually low descent of the larynx in Homo Sapiens. 
Deacon (See Deacon 1991:439-365) argues that this has resulted 
from a co-evolutionary process involving a hybrid progression from 
non-verbal symbolic behaviour i.e. gestures and bodily control of 
movements, to eventual vocalization.  
 
Deacon (1997) and Donald (1991) argue that the PFC is essential 
to symbolic learning and higher-order representations. Likewise both 
see symbolic behaviour and language as the “prime mover” in a co-
evolutionary process between the encephalization of the pre-frontal 
region and the external properties associated with symbolic 
representation (Deacon 1997:45). Deacon proposes a more 
Baldwinian process: as symbolic behaviour became more complex, 
selection acted on regions in the brain that were able to cope better 
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with this emerging complexity. Yet this model doesn’t view natural 
selection as acting on a specific region or module in the brain 
devoted to language acquisition. Instead selection was “cheaper” – 
“dirtier” and more efficient in its utilization of existing neural structures 
in the brain. Thus selection may not have selected for something as 
elegant as a language “mental organ” for instance. Instead selection 
opts for neural plasticity which is crucial in the interaction between 
agents and the external properties culture (Clark 2001).  
 
4.3. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented a measure of theoretical challenges to the 
concepts offered by EP in chapter 2. Merlin Donald suggested that 
EP needs to readdress some of the correlations between its concept 
of domain specific systems and the neurophysiological evidence. He 
stated clearly that the modularity thesis is undetermined by the data. 
Donald argued that there are strong connection properties which exist 
linking our internal cognitive machinery and external cognitive 
resources. And it appears as if our brain has evolved to rely on these 
resources. Cultural properties not only support or ‘scaffold’ the 
computational limitations of our biological brains, but Donald 
proposes that genes and culture have co-evolved in a mutual 
interdependence. EP Donald argues, undervalues this integrated 
dynamic. Further, neurological evidence suggests that the most 
recent development in hominine cognitive evolution has been in the 
prefrontal cortex – which is functionally plastic, not content-rich and 
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specialized. Thus it is this ‘hybrid’ integration, between brains and 
culture, which has determined the evolution of human intelligence.  
 
An examination of the cognitive niche that we inhabit can be 
considered a ‘wideware’ model. Cognition isn't limited to the ‘space 
between our ears’ (as offered by EP’s ‘hardware’ model). 
Subsequently cognitive capital shouldn't be viewed as just simply 
neurological resources alone. The cognitive niche is comprised of a 
variety of non-genetic resources which supports our intelligence. Our 
ecologically engineered environment sustains the coordinated and 
cooperative transmission of information to current and downstream 
generations for the purpose of learning and innovation. As in the 
Kanzi example, it is the presence of cognitive tools, coupled with 
enculturation that established its symbolic ability. Kanzi was raised in 
a cognitive niche where the transmission of cognitive skills were 
coordinated and supported by human agents and instituted learning 
tools and techniques.  
 
The same is true for religious learning. The concepts associated 
with theological information are difficult to transmit and learn without 
the use of symbolic-cognitive tools and social learning. Religion – far 
from being ‘natural’ – is a culturally transmitted complex. The 
religious cognitive niche consists of an interwoven complex structured 
for the transmission of theological knowledge. And as shall be shown 
in the following two chapters, the religious cognitive niche exploits 
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unique features of our cognitive architecture in order to support the 
transmissive frequency religious representations. Symbolic learning 
remains a crucial feature of human intelligence, but it is the storage 
and transmission of these symbols which is so fundamental to 
cultural inheritance. I will further show that without this form of cultural 
technology, humans would not be able to develop the complex bodies 
of theological knowledge and concepts which constitute religious 
beliefs and practices.  
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Chapter 5:   The Evolution of Symbolic Storage  
 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
 
A conspicuous feature of human cognition is our capacity to 
employ and manipulate symbols. Unlike chimpanzees humans are 
well-equipped to engage socially and communicate using gestures, 
speech and artefacts. Kanzi was able to respond to cues and employ 
basic symbolic signs, while humans have the capacity to not only use 
symbols to pass on information, but also to develop complex ‘higher 
order’ symbolic associations such as metaphors and analogy. We 
also have the capacity to construct densely interwoven symbolic 
worlds comprised of theological concepts which we feel meaningfully 
connected to. Symbols of prestige, for instance, differ from culture to 
culture. There may maybe asymmetrical relationships between 
religious adherents and the religious elite (e.g. priesthoods, or 
elders). Yet this status may hold little sway in Western secular 
societies where you find titles and prestige connected to commercial 
success. Hierarchy and symbols of prestige evolve out of a particular 
cultural context.  
 
Religious beliefs and practices are an example of the human 
capacity to organise and arrange a symbolic system whereby value is 
assigned to particular objects, places and individuals. But how and 
why did this come about? How did humans evolve the capacity to 
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inhabit this symbolic niche? This chapter will look at the wideware 
model discussed in the preceding chapter, but focus specifically on 
the relationship between the evolution of symbolic intelligence and 
the cognitive niche. Donald’s co-evolutionary model for hominine 
intelligence will be further expanded upon, which divides cognitive 
evolution into three major transitional periods in our ancestral lineage. 
On this view it is hominine activity that has determined the 
development of symbolic intelligence. It has been employment of 
symbolic communication within a socio-cultural context that has 
driven hominine cognitive evolution in its unique direction towards 
complex representational ability.  
 
However, human beings have the ability to manipulate and store 
symbolic representations in our external environment. While physical 
gesture and speech have been important steps in the development of 
Homo-Symbolicus, it is the creation and use of symbolic artefacts 
which have defined our cultural evolution and thought. Indeed 
symbolic artefacts, on this view, are seen as ‘thinking tools’ which 
support the processing of cognitively difficult concepts. Thus the 
‘symbolic storage’ of representations has supported what Donald 
calls a ‘theoretic culture,’ constituted by abstract forms of 
communication and worldviews.  As I will show further in this thesis, 
theological knowledge not only depends upon symbolic thinking tools 
for transmission, but the complexity of this knowledge has also 
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affected our capacity for thought. 
 
5.2. Merlin Donald’s Three Stages 
 
Merlin Donald (1991) endorses a triadic process within symbolic 
learning as a key component to the co-evolution of hominine 
cognition. Donald proposes that humans have evolved the capacity 
for learning symbolic associations by way of mimetic, mythic and 
technology supported culture. According to Donald the engine of 
human cognitive evolution has been fuelled by the emergence of a 
set of adaptations for representational ability, but more primarily by 
voluntary physical coordination, self-awareness within a social 
context and cognitive flexibility. Donald argues that this has occurred 
at these three transitional stages in hominine evolution. Donald 
argues that a co-evolutionary feedback loop between brains and 
culture has occurred in the development of human representational 
abilities.  
 
Donald argues that while the mimetic and mythic transitions were 
the result of major genetic changes in human cognitive evolution, a 
‘theoretic stage’ evolved later and was the result of humans 
employing non-biological resources (i.e. such as material symbols) in 
order to support higher representational abilities. For Donald the 
hominine ability for external symbolic storage enabled individuals to 
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modify their environment.12 Importantly human beings are not only 
the product of their environments but have also been a major force in 
creating the environment that has produced their own 
representational abilities. Symbolic communication, he argues, has 
been extended into the environment via the invention of symbolic 
storage and influenced by a radical shift in enculturation that led to a 
kind of cognitive-cultural engineering capacity amongst humans 
(1998:15). With the invention and use of external symbols, Donald 
argues, humans have been able to cultivate modes of thought that 
would not normally be possible without this technology. Theoretic 
skills such as complex mathematical thought or scientific reasoning 
would be impossible without external symbolic control. I argue later 
that this theoretic skill and complex conceptual reasoning (enabled by 
a technologically supported culture) remains crucial to our 
understanding of religious beliefs and activities.  
 
5.2.1. Mimetic Culture  
 
Mimetic skill Donald defines as an evolutionary benchmark in 
Hominine cognitive development. Once early Homo achieved the 
capacity for the cortical control of their bodily movement, Hominines 
adopted the capacity to utilize their bodies as representational 
devices in a public-social setting (see Donald 1991). What it required 
                                                 
12
 Donald never formally uses this term, nor does he make explicit reference to niche construction. 
However, Donald’s understanding of ‘symbolic storage’ has obvious correlations with a niche 
construction model. Similarly, the cognitive niche construction model holds that organisms actively 
modify their environments in order to enhance cognitive expertise. Donald’s model too proposes that 
the active manipulation of external media more-than-likely first supported the computational 
limitations of memory (see Donald 1991: Chapter 8). 
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however was the voluntary manipulation of their physical presence in 
the form of gesture and movement. Donald (1991, 1995) proposes 
that mimetic skill made it easier for hominines to manage complex 
social-coordination problems. By being able to voluntarily coordinate 
one’s action in accordance with the actions of others, groups could 
respond to a variety of socio-ecological problems that only a 
coordinated collective could overcome (think about a division of 
labour i.e. hunting and foraging and the kind of problems faced by 
organizing these social institutions).  
 
But mimetic skill also laid the foundation for verbal language 
acquisition and skill. Donald notes that despite the necessary 
physiological preconditions for language (e.g. the descent of the 
larynx etc) human language: “still emerges from a rich non-verbal 
communicative background that is held together by pointing, 
repetition, imitation, gesture, facial and vocal expression, mutual 
gaze, body language, mutually-directed attention, self-reminding, and 
coordinated group expressions” (Donald 1995:1098). Thus it is 
important to recognize still, despite the neural and physiological 
requirements for verbal speech, that language’s utility and learning 
emerges from a non-verbal context involving the voluntary and co-
regulatory structuring of physical/bodily associations. 
 
Yet the structuring of a mental representation, while being relatable 
via a linguistic interpretation of the experience, is nonetheless non-
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verbal in its retrieval. For Donald the self-triggering or auto-retrieval of 
memory, which allows for a voluntary access to certain images or 
representations, maybe derived from the mental rehearsal of a 
particular experience associated with motor activity, or what Donald 
calls “mimetic” skill. For example, when someone asks “Describe 
your bedroom”, there is the intuitive conception that a centralized 
“self” has the capacity to access a representation of the space that is 
your bedroom. Yet, Donald says this capacity is derived from our 
“kinematic imagination.” Thus: “to conjure up one’s bedroom, the best 
strategy is to imagine the motor activity of ‘getting up’ or ‘walking 
across the room’” (Donald 1995:1091). Put simply, the ‘mental 
rehearsal’ of a particular experience has physical and bodily 
correlates connected to the representation.  
 
The ‘mimetic’ recall of an explicit memory is essentially a 
procedure that is associated with the sensory-motor experience of the 
body. Prior to being able to express experiences linguistically, 
hominines first had to acquire the capacity for auto-cuing memory 
retrieval independently of environmental cues. Thus memory retrieval 
is autonomously self-organizational in the reconstruction of mental 
imagery, yet not dependent upon language. Hominines were first able 
to model their bodily activity both as a physical representation (i.e. 
imitation or gesturing) and as a mental representation (i.e. memory) 
before the evolution of complex verbal communication (and it is 
pertinent to note that mimetic skill facilitated the evolution of the 
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meme - or the imitative learning of cultural representations [Dawkins 
1976]).  
 
The recoding of knowledge is the human capacity to construct 
symbolic representations of experience. Thus symbolic 
representations can produce pathways for the retrieval of memory. 
So bodily-rehearsals in the form of ritualized-mimetic activity were 
probably the first forms of symbolic representation. The bodily-
rehearsal of a certain experience, for instance, is a purposive 
endeavour involving repetition and the self-modelling of a conscious 
representation (Donald 1991, 1993). The body became a source for 
symbolic representations.  
 
The mental rehearsal of certain activities is derived from the cross-
modal perception of the experience (i.e. visual cues say coupled to 
the cognitive organization of sensory-motor dynamics). Likewise, for 
Donald, the recalling of certain experiences involves the rehearsal of 
the sensory-motor activity via mimetic skill. Thus hominines are 
unique, he says, in their capacity to evoke certain sensory stimuli as 
representations; to recall and “symbolize” a past action or experience. 
Thus the neuro-physical composition of hominines is constituted by a 
highly integrated nervous system that can self-organize and cross-
network different modes of representations. In symbolic thinking we 
can self-organise and express a variety of novel representations 
because of this integration. Metaphorical associations such as: ‘It’s 
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raining cats and dogs’ can be employed to describe a particular 
weather condition.  
 
According to Donald then firstly we had to acquire the capacity for 
voluntary communication. Publicly represented bodily movement thus 
constituted the first complex social form of communicative abilities. 
By controlling the output of physical representations, we were able 
express meaning through voluntary action-patterns. This, for Donald, 
illustrates a “supramodal” adaptation for communicative purposes. By 
supramodal it is assumed that we were able to employ physical 
movement and action within the realm of higher order associations 
i.e. deliberate representations endowed with meaning. This mimetic 
skill capacity would have required the “conscious scrutiny and 
improvement” of actions (Donald 1995:1096) that only auto-voluntary 
action can provide. Through this capacity to mimic others’ behaviour 
agents can model actions and assume the intentionality of a 
representation within the social-public realm.  
 
Thus agents had to have an awareness of “self” as intentional 
actor yet this only arises out an awareness that the actor itself is a 
“public representational device” (Donald 1995:1094). Thus the 
consciously repeated act of a physical representation is “in effect 
representing itself, to both the actor and the audience” (Donald 
1995:1096). Out of this the actor begins to form a representation of 
self as intentional. Agents become aware via mimetic skill that they 
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are a meaning-making apparatus that is constantly being interpreted 
by others. Thus the cortical control of the physical-representational 
output becomes crucial to the actor as a result:  
 
“Representational invention on this level raises the 
question of large-scale integration within the nervous 
system, and its interaction with cultural environment; once 
public representations started to evolve, human cognition 
acquired a culturally driven dimension” (Donald 
1995:1093).  
 
Hominines began to inhabit a symbolic world that is transmitted 
and reinforced culturally. Further, this new dimension of collective 
communication and representations begin to “transcend” the 
hominine brain as representations become distributed within the 
social-cognitive niche. A collectively shared set of representations are 
thus extended and learned within a cultural milieu.  
 
On this view ritualized activity becomes important for establishing 
the coordinated activities of a collective (Teske 2001). Bodies can be 
used as representational devices for social communication while the 
social environment itself appears as an intentional structure 
comprised of these representational devices (Dautenhahn 1997). 
Thus ritual communication becomes an important feature driving the 
evolution of cooperative strategies. More importantly it also allows for 
the distribution of shared knowledge within a collective. Human 
agents have the capacity to “lean-on” the knowledge and skills of 
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others, while the transmission of information becomes easier once 
the voluntary control of bodily movement ensures that people can 
monitor the outputs of communication and learning. It is also the 
stage in which signalling behaviour became more complex and 
representational.  
 
According to Donald then mimetic skill would have enabled the 
formalization of collective ritual particularly since ritual coordination 
requires the copying of others’ with the intention of simulating a 
particular behavioural output – for religious purposes or otherwise. 
Arguably then Donald suggests that the ritualized communication 
associated with religious custom would have preceded lexical ability 
and spoken language. Next I will show that the second and third 
stages of hominine development (both mythic and theoretic) would 
have been crucial to evolution of the traits associated with religious 
cognition.  
 
5.2.2. Mythic Culture 
 
Donald (1991) suggests that the next step in the evolutionary 
development of symbolic behaviour came in the form of Mythic 
culture (see Donald 1991: Chapter 7). The foundation was laid by 
capacities for the acquisition of lexical skill and speech. Thus while 
mimetic skill served as a precondition for linguistic competence, 
hominine lexical ability enabled the capacity to communicate 
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representations that were outside the immediate context. With the 
advent of speech however, individuals could discuss things that 
weren’t in their immediate presence. Thus with the advent of speech 
we began to transcend our immediate environment by constructing 
early meaningful associations within a larger discourse.  
 
Donald proposes then that lexical skill and language evolved not 
only as a social device for communicative purposes, but as means to 
model reality. With the advent of a semiotic niche there arose a 
representational capacity used primarily as a means to construct 
“conceptual ‘models’ of the human universe” (Donald 1991:213). 
Thus underlying the structure of language itself, and embedded within 
a system of symbolic associations, there remains an implicit frame of 
reference more broadly defined with what Donald calls a mythic 
understanding of the world: 
 
“The primary objectives of language and speech are 
thematic; their most salient achievements are discourse 
and symbolic thought. Words and sentences, lexicons and 
grammars, would have become necessary evils, tools that 
had to be invented to achieve this higher representational 
goal. In this view, language would have represented not an 
end unto itself but an adaptation that met specific cognitive 
and cultural needs, that is, ultimately for the formalization 
of thought and knowledge” (Donald 1991:216). 
 
For Donald (as stated above) the engine in the evolution of 
language was not the need for social communication. Instead, 
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embedded within a system symbolic communication is a model of 
reality constituted by a semiotic oriented context. For Donald human 
language systems have a currency within a kind of discursive 
narrative. Hence it was a need to formulate and conceptually orient a 
shared frame-of-reference (i.e. a mythic world) that co-actively drove 
the evolution of symbolic behaviour and lexical invention. Language 
established a unified mode of thinking about the world within a 
collectively perpetuated mythic culture. This he suggests is the 
reason why language systems typically reveal a culturally encoded 
source of meaning for its users comprised of myths, narratives, 
beliefs and worldviews that are shared implicitly within the socio-
cultural context.  
 
This cognitive dialectic between minds and symbolic properties 
thus constitutes a collectively perpetuated system of beliefs. Yet 
accepting the structured network of meaning that comprises a social 
body of shared symbols and knowledge requires a capacity to commit 
to the reality of those representations. Thus critical to this view are 
the preconditions necessary for the evolution of a symbolic network; a 
symbolic network that structures minds and collectives. Chris Knight 
(1998) quotes archaeologist Philip Chase (1994) when he says:  
 
“Symbolic culture… requires the invention of a whole 
new kind of things, things that have no existence in the 
“real” world but exist entirely in the symbolic realm. 
Examples are concepts such as good and evil, mythical 
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inventions such as gods and underworlds, and social 
constructs such as promises and football games.” (See 
Knight 1998:69). 
 
Linguistic terms, he says, aren’t just functional devices that 
discretely map references to objects in the world. Instead linguistic 
terms are also set against the backdrop of a more pervasive 
structure: a communal construct of representations ‘established in the 
universe of discourse’ (Knight 1998:69). Hence linguistic terms do not 
function independently of the network of assumed social discourses 
constituted by rituals, norms, beliefs and other ‘symbolic 
experiences’.  
 
A symbolic culture is a collective deception according to Knight, as 
humans engage in ‘a world of patent fictions’ as a reliable context 
(Knight 1998:76). Symbols, and their arbitrary relationship to real-
world properties, provide us with a frame-of-reference in which to 
function. Myths and metaphors are appealing while being instructive. 
Knight argues then that, as symbolic creatures, we adhere to a 
‘collusion in deception’ and the ‘maintenance of fictions which have 
social support’ (Knight 1998:76). The human cognitive niche is 
constituted by a realm of ‘collective deceits’ (Knight 1995:77 [Sperber 
1975:93-5]). Religious beliefs and activities require the complicit 
support for intangible or ‘non-verifiable’ representations by all 
adherents. Thus in order to refer to the representation itself, all 
 107 
individuals must ‘inhabit the same imaginary world’ (Knight 1995:77). 
Religious systems provide worldviews as a reliable context.  
 
But for Donald and Knight a mythic culture constitutes a socially 
transparent environment only if individuals are able to communicate 
within the same fictional world. Interests certainly never converge 
uniformly. However, they rarely need to if all cultural agents are 
employing the same communicative resources for representational 
purposes. On Knight’s view, strong reciprocation is assumed as a 
precondition for communication enabled by the evolution of 
conspecific signalling. But uniquely, the evolution of hominine 
signalling is underpinned by an instinctual low-resistant trust of 
signals. At the outset of his model, Knight cites Krebs and Dawkins 
(1984), noting that signals in the animal world are frequently high-cost 
spectacles that are only reliable indicators of an organism’s fitness 
(See Zahavi 1987). They are merely informative in a narrower sense 
as animals invest a greater level of energy into more elaborate 
displays for the signal to be recognised.  
 
Subtle signals of communication do not develop especially since 
readers of signals will not be motivated to risk investing the energy 
required in interpreting quieter, less costly displays of communication. 
They avoid such a risk because subtler signals can be plausibly 
utilized in the deception of others for the signaller’s own self-interest 
(i.e. purposeful epistemic pollution). As a consequence of these 
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conflicting interests then animals develop a ‘sales-resistance’ to these 
signals, a default position which circumvents potentially coercive 
signals. Thus, according to Krebs and Dawkins, organisms produce 
louder displays because (a) they contravene the ‘sales resistance’ 
threshold, when they are more conspicuous to the observer, and (b) 
loud and costly displays are a clear measure of the animal’s capacity 
to meet the fitness costs required for the display.  
 
However Krebs and Dawkins (1984) observe that in cases: 
“[w]here interests converge… this dynamic is set into reverse” (Knight 
1998:71). In exchanges where mutual objectives are fostered 
amongst conspecifics, there is a greater level of trust and 
commitment to the signals being shared. Receivers are no-longer 
constrained by computationally intractable cue-based deductions. 
Calculating which signal is reliable against those that aren’t is a costly 
process - especially if guided responses generate a higher ratio of 
false-negatives. As a rule, agents should be predisposed to not 
cooperate with other agents if the calculative load is too high, relative 
to the potentially high-cost returns. But the calculative burden of 
interpretation is lowered if trust or cooperation is tacitly recognized or 
assumed. As a result signallers need only exert the level of energy 
required to communicate. Signals needn’t be so bold. Thus they 
become quieter and more concealable. But this also means that 
signallers can ensure that the energetic burdens generated by high-
cost displays can be unloaded onto receivers. As receivers are 
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motivated to invest more time in the interpretation of signs, due to the 
expected content of a sign (i.e. signs are assumed to convey valuable 
information in cooperative social exchanges), then signals become 
quieter and more nuanced. Krebs and Dawkins calls this 
communication dynamic ‘conspiratorial whispering’ (again see Knight 
for discussion 1998:71-72).   
 
Similarly to Donald, Knight suggests that colluded deceptions are 
not just the product language abilities, but a prerequisite for language 
abilities. More broadly however the emergence of a mythic culture in 
human societies would have enabled: “the production of collective, 
standardized narratives in mythology and religion, and a narrative 
frame of governance [for] pre-existing mimetic institutions” (Teske 
2001:101). By establishing coordinated activities comprised of 
customs and routines, cultures could further institute a communal 
system of knowledge providing meaning and purpose to these 
activities. Coordination is thus derived from beliefs and practices, 
much in the same way that Emile Durkheim proposed in his definition 
of religion, whereby social cohesion is formed through societies 
organising themselves around the sacred aspects of their culture 
(Durkheim 1963 / 1915) Mimetic skill allows for simple, episodic 
representations language and metaphor enables a connection 
between representations forming an overarching narrative inherent 
within the context of communication.   
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The capacity for myth, on Donald’s view, became a means for 
integrating representations into an easily manageable modelling of 
reality. Standardized mimetic gestures and rituals could now be 
merged within a collective network of interwoven symbols. This 
integration enabled the capacity for small-scale communities to 
develop a theological understanding of themselves and their world. 
While religious activities would have been associated previously with 
rituals that exploited episodic memory events, with the emergence of 
a mythic culture societies would have been able to embed rituals and 
customs associated within a communal context constituted by a 
larger collective of individuals. A society’s rituals and customs would 
thus be underpinned by a sense of relevance and purpose passed-on 
inter-generationally. And this capacity to endow social relations and 
activity with meaning would have exerted a greater pressure on 
memory for transmitting information. A mythic culture and the ability 
to store this collective information in narratives would have eventually 
required an easier and more memorable format for communicating a 
system of beliefs.  
 
5.2.3. External Storage and Theoretical Culture 
 
Within the third stage in Donald’s co-evolutionary model is the 
capacity for active-externalism culminating in the “external symbolic 
storage” of representations (see Donald 1991: Chapter 8). Donald 
views the external symbolic storage of representations as a crucial 
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development in the evolution of hominine cognition. Unlike mimetic 
and lexical skill which depended primarily upon the individual’s 
capacity for recall, external symbols enabled Homo Sapiens to 
offload some of the computational burden associated within the 
processing of cognitively difficult representations. Hence the 
utilization of external mind tools for Donald is an epistemic act. 
Artefacts have subsequently become cognitive features that expand 
the computational capacities of our naked brains. While the ability to 
model reality through lexical invention enabled mythic culture, the 
external symbolic storage of cultural models became necessary when 
representational networks of information became more complex.  
 
It is at this point that Donald suggests that cultures proceeded from 
mythic structures dependent upon just lexical communication, to a 
theoretic culture scaffolded by external memory devices. With the 
utilization of external media or exograms as Donald calls them, 
societies could engage in the storage of ideas with cognitive 
technologies further augmenting working memory. Through the 
capacity for symbolic storage communication became constituted by 
the offloading of information into the environment. More importantly 
however the active manipulation of external media enables 
individuals to direct and organize their thinking.  
 
For example an artist utilises a pen and paper to sketch ideas; to 
form representations that would not normally be available to the bare 
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brain. During the active manipulation of external media agents 
monitor their outputs and mediate their action in an intentional 
manner to shape novel representations that were previously 
unavailable to an individual’s brain. Hence language is certainly a 
prime mover in hominine representational abilities, but it is certainly 
not sufficient for a theoretic culture. With the active manipulation of 
external media agents could subsequently produce novel 
representations thus generating more complex theories and 
concepts.  
 
In addition, with the advent of external symbolic storage agents 
could widen, what Donald calls, the ‘external memory field’ available 
to them (Donald 1991: 354); further enhancing what may be 
described as the symbolic invention of cognitive capacities such as 
conceptual models of reality (i.e. calendars, time measuring devices 
and texts). Modifiable forms of external media facilitate complex 
problem-solving and aid in developing possible representational 
forms outside the limits of the basic brain. As stated, mathematical 
invention and the development of writing would have not only 
complemented memory, but widened the theoretical boundaries of 
what was normally intractable. It could be argued that religious 
systems depend heavily upon the cognitive technologies required to 
develop complex theologies and subsequently store knowledge within 
these symbolic artefacts.  
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The modelling of reality facilitated by lexical invention and a mythic 
culture was subsequently augmented by the capacity to store and 
modify information in the environment. Robust theological concepts 
represented in symbolic external media (e.g. alters, statues, paintings 
etc) can be stored in the environment and act as cognitive properties 
for religious belief systems directing action and organising modes of 
conscious experience. Religious adherents, once in the presence of 
external symbolic media, may utilise an artefact’s representational 
qualities for processing cognitively difficult theological concepts. A 
theoretic culture scaffolded by cultural technologies such as material 
symbols can relieve the epistemic burden of processing theological 
concepts. Indeed the symbolic storage of information may be viewed 
then as religious ‘mind tools’ ensuring that the theoretical frameworks 
represented in a symbolic structure is processed and communicated 
more effectively.  
 
Donald argues that a crucial feature of human cognition has been 
the evolved integration between mimetic, narrative and theoretic 
stages hominine evolution. Thus while these traits have merged 
successfully, the domains associated with each stage constitutes the 
cross-networking of information within our cognitive architecture. For 
instance, the capacity for ritualized communication - in the form of 
chanting and movement say - indicates a robust interface between 
mimetic and lexical skill within a mythic context. The body is both a 
pre-linguistic representational device, while being self-referential 
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within the larger cultural narrative associated with the society’s belief 
system.  
 
The network dynamics that support the transmission of religious 
representations additionally establish a context-dependent structure 
for individuals and society. Put simply, there is no semantic or 
somatic content intrinsic to the representation alone.  This presents a 
problem for SM. If all minimally counterintuitive concepts accumulate 
around innately driven cognitive regularities, then you would expect a 
greater motivational salience directed towards representations 
independent of context. What this demonstrates, according to 
cognitive anthropologist Harvey Whitehouse (see below), is that 
memory and commitment to certain representations are always 
“context bound” (Whitehouse 2004:23). Hence the constraints on 
memory that determines a context are just as significant to a more 
comprehensive examination of religious belief. However, memory is 
not bound to the cranium. Similarly to Donald’s examination of 
hominine co-evolution and symbolic storage the constraints on 
cognition operate in unison (or “dovetail” to use Andy Clark’s 
terminology [1998]) with the external properties of culture.  
 
5.3. Summary and Conclusion 
 
 We can surmise that the initial concern for the SM was that it 
didn’t really take seriously the properties of culture and their 
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influence. The problem for the EP paradigm is that the features of 
culture are determined by psychological processes first-and-foremost. 
Likewise, the SM assumes that religious behaviour can be attributed 
primarily to the preset nature of our cognitive inferences. However, as 
the above chapter showed, there is a great deal to learn from how 
environmental factors influence our behaviour. Human agents are not 
so much disembodied computers as they are ‘cybernetic’ organisms 
who depend upon a niche constructed environment rich with cognitive 
resources (see Clark 2003).  
 
In religious networks, symbolic structures play a crucial role in not 
only transmitting information (via rituals and myth for instance), but 
the external cognitive tools utilised in religious systems facilitate a 
conceptual understanding of a socio-ecology via the use of myths, 
sacred spaces and social norms. Anthropologists needn’t hesitate in 
assuming that symbols and their meaning constitute a semiotic 
environment (Geertz 1973), constituted by a “deep web of symbolic 
relationships” (Deacon 1997:128). Individuals not only inherit genes 
and learnt information they also inherit entire networks of symbolic 
information comprised of languages, belief systems, food 
preferences, writing skills, bad habits and prejudices (Jablonka and 
Lamb 2005). All these factors make-up a contextual environment that 
is both intelligible and coherent for agents embedded within these 
structures.  
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So a hybrid mind model may provide an explanation for the 
problem of theological complexity (re - last section Chapter 3). In 
other words, it may bring us closer to understanding the topological 
divergence in religious belief systems cross-culturally. We have seen 
that individuals are embedded in a cultural-symbolic system 
constituted by a collectively perpetuated frame-of-reference. This 
matters because: “All symbolic systems enable the construction of a 
shared imagined reality” (Jablonka and Lamb 2005:201). Yet the 
belief in accepting the structured network of meaning that comprises 
a social body of shared symbols requires a capacity to grasp to the 
particular context where these representations have meaning 
(Deacon 1991; Knight 1998).  
 
Humans are not only enduringly cooperative within the cognitive 
niche (See Sterelny 2003), but the cognitive niche itself is constituted 
by an engagement with a collectively perpetuated fiction. 
Subsequently, the human cognitive niche is constituted by a symbolic 
reality of collectively agreed upon representations. The reason why 
religions look the way they do isn’t exclusively due to brain function. 
Instead a causal explanation for theological complexity can be found 
by examining how a society has niche constructed their environment 
in relation to socio-ecological circumstances.  
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Chapter 6:   Whitehouse’s Modes Theory 
 
 
6.1. A Study of Religion in “The Round” 
 
Some researchers have criticized the SM and there has emerged 
some alternative research within the biological sciences endorsing 
functionalist approaches to human religiosity (Bulbulia 2004; Bering 
and Johnson 2005; Sosis 2000; Sosis and Alcorta 2003; Wilson 
2002). While authors like Harvey Whitehouse (2004) and Steven 
Mithen (1996a; 1996b; 2001), have slowly gathered support for (what 
I would consider to be) distributed cognition models. Whitehouse in 
particular appears dissatisfied with the SM’s research focus. 
Whitehouse (2004; 2005) concedes that the SM might be able to 
explain the basic cognitive biases for religion (underpinned by 
minimally counterintuitive concepts, for example) it remains unable to 
explain the extent to which religious belief systems exert an intense 
cognitive demand on believers to learn and adhere to rather complex 
theological systems of belief. Moreover religions are often comprised 
of highly complex socio-political structures constituted by hierarchical 
arrangements and social norms. Indeed, because religions are often 
highly complex there are subsequently many cognitive and physical 
costs involved with being “religious”. 
 
According to Whitehouse the cognitive optimality thesis, endorsed 
by the SM, “casts its net rather widely” (Whitehouse 2004:45). If 
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religious representations were indeed cognitively optimal then why is 
it that societies tend to perpetuate the demanding practices 
associated with their religious practices? Thus Whitehouse argues 
that the SM renders a rather rudimentary “folk” conception of religion 
– constituted primarily by “supernatural” representations - while 
further excluding the range of properties that inevitably determine the 
complexity and subsequently the costs of religious behaviour. For 
Whitehouse the complexity and costs problem reflects not just the 
limitations in the SM’s definition of religion, but also their 
understanding of the cognitive preconditions that necessitate the 
transmission of a culture’s belief system. Whitehouse argues that 
there has to be alternative model of mind proposed before we can 
offer a suitable explanation for religious cognition. The disembodied 
computer on this count cannot be enough. Indeed on Whitehouse’s 
view, culture is not evoked. Instead, cultural properties influence and 
support religious behaviour.  
 
However Whitehouse is an anthropologist, so perhaps he can be 
forgiven for his tentative criticisms of the SM and its rather “wide” 
methodological net. Most anthropologists adopt a comparative 
approach to ethnography. An ethnographer’s observation of a culture 
- and the effort that is required for interpretation - is seldom an easy 
process. Those who choose to participate in a society’s practices 
encounter difficulties in explaining those “webs of significance” 
inherent within any system of symbolic behaviour, such as the subtle 
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and meaningful interactions between agents and symbols (Geertz 
1973). The range of superficial variation that exists cannot be 
accounted for via explanatory models alone. Ethnography is 
inherently an interpretive process.  
 
Whitehouse however concedes that the cognitive sciences still has 
something valuable to contribute to the anthropological discipline. 
Like Dan Sperber (1985, 1996; see Chapter 2) Whitehouse 
recognizes that anthropologists often overlook the regularities that 
emerge within cultures due to constraints of cognition. Yet like any 
scientific method Whitehouse concedes that the cognitive science of 
religion should nevertheless attempt to “carve up” the subject matter 
at the joints, thus laying bare “the mechanisms that shape religious 
thinking” (Whitehouse 2004:15). Indeed one cannot establish an 
explanatory model without a system of measurable processes. 
Ethnographic research is a hermeneutic process, whereby signs and 
symbols should be interpreted from the standpoint of the cultural 
actor (or an understanding of culture as a semiotic environment) 
[Geertz 1973]). However, cognitive scientists recognize that the 
anthropological interpretation of “meaning” and symbols doesn’t offer 
an explanation for the causal mechanisms that produce cultural 
representations.  
 
Whereas Boyer would argue that the interpretation of meaning is a 
trivial problem. Ethnographic interpretations should be deemed a 
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separate division of labor from the cognitive sciences, thus it should 
employ different methodologies. On Boyer’s view the cognitive 
sciences ought to remain an explanatory enterprise. Yet Whitehouse 
believes that both ethnography and the cognitive sciences combined 
provide satisfactory explanations for human religiosity. By reconciling 
two methodologies - both interpretive and explanatory models - 
researchers may achieve what Whitehouse calls the study of “religion 
in the round”. Researchers are able to achieve a more 
comprehensive model for the study of religion within the cognitive 
sciences (Whitehouse 2004). Whitehouse believes that the cognitive 
science of religion can develop an explanatory model that is both 
widely applicable while being open to the diversity of cultural 
properties observed in the ethnographic literature. Whitehouse 
recognizes that while examining the “micro-dynamics” of religious 
cognition researchers should not by default discard the “macro-
dynamics” of religious cognition either (See Day 2005: 97 ). Put 
simply, researchers should not ignore the socio-ecological 
circumstances into which agents are embedded.  
 
 Similar to the wideware model of cognition, Whitehouse highlights 
the explanatory limits of studying the “isolated mind” disembodied 
from the non-genetic resources that constitute patterns of behaviour. 
For instance, Whitehouse suggests that religious cognitive properties 
can be widely distributed to varying degrees constituting a collective 
memory within a population. For example, a stratified theological 
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hierarchy comprised of the laity up to an elite body of individuals can 
act as a collective memory store whereby knowledge is secured at 
differing levels of organization. Access to theological resources may 
vary (e.g. between the laity and the elite), but those resources - 
including the cognitive system itself - are nevertheless transmittable 
within a population and across generations.  
 
6.1.1. Open versus Closed behavioural programs 
 
Whitehouse (2005) observes that there are currently two types of  
theoretical positions within the cognitive science of religion, of both 
open and closed behavioural programs (See Whitehouse 2005:207 
for discussion). Closed behavioural programs may be defined - by 
what nativists classify - as innately-driven cognitive traits intrinsic to 
human behaviour. Hence, the behavioural outputs of closed cognitive 
traits are usually viewed as universal and existing independent of 
context. Whitehouse identifies closed behavioural programs as 
involuntary responses to external stimuli (such as flinching, laughing 
and crying), which are uniformly evoked and comparable cross-
culturally (Whitehouse 2005: 207-208).  
 
Subsequently, it takes precious little ethnographic research to 
conclude that laughter and flinching “looks” the same from one 
society to the next. Contrastingly, Whitehouse (2005) views open 
behavioural programs as hybrid learning processes constituted by 
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brains and culture. Thus language, while appearing to have some 
remarkable similarities in structure and the manner in which it is 
learned, is nevertheless expressed in variety of different ways. For 
Whitehouse then, language exhibits not just “open” and “closed” 
behavioural programs, but “varying degrees of openness” required 
for its expression (Whitehouse 2005:207). While a flinch or laugh 
looks remarkably similar, it is the arbitrary relationship that symbols 
have to their referents that constitute their ‘varying degrees of 
openness’ cross-culturally (Whitehouse 2005).  
 
Whitehouse argues that the SM has been in the former camp of 
closed behavioural programs. Hence, while religious belief systems 
vary cross-culturally within the SM the primary concern is examining 
the cognitive regularities of religious representations within human 
culture. Thus there is no need to examine the differences between 
the symbolic structures of society - or why one society believes in a 
certain god over others. Indeed the SM has to varying degrees 
attempted to explain the uniformity of expression in religious belief. 
On this view there is subsequently a reducible catalogue of “gods” 
underlying religious belief systems. Thus if ethnographers only 
scratch the surface of religious and cultural complexity they will find 
that supernatural concepts are remarkably limited - or closed - in their 
expression. The SM suggests then that despite the apparent 
differences within religious beliefs and practices, external/cultural 
structures are only capable of doing just one job: evoking a limited 
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catalogue of representations.  
 
According to Whitehouse, however, the study of religion should be 
viewed as a distributed system of internal and external cognitive 
properties constituted by a complex range of variables which 
inevitably places mnemonic demands on its adherents13. On 
Whitehouse’s view the transmission of religious representations is 
often cognitively difficult - not cognitively optimal. As a result of this 
complexity, Whitehouse argues that religious belief systems often 
employ socio-technological resources in order to support 
transmission (i.e. external cultural properties such as rituals, texts, 
symbols, alters, hierarchies, and social norms etc).  
 
On Whitehouse’s view religious belief systems have been 
successfully transmitted inter and intra-generationally as humans 
have been able to modify their socio-ecological environments in order 
to facilitate the transmission of cognitively difficult theologies. Indeed 
religious agents have actively constructed a religious niche in order 
to exploit memory constraints. Whitehouse suggest then that the 
culturally transmitted tools utilized by religious belief systems (i.e. 
symbols, rituals, texts etc) can sufficiently support the cognitive 
limitations beset by memory. Consequently socio-technological 
                                                 
13
 Please note that the term ‘distributed’ cognitive system is never explicitly utilised by Whitehouse, yet 
Matthew Day interprets Whitehouse’s model as such in: Matthew Day “Rethinking Naturalness: The 
Modes of Religiosity and Religion in the Round,” In Harvey Whitehouse and Robert N. McCauley, 
eds., Mind and Religion: Psychological and Cognitive Foundations of Religion, 2002: 207-232.  
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resources can indeed support the transmission of cultural 
representations which do not conform to the cognitive optimum. 
 
According to Whitehouse then if the memorability of religious 
representations was dependent upon the cognitive optimum alone 
then the body of knowledge that constitutes the richness and 
complexity of religious systems would be too unstable due to the 
mnemonic frailty of individual minds. Individual minds contribute to a 
division of labor in the construction and reconstruction of a religious 
cognitive niche. Yet the stability of transmission according to 
Whitehouse crucially depends upon the socio-technological 
properties inherent in the cultural environment. Societies relieve the 
cognitive burden of memory and transmission by establishing 
networks and materials that scaffold this process (see discussion on 
the cognitive niche and scaffolding above). Cultures and belief 
systems look different precisely because societies are beset by a 
range variables and constraints, which inevitably determine the 
topological features of their religious niche.  
 
“The key cannot be found in the cognitive apparatus 
taken out of its context of operation, because variables 
cannot be explained in terms of contents. But a solution 
may emerge if we take into consideration variations in 
transmissive frequency” (Whitehouse 2004: 23-24).  
 
Whitehouse’s concerns echo the same concerns motivating the 
niche construction model, that: (a) the variability in religious belief 
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systems requires an explanation. Hence researchers must attempt to 
explain why theologically complex systems of knowledge - that 
normally depart from the cognitive optimum - are important to 
cultures; and (b) researchers must also account for why religions 
depend so much on socio-technological properties of culture for 
transmission. Similar to the researchers examined above within the 
niche construction model of human cognition, Whitehouse concedes 
that the religious mind is enabled not only by “varying degrees of 
openess” (see overview above), but also by socio-ecological 
engineering as well.  
 
Indeed for Whitehouse religion is a collective phenomenon. The 
properties associated with any particular belief system will depend 
upon collective practices for its successful transmission. Religious 
cognition for Whitehouse is a distributed system that functions and is 
facilitated by the external properties and processes of culture 
(Whitehouse 2005:16). And while Whitehouse doesn’t deny the 
cognitive optimum, he does however propose that religion is a 
‘hybrid’ learning process constituted by varying degrees of openness. 
Hence while the cognitive optimum exerts a rather powerful 
gravitational pull towards more intuitive concepts, societies 
nevertheless value and consequently employ more complex bodies 
of religious knowledge.  
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6.2. The Modes Theory: Memory and Costs 
 
Because these two dimensions of knowledge remain in 
competition the more complex bodies of knowledge require different 
modes of transmission in order to gain a selective advantage over 
the more ‘cognitively optimal’ representations. Hence a significant 
according to Whitehouse is that memory constrains the transmission 
of complex theologies. Indeed the constraints which define the 
cognitive optimum will inevitably limit the memorability of certain 
concepts being transmitted.  
 
Hence Whitehouse recognizes that societies utilize more 
distributed methods of transmission (comprised of rituals, hierarchies, 
political systems and material artefacts) in order to stabilize the 
transmissive frequency religious representations. Indeed memory 
and the transmission of religious representations can be made more 
manageable if social arrangements utilize cognitive technologies in 
order to preserve information to current and future generations. Thus 
a religious cultural environment could be viewed as a distributed 
cognitive system (Day 2005).  
 
Yet another problem that Whitehouse recognizes is that the SM 
often assumes that explicit religious representations are invariably 
the product of more implicit motivations (see Whitehouse 2004:24-
26). The SM argues that it is primarily the underlying cognitive 
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machinery which motivates individuals to adopt their belief in the 
concept. However Whitehouse argues that people are “highly 
mindful” of their professed attitudes within specific contexts. It seems 
then according to Whitehouse that “explicit beliefs can provide a 
highly reliable guide to motivation” (Whitehouse 2004:25). Further, he 
notes that religious belief systems are often comprised of rituals and 
beliefs that conflict with intuitive processes. Religious adherents 
spend a significant level of time and energy engaging in costly 
practices which run counter to individual optimal behaviour (See 
Sosis and Alcorta 2003; Bulbulia 2004).  
 
As Whitehouse points out religious practices often “override 
intuitive, implicit inference… and apply explicitly formulated (often 
massively counterintuitive) principles in their stead” (Whitehouse 
2004:25). An undeniable feature of religious belief systems is that 
they are often comprised of rituals, beliefs and social norms that 
normally runs counter to the “ordinary thoughts and urges” of its 
practitioners (Whitehouse 2004:25). Thus Whitehouse argues that if 
religion is a “natural” phenomenon then why do people do “unnatural” 
things in the name of minimally counterintuitive concepts? It seems 
instead that a society’s religion exerts a great deal of costs centered 
on maximally counterintuitive beliefs and practices.  
 
Whitehouse shows that the problems associated with memory and 
costs can be explained by recognizing two modes in which religious 
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representations that are “difficult to remember” and “difficult to do” 
are transmitted within a culture. Societies solve the problem of 
memory via costs to ensure that the cultural transmission of religious 
belief systems remain stable over time. Hence Whitehouse identifies 
both doctrinal and imagistic modes of religiosity as crucial to the 
successful transmission of the religious cognitive niche. Although 
Whitehouse attempts to outline an evolutionary model for the 
transmissive frequency of religious representations, he does not 
provide a sufficient causal explanation for how human religiosity 
emerged. Whitehouse instead is primarily interested in how agents 
interact with the socio-ecological constraints of a cultural milieu and 
how religious systems are shaped by these contingencies.  
 
6.2.1. Doctrinal Mode 
 
The doctrinal mode can be summed up as ritualized behaviours 
constituted by high frequency practices (i.e. regular and rehearsed) 
that illicit low arousal responses (i.e. minimal emotional stimulation). 
Doctrinal ritual could be viewed as being a component of the socio-
political features of a religious belief system comprised, for example, 
by social norms in relation to the religious creed. Ritual in the 
doctrinal mode thus depends upon the gradual learning of 
semantically encoded facts that accumulate around socially 
sanctioned knowledge: 
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Doctrinal mode rituals - semantic memory: Whitehouse 
argues that repeated instances or routines get stored in 
semantic memory further entrenching automated 
behavioural routines. Thus semantic memory refers to 
general conceptual knowledge, yet not specific 
autobiographical memories (or specific instances). Upon 
reflection, religious representations that emerge from 
semantic memory stores remain tacit to the believer. 
Agents are usually unable to discern the causal factors for 
semantically determined memories. Indeed semantic 
memories are usually constituted by motor routines that 
are implicit to a believer and are more than likely the 
product of years of enculturation and development (i.e. 
tacit knowledge such as riding a bicycle). 
 
Doctrinal mode – cultural technologies: Whitehouse 
observes that the doctrinal mode is predictably the product 
of conditioned behaviour. Yet socio-ecological features 
inevitably determine whether or not society adopts more 
predominantly doctrinal modes over imagistic modes (see 
below). Large-scale communities that are difficult to 
manage employ highly politicized institutions comprised of 
hierarchical relationships. In addition large-scale 
communities present a problem for the transmission of 
religious belief within a population as representations 
become dispersed within a larger population there is a risk 
that the cultural variants associated with a belief system 
will become lost or diluted. Yet correspondingly 
populations that are big enough to retain a division of labor 
have at their disposal better socio-technological resources 
in which to secure and transmit more complex bodies of 
knowledge. Institutionalization (hierarchies, social norms 
etc), plus symbolic priming (i.e. symbolic markers, texts, 
rituals and myth etc), thus produces the likelihood that a 
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society will establish more doctrinal forms of religious 
transmission. 
 
6.2.2. Imagistic Mode  
 
Imagistic modes describes low frequency rituals (i.e. irregular and 
uncommon) which illicit high arousal responses. A good example of 
this can be rites of initiation which often utilize “shock” tactics such as 
tattooing or ritual scarring in order to render the experience 
memorable and salient to the ritual participant. Imagistic rituals 
maybe comprised of high pageantry, or traumatic acts, that are 
organized to provide vivid autobiographical memories: 
 
Imagistic Mode - episodic memory: episodic memory 
consists of distinct moments of experience. These 
experiences are usually arousing and personally significant 
to adherents constituted by “vivid and enduring” incidents 
in a person’s life (Whitehouse 2005:211). These moments 
typically stand out as unique - such as the day a person 
got married - and because they are often infrequent they 
depend upon the concentrated arousal that comes from 
emotionally salient rituals. Hence religious knowledge is 
embedded via the exploitation of episodic memory; this 
mode of learning religion is like touching a hot stove - it is 
salient to individual cognition and infrequently performed. 
Thus imagistic rituals exploit episodic memory experiences 
which are usually rich in sensory detail. 
 
Imagistic Modes - non-centralized traditions: 
Whitehouse observes that ethnographers are more than 
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likely to find imagistic modes of ritual in small-scale 
communities that depend less upon institutionalized socio-
political arrangements for their functioning.  
 
 Whitehouse argues however that both the above modes should 
be better understood as extra-genetic basins of attraction “around 
which ritual actions and associated religious beliefs cumulatively tend 
to congregate” (Whitehouse 2004:213).  Subsequently, religious 
beliefs and practices which do not conform to these modes will 
typically become selected out. Indeed Whitehouse argues that the 
basin of attraction defined by the SM is insufficient for understanding 
how it is that societies manage the complexity of religious knowledge. 
Certainly inference engines create a basin of attraction. However, 
Whitehouse argues that religions are not constituted by just 
supernatural concepts alone. Instead the cognitive load in having to 
adhere to a particular religious belief a specific socio-ecological 
context requires more computational effort (especially on memory) 
than the advocates of the SM acknowledge. Whitehouse’s solution to 
this problem is to argue that the two modes described above can act 
separately - or in combination – in order to scaffold individual 
memory constraints.  
 
6.3. Socio-Ecological Engineering and the Modes theory 
 
Viewing the ‘cognitive processor’ then as being embedded within 
the socio-ecological context, the human cognitive niche should be 
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viewed as a causally relevant feature for the cognitive science of 
religion. Predictably then, a religious cognitive niche should 
successfully employ socio-cultural properties which facilitate the 
frequency of certain representations thus reinforcing the “relationship 
between inputs and memory effects” (Whitehouse 2004:22). By 
conforming to the majority of representations agents’ memories 
remain not only distributed throughout a population, but also gradually 
conditioned by their context. Thus the fast and frugal rule – “copy the 
majority” – remains a powerful mechanism in the evolution and 
development of culturally determined behaviour (see Boyd and 
Richerson 1985).  
 
Notice that this mode of transmission breaches memory 
constraints. Though the doctrinal mode of transmission remains 
dependent upon a social learning history and frequent repetition, 
external guides are also distributed within the environment which act 
as tacit cues for action. For example, a ritual doesn’t have to be 
stored in individual memory if an agent can attend to the ritual cues 
within a community of adherents. The epistemic burden of recall then 
is essentially offloaded into the social-cultural environment. For 
example, the members of a congregation need not draw upon explicit 
memory stores in order to “remember” when and how to behave 
during a service if others’ are also repeating the ritualized activity.  
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Further, the exegetical reflection of religious teachings - or explicit 
religious concepts - is determined by an agent’s social learning 
history within a particular cultural setting. However, the use of a 
religious vocabulary or ritual within a specific context requires that 
agents share a similar frame of reference for communicating 
theological concepts. For instance, these can be learned via frequent 
repetition, or monitored by orthodoxy checks, whereby elite members 
within a religious hierarchy guide and regulate certain patterns of 
behaviour (i.e. how to behave accordingly within a sacred context). 
Within a socio-political arrangement, orthodoxy checks can be 
regulated not just by leaders within a community but also by other 
members of the laity.  
 
For instance, folk-level monitoring such as scrutiny by individuals 
within a small-scale community – or even neighborly gossip - can be 
a powerful policing tool if the laity fears retribution for not monitoring 
the behaviour of others (especially if supernatural rewards are 
deemed an important upshot to ratting out your neighbor for 
practicing witchcraft). Thus by acting in accordance with majority, 
socio-political arrangements can effectively reinforce the frequency of 
representations distributed within a population. Yet because imagistic 
modes of ritual are rarely performed the prediction is that 
communities with little or no socio-political arrangements will depend 
upon rituals that are of high-arousal. As a result, small-scale 
communities which depend upon imagistic modes will tend to be 
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exclusive in nature. This additionally requires that a small, cohesive 
unit of individuals with exclusive membership is established.  
 
Anthropologists recognize the causal significance that cultural 
practices play in the patterns of human behaviour, while cognitive 
scientists endorse minds as being more important to an 
understanding of human behaviour cross-culturally. However 
Whitehouse views cognitive processes as being extended into the 
external environment whereby cognitive resources are enabled by 
cultural transmission. Much like Merlin Donald’s understanding of the 
hybrid mind (see above), and Andy Clark’s wideware model (see 
Chapter 4; Clark 1998; 2001a), Whitehouse does not assume that 
the evolution of human intelligence and behaviour stems purely from 
biological endowments.  
 
Recall that the niche-construction model implies that individuals 
not only engineer their local ecology, but that they also shape their 
selective environment in a social-cultural sense. Thus social and 
cultural constraints, such as institutions and social norms, also select 
for individual behaviour (or at least conditions certain behaviours). 
Though this does not imply genetic changes or the development of 
biologically endowed cognitive abilities, it does imply however a 
greater breadth of knowledge. Information-rich niche environments 
develop methods for information transmission. Individuals have to 
learn ecological strategies; build sophisticated weapons, tools and 
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shelter; while also navigating an increasingly complex social world 
constituted by customs, hierarchies and institutions.  
 
What a cooperative society requires however is transparent 
information about how a community is socially organized in order to 
solve coordination problems brought about by a division of labor and 
its management. Agents need to recognize immediately those 
prearranged expectations constrained by social conventions, while 
accurately anticipating the behaviour of others. A symbolic system of 
shared representations ensures that actions are regulated and lower 
the ‘calculative burden of strong reciprocation’ (Sterelny 2007:722). 
Thus agents imbue these collectively reinforced symbolic systems 
with a normative value which ‘disambiguate a social environment’ 
(Sterelny 2007:722). Behaviour and action once regulated by norm-
governed systems of communication, effectively makes public those 
mutual requirements for cooperation. Entrenched protocols, customs 
and rituals make violating norm-governed cooperative exchanges 
more conspicuous and easier to monitor.  
 
So how do these factors affect the development of social-
organizational patterns and symbolic behaviour in particular? Socio-
ecological demands placed upon complex or information-rich 
societies would have required (a) a division of labor leading 
specialized technologies in resource extraction and production (b) 
more efficient means for communication across not only horizontally 
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complex associations [i.e. between individuals], but also vertically 
complex associations i.e. proto-institutions resulting from a division of 
labor and larger populations (See Sterelny 2007). And consequently 
(c) highly regulated patterns of behaviour for reducing the cognitive 
demands for managing social exchanges. The structure of a society 
is founded upon a network of social, ecological and economic factors. 
Whitehouse recognizes then that human religiosity is integrated 
within these socio-ecological features within a society. Religious 
customs govern economic behaviour and political structures as well 
as social exchanges.  
 
Literature on the evolution of religious cognition has focused 
broadly on the social conditions which sustain religiously defined 
representations. In certain examples religious information is 
transmitted or evoked to solve social-exchange problems (Irons 
2001; Wilson 2002; Sosis 2003; Bulbulia 2004; Bering and Johnson 
2005). And even outside these functional explanations we find 
‘spandrelist’ accounts for such traits subsuming intuitive ontological 
reasoning about agency (Boyer 1994; Mithen 1996a; see Chapter 3). 
Not to say that these positions aren’t compatible with a niche 
construction model. But they overlook the importance of social 
organization brought about by ecological demands. A central feature 
of religious systems is the collectively prescribed norms that govern 
behaviour and social conventions. Whitehouse argues that norms of 
behaviour establish a common language within the social world of 
 138 
adherents. Thus, on Whitehouse’s view, if social organization is a 
response to ecological pressures, then one may also infer that 
normative cultural practices (such as religious norms) were 
established as a response to socio-ecological complexity.  
 
Whitehouse has argued that the doctrinal mode is not constituted 
solely by supernatural concepts, but additionally religious belief 
systems are founded primarily upon a shared system of beliefs, 
practices and norms. On Whitehouse’s account, the social 
organization and structure of a society constrains the network 
pathways of information that is collectively reinforced within a 
community. Information is ritually communicated and reinforced by a 
network of collectively understood norms and practices. A hunter 
maybe delimited to a certain position in within a community, but he is 
also symbolically recognized for his level of expertise. Likewise, 
individuals are conditioned to recognize positions of authority within 
their cultural milieu. Individuals, groups and sub-groups assume a 
recognized status within a social system. Whitehouse’s doctrinal 
mode is defined by normative religious codes structured within a 
symbolic network of communication. And while the archaeological 
evidence is scarce at best, particularly for tracking the emergence of 
religious behaviour, Whitehouse has established a model in which to 
measure the material and cognitive constraints which shape the 
topology of religious belief systems.  
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Again Whitehouse has touched on some significant obstacles for 
the SM. But he has yet to establish a causal explanation for why 
religious systems develop along the line that they do. In other words, 
Whitehouse has failed to explain how psychological factors interact 
sufficiently with socio-political arrangements (Pyysiäinen 2006). How 
are these rather complex theological concepts represented in the 
minds of individuals? It maybe what Ilkka Pyysiäinen (2006) calls a 
“theological fallacy” to assume that a belief system is “more or less 
accurately reflected” in the minds of individuals (Pyysiäinen 2006). 
Indeed Whitehouse highlights the constraints on memory and the 
cultural properties which enable religious belief systems. However 
little is discussed on the representational content of religious 
concepts.  
 
At this juncture it would be sensible to review some of the 
conceptual issues which EP attempts to highlight in its explanation 
for human cognition and behaviour. Certainly our perceptual systems 
will inevitably constrain how we register the world, and the SM 
argues that this will almost certainly be true in the case of religious 
information. On the SM view, religion looks the way it does because 
of the kinds brains we have. But what kinds of brains do we have 
exactly? If we can agree with the cognitivist school of thought that the 
brain is a representational device – an information processor if you 
will – then the SM’s account for religion is accurate. However if it is 
more relevant to view human cognition as not just an internal 
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process, but as a hybrid dynamic that integrates both internal and 
external properties, then the SM offers only a partial explanation for 
religious cognition.  
 
As Sterelny (2003) notes: why assume a “single connection 
property” between the informational character of the environment and 
how and agent represents that information, when there are (most 
notably of human primates) a medley of connection properties both 
innate and learned which help agents track the world reliably 
(Sterelny 2003:17; See also Chapter 11.5). Indeed on this view our 
perceptual systems have been shaped by an inherited epistemic 
environment. How agents register the world then depends upon not 
just on internal cognitive processes alone, but also on the 
informational resources that support the development of our cognitive 
expertise in a co-evolutionary dynamic between brains and culture.  
 
6.4. Conclusion: Whitehouse and the Standard Model 
 
Whitehouse observes that religions around the world often 
differentiate between cognitively optimal concepts, and “teachings 
and revelations that carry a heavier conceptual load” (Whitehouse 
2004; 2005 Barrett 1999; Slone 2004). In fact, a lot of religious 
traditions embrace concepts that vary in complexity and depart 
significantly from the cognitive optimum. Theologically-rich beliefs 
and practices are conceptually difficult in comparison to the “closed” 
 141 
behavioural understanding of god concepts. Hence Whitehouse 
suggests that the transmission of explicit religious representations 
cannot be explained by the cognitive constraints that generate 
simpler supernatural concepts. As Sperber (1996) has pointed out, 
often symbolic representations are comprised of multi-layered 
representations dependent upon both dissimilar beliefs/mental states 
operating in unison, coupled with an interwoven understanding or 
interpretation of these integrated representations (i.e. meta-
representations).  
 
More significantly however, if the cognitive optimum is the only 
basin of attraction then the real “elephant in the room” requires an 
explanation: why the costs of religion? (Atran 2002; Bulbulia 2004; 
Whitehouse 2004; Dennett 2006). Why do people exert incredible 
about of time and energy learning these conceptually difficult 
theological concepts? If the cognitive optimum is correct then it has a 
long way to go towards explaining why people commit so heavily to 
certain religious representations with societies investing so much 
time and resources in the transmission of cognitively costly beliefs.  
 
If the SM consistently utilizes the representationalist paradigm, it is 
missing something in its examination of human culture and religion. 
This is the primary concern that Whitehouse has with the SM: their 
neglect in recognizing the socio-ecological context and the cognitive 
properties of culture. Whitehouse has recognized that whether a 
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society employs ritual modes (imagistic or doctrinal) will depend more 
upon socio-ecological constraints in addition to the cognitive 
constraints that the SM underscores as being more efficacious to 
religious belief. Hence there is an implicit correlation between 
Whitehouse’s modes theory and the niche construction model. Both 
Whitehouse and niche construction highlight a circuitous dynamic 
between material constraints (organisms and physical conditions) 
and culturally evolved traits and conditions.  
 
Whitehouse highlights three significant points in his examination of 
religious behaviour. Firstly, context matters. Cultural properties 
should not be viewed merely as an expression of the regularities of 
religious cognition, but a causally relevant feature in an explanation 
for religious behaviour. Thus, an explanation for the diversity of 
religions may be found by looking at the socio-technological factors 
which support the transmission of beliefs and practices. Secondly, 
the transmission of religious beliefs and practices involves memory 
demands and costly rituals. This, Whitehouse argues, maybe difficult 
to reconcile with the cognitive optimality thesis (constituted by 
minimally counterintuitive beliefs and practices). Instead theological 
information is often maximally counterintuitive involving physical and 
cognitive demands.  
 
For Whitehouse then memory and costs are both the cause and 
solution to theological complexity. Thirdly, Whitehouse suggests that 
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an underlying theme within religious belief systems is that societies 
tend to adopt beliefs and practices that congregate around either 
imagistic or doctrinal modes of transmission. Though, cultures often 
utilise a combination of the two ritual modes, some societies will tend 
to utilise one more than the other depending on the variables 
inherent within the socio-ecological environment (see above). 
Whitehouse supports an extended mind model for religious cognition. 
The transmission of religious artefacts, practices, institutions and 
information remains subject to external/cultural contingencies, not 
just internal/psychological regularities. 
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Chapter 7:   Towards a Wideware Model of Religious 
Cognition 
 
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
I have argued that religious information is not just processed and 
transmitted via internal cognitive systems, but religious information is 
also stored and communicated externally. Firstly, human cognition 
depends upon the non-neurological resources within our cognitive 
niche. Consequently, human environments are modified in such a 
way as to preserve religious beliefs and practices (the external 
cognitive tools which make us ‘smarter’ also support the transmission 
of religious beliefs and practices). Secondly, if the information-load in 
religious transmission was low then the epidemiological theory for the 
spread of supernatural concepts offered by the SM would be true. 
However, the processing of religious information is far from effortless. 
The theological concepts which support the content of religious ideas 
are highly complex and costly to transmit. The following will show that 
these two strands mutually support a wideware model for religious 
cognition. This implies that the external world as a cognitive system 
functions in conjunction with individual brains to support human 
religiosity (Clark 1998; 2001a).  
 
In exploring this connection I review the work of archaeologist 
Steven Mithen (1996) who has made similar observations. Mithen 
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argues that material culture not as just an adaptation to ecological 
pressures but as a form of ‘cognitive technology’. A tool can indeed 
be utilized in the utilitarian sense (e.g. for extracting resources), but it 
is also carries valuable information in its construction. A tool is 
utilitarian in the sense that it can act as a blueprint for others’ to copy 
and manufacture other devices. However, a utilitarian device can also 
be used in a non-utilitarian sense to denote an individual’s prestige 
within a group. As a symbol, a valuable tool may gain a social 
currency also. Humans he argues are unique because they can 
cross-network these domains. The technological (i.e. a tool for 
instance) can become a social device. What is valuable in one 
domain, can be valuable in another.  
 
Mithen notices that religious belief systems are often comprised of 
non-utilitarian material items. In addition, Mithen argues that 
supernatural concepts are too computationally difficult to transmit and 
process without the cultural evolution of the use of symbolic artefacts. 
Religious concepts, he argues, remains highly dependent upon a 
material representation for transmission. Religion is not in the brain. 
Instead it is enabled by external cultural technologies. Mithen argues 
that it is ‘cognitive fluidity’ which has allowed for our capacity to 
conceive of the arcane beliefs and practices found within religious 
systems (Mithen 1996:217). The ‘fluid’ interface between intra-
internal and inter-external cognitive domains has facilitated the 
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creative development of our symbolic intelligence and consequently 
religious cognition.  
 
7.2.1. Offline Reasoning and Non-Intuitive Worlds 
 
In Chapter 3 I reviewed the experiments conducted by Justin 
Barrett and Frank C. Keil which showed that individuals could 
rationalize theological concepts explicitly, but always employ default 
inferences implicitly while doing so (Barrett and Keil 1996). Though 
religious adherents could indeed explain that god was omniscient, 
during experiments where they had to recount a narrative by memory 
god had a fixed temporal and physical location. Barrett has 
suggested then that there exists two contrasting yet corresponding 
psychological kinds operate in unison when reasoning about religious 
concepts (Barrett and Keil 1996; Barrett 1999; 2000). He argues that 
people adopt theologically correct positions when reasoning on an 
explicit-level about their beliefs offline (e.g. when communicating god 
concepts as a public representation with others). Thus a theologically 
correct position would pertain to circumstances where individuals 
justify or attempt to rationalize their religious belief (e.g. why they 
have faith, or why perform a particular ritual etc). Offline reasoning 
assumes that a cognitive system can form representations decoupled 
from the immediate context, or disengaged from the here-and-now.  
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In Barrett’s words supernatural concepts “are conceptualized on at 
least two different levels: the basic, everyday concept used in real-
time processing of information, and the theological level used in 
discussion of God's properties or activities outside of on-line, real-
time processing demands” (Barrett 1998:616). Consequently it is 
recognized that there are two distinguishable forms of psychological 
kinds for religious cognition: both folk (or implicit) religious 
representations and theologically correct (or explicit) forms (Barrett 
1999): 
 
a) Folk:  Governed by online processing - This is sometimes called 
folk religious reasoning which constitutes automatic, fast and 
intuitive inferences that conform to the cognitive optimum; 
b) Theologically correct:  Supported by offline processing – This is 
constituted by controlled, reflective inferences that conform to a 
culturally learned knowledge-base14 
 
The concept of an omniscient god (for example) remains quite 
different to the online percept of how agents are normally 
represented. Further: “a robust concept of god”, Barrett argues, is 
constituted not just by learning a religious creed, but by the implicit 
(online) and explicit (offline) reasoning about a supernatural concept 
working in unison (Barrett 1998:617). Reasoning about supernatural 
concepts online means that mental representations normally conform 
                                                 
14
 See Ilkka Pyysiäinen’s “Intuitive and Explicit in Religious Thought.” Journal of Cognition and Culture 
(2004) 4(1):123-150 for conceptual overview.  
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to the processing constraints of our innate cognitive systems. As the 
Barrett and Keil experiments show, online mental representations 
regarding ‘god’ concepts seems to depart significantly from the 
‘theologically correct’ version of god concepts (Barrett 1999). The 
capacity for offline reasoning, on the other hand, enables the kind of 
theological complexity that is explicitly expressed in religions. 
However, the similarities underlying religious systems can be 
explained by implicit cognitive constraints. Folk religious 
representations such as anthropomorphic beings and the living dead 
can be explained by these default inferences. Barrett argues then that 
religions are made up of both theologies and cognitively optimal (folk) 
representations.  
 
One thing to notice about these categories is that folk religious 
concepts appear to be enabled by ‘normal’ intuitive inferences, 
whereas theologically correct beliefs and practices are facilitated by 
enculturation. Theologically correct beliefs require a variety of cultural 
resources in order to support their cultural transmission (i.e. such as 
symbols, myths and rituals). This is notable, as explicit religious 
concepts are often harder to acquire than, say, folk religious concepts 
(such as MCI concepts [see Boyer above]). Thus researchers have 
recognized that despite the transmission of theologically correct belief 
structures within the cognitive niche, agents still tend to adopt a 
“theologically incorrect” position when employing religious inferences 
(see Slone 2004 for discussion).  
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With offline reasoning, human agents possess a unique capacity to 
‘think ahead’ or reason about a variety of potential scenarios 
independently of their immediate context. Kim Sterelny (2003) has 
dubbed this capacity decoupled representations. Offline thinking or 
decoupled representations allows for the cortical control of a broader 
range of behavioural outputs for agents. Put simply, this is the 
processing channel for information removed from the ‘here and now’. 
Hence, organisms that possess this capacity aren’t constrained 
stereotyped responses coupled to immediate environmental stimuli 
(i.e. aren’t dependent upon just online, single cue/single response 
mechanisms). Though intuitive reasoning is governed by online 
processing, non-intuitive or counterfactual reasoning is governed by 
offline processes. An explicit religious concept such as an 
omnipresent god is a counterfactual concept because it breaks with 
our ontological understanding of agency. The capacity to conceive of 
a supernatural world is an example of this offline reasoning capacity 
because it exists outside of an immediate real-world and real-time 
context.  
 
However, the formulation and transmission of explicit religious 
concepts, I will argue, is enabled by the evolution of cultural 
technologies such artefacts and symbol-use. It is one thing to have 
the ‘capacity’ to generate religious representations and express 
theological ideas, but it is another to conceive of these 
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representations without the use of external cognitive devices. 
Consequently, the Barrett and Keil experiments don’t detract from 
wideware model. On the contrary, such evidence supports the notion 
of wideware intelligence. If the cognitive demands associated with 
engaging in theologically correct concepts are outside of ‘real-time 
processing demands’ then we can conclude that external cognitive 
tools are a necessary component in the transmission of complex 
beliefs and practices. And both Barrett and Keil would not deny this 
fact. It’s just that they have yet to explain why agents engage in 
cognitively demanding religious concepts in the first place. And this is 
the problem that this thesis has been tackling: if it is indeed easier to 
process representations which conform to a cognitive optimum, then 
an explanation for why religions are commonly composed of complex 
theologies is required. Explicit representations are highly valued and 
costly to believe in.  
 
Whitehouse offers a similar challenge to the SM. On Whitehouse’s 
account, the socio-political arrangement associated with a religious 
belief system is structured in a way to condition and regulate patterns 
of behaviour. Religious belief systems often establish a rigorous 
membership system comprised of costly rituals and expect their 
adherents to conform to demanding customs. Further, as Whitehouse 
argues, theological knowledge often exerts cognitive demands for 
adherents when learning difficult to remember concepts. Hence a 
value appears to be assigned to the theologically correct position. For 
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Whitehouse then explicit belief concepts seem to be just as 
motivationally salient as the implicit motivations for religious 
representations. The counterfactual worlds created by human 
enterprise are both non-intuitive and motivationally salient.   
 
 Indeed what separates the “fairies from the gods” Whitehouse 
argues is that gods aren’t just supernatural beings that conform to the 
cognitive optimum. Instead explicit representations within religious 
belief systems are usually highly complex concepts that are also 
dependent upon a rich understanding of the context into which the 
‘gods’ are embedded (i.e. myths, rituals, alters and temples etc). 
Thus the difference between the ‘fairies’ and the ‘gods’, Whitehouse 
contends, is that the gods are coupled quite considerably to the 
cultural milieu into which people are embedded - this runs counter to 
the SM argument that the gods are reducible to certain universal 
properties. Fairy concepts maybe cognitively optimal, but the 
Kabbalah certainly is not. Likewise: ghosts are scary, but not as 
gruesome as god’s wrath. Explicit god representations are collectively 
valued by cultures to varying degrees of concentration. An ancestor 
spirit may be venerated quite differently from another deity or god. 
The value assigned to a particular supernatural representation 
appears to be differentiated by the culture.  
 
This is perhaps a problem for the cognitive optimum then. Because 
of the memory demands associated with learning and understanding 
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the sacred elements within a cultures – constituted by cognitively 
difficult theological concepts – agents should predictably prefer so-
called “fairy” concepts (the cognitively optimal concept) over god 
concepts, only because “fairies” are far less complex and less costly 
to believe in (and subsequently transmit). With that said, it maybe 
hard to conclude that religion is ‘natural,’ or that all religious concepts 
are cognitively easy to process. As Whitehouse has noted, societies 
invest much more energy and resources (i.e. costs) into their explicit 
beliefs and practices. The question remains: why are individuals 
committed to such costs? 
 
7.2.1. Commitments and Costs 
 
The capacity to conceive of complex cosmologies and theological 
beliefs raises another important problem for the cognitive science of 
religion. Offline reasoning can be useful and certainly plays a 
significant role in our imaginative ability. We can, as stated, decouple 
our representational competence from an immediate context and 
conceive of potential scenarios, which is useful for planning and 
preparation. This is partly why human agents are so innovative and 
flexible. As Sterelny (2003) and Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996) have 
recognized, when decoupled representations track the world 
accurately they become “fuels for success”, especially when socio-
ecological environments can be epistemically polluted by others (or if 
decision-making is blocked by an inability to navigate a ‘translucent’ 
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environment [Sterelny 2003]). Importantly, within a social context 
agents can strategically lie and give false information in order to reap 
the benefits of another’s credulity. Thus a false belief about the world 
can have fatal consequences if acted upon.  
 
A major problem then in the study of religion is to explain why 
individuals not only entertain supernatural concepts and imagine 
fictional worlds, but also why they invest a great deal of energy, time 
and resources into ensuring their transmission (Atran 2002; Bulbulia 
2004; Dennett 2006). Religious concepts make the epistemic 
environment very noisy indeed. Individuals express a deep 
commitment towards ideas which appear to have no utility. On the 
contrary, religion reduces fitness levels and increases fitness costs. 
But also, the belief in something that doesn’t exist distorts the 
accurate tracking of the world. As Chris Knight (1998) states, humans 
implicitly agree to a ‘collusion in deception’ by inhabiting a world of 
collectively agreed upon symbols and concepts (see above Chapter 
5; Knight 1998). But while symbolic communication plays a functional 
role, religious beliefs and practices can result in highly costly 
motivations. Thus it’s puzzling as to why individuals would expend the 
level of costs they do in order to guarantee the gods are sustained 
within the cognitive niche (Bulbulia 2008).  
 
Some say that the costs of religion should not be viewed as a 
puzzle but as a causally relevant feature of religious cognition. 
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William Irons (1996, 2001) recognizes that the fitness-costs incurred 
by religious behaviour are outweighed by the benefits of establishing 
low-cost policing for effective cooperation. Similarly Bulbulia (2004) 
argues that the cost of religious ritual is linked strongly to the 
commitments required to perform them. Commitments to religious 
beliefs or actions encourage inter-agent cooperation within religious 
groups. Rational agents do not cooperate on this view, but irrational 
agents do – especially if they believe that a deity will punish them if 
they fail to coordinate their interests with others. Hence it is the 
commitment reinforced by the costs of commitment that subsequently 
counteracts asymmetric strategies for defection15. 
 
 The epistemic environment is purposefully noisy on this account. 
Defective strategies cannot emerge if self-interested agents are 
unable to ascertain the costs and rewards of defection. This is true in 
most hostile or socially complex environments. For example, in group 
environments where the costs of defection is higher or 
computationally intractable (i.e. in hostile environments where the 
                                                 
15
 This implies that a game theoretical dynamic like the Prisoner’s Dilemma underpins cooperative social 
exchanges. The Prisoner’s Dilemma generally describes a situation in which two captives – let’s say 
their names are Roy and Ted – are being held in separate cells for a crime – say a robbery. The 
prosecution tells them that they can choose to remain silent or confess. But both Roy and Ted are 
given the same offer: if one confesses to the robbery and the other remains silent, the person that 
owns up can walk free while the other gets 10 years. However, if both confess they’ll get 5 years 
each. But if they both remain silent they’ll get only 6 months each. Obviously, the ideal outcome 
would be for both Roy and Ted to stay quiet. Yet there is no guarantee that one won’t rat out the 
other (the sucker’s payoff would be staying silent while your partner-in-crime talks), so the optimal 
solution would be to confess anyway. The payoff matrix demonstrates that both should rationally 
‘defect’ against one another. Thus ‘cooperation’ (i.e. both remaining silent) is an irrational action 
according to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In biology the Prisoner’s Dilemma is used to show that rational 
decision-making does not necessarily entail cooperation or pro-social behaviour between agents. In a 
Darwinian sense, it offers a puzzle as to how and why animals do indeed evolve cooperative 
tendencies. When there is competition, and relative fitness is increased by ‘selfish’ strategies, agents 
shouldn’t engage in cooperative social exchanges because it isn’t in their best interests to do so. 
Asymmetric strategies are those strategies in social exchanges where interests do not meet (i.e. 
defective/non-cooperative behaviour).  
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threat of predation requires group solidarity for defense), the better 
option is to anchor one’s “fate to collective outcomes” in order to 
avoid the potential risks of non-cooperation or defection (Bulbulia 
2007; Dunbar 1996; Skyrms 1996). Thus, polluted epistemic 
environments can become fertile ground for establishing cooperation. 
Indeed credulity surfaces ostensibly as a prudent solution to 
individual risk.  
 
By ensuring the establishment of trustworthy relationships within 
the community, via costly religious beliefs, the actual costs of policing 
cooperative tendencies are lowered (Irons 1996, 2001; Sosis 2003; 
Alcorta & Sosis 2005). As opposed to more secular policing methods 
(which may require establishing a strong legal institutional base 
further absorbing far greater resources), the establishment of an 
illusionary belief in an omniscient, all-powerful deity reduces the costs 
of coordination and punishment (Bering and Johnson 2005; Shariff 
and Norenzayan 2007). The costs of religion generate establishes 
social cohesion: it culls individualistic behaviour and ensures the 
stability of cooperation. Self-regulation thus ensures a more stable 
cooperative milieu, but it also helps to reduce the calculative burden 
in agency-prediction (see Bulbulia 2007, 2008). The reinforcement of 
a "shared sense of reality" via symbolically defined ritual 
communication makes the environment more transparent. 
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The claim for religious activities enabling social cohesion seems to 
be supported by the ethnographic and sociological literature. For 
instance, an understanding of ‘selfhood’ especially in small-scale 
communities is not often constituted by a distinct understanding of 
identity operating within a world of other individuals and external 
signs. On the contrary, individuals are merged into a social reality, ‘a 
merger facilitated through symbols… which encapsulate and express 
the shared subjective experiences of society's members’ (Balfe 1985; 
See her discussion on Durkheim: 240-241). Individuals develop social 
identities within the milieu into which they are raised, but they also 
develop a symbolic understanding of themselves and others. Agents 
recognize how a society is organized based on the interwoven 
network of symbolically markings, socio-political hierarchies and 
institutions. A symbolically marked social world makes it easier to 
track especially if individuals have been habituated by their cultural 
environments. The ritual communication of these symbolically marked 
conventions can signal unambiguous signs regarding the social 
structure within a niche.  
 
Consequently, the psychological states and experiences of 
individuals within the social structure can be regulated via their 
implicit motivation to communicate within their symbolic world. 
Symbols and social rituals are underpinned by certain meanings and 
emotions. There are certainly social causes for feelings of guilt and 
regret – i.e. the breaking of certain norms or customs. But further, 
 158 
pro-social bonds between kin and non-kin members are constituted 
by the social structure and the obligations therein. Sexual norms and 
conventions are a good example of this: 
 
“Families and kin groups cannot organize sexuality for 
themselves; the partners and patterns they require are 
usually rooted in wider communities, where lively traditions 
of sexual prescription-courting behaviour, ritual 
prohibitions, sexual socialization and the like are played 
out” (Ross and Rapp 1981). 
 
Cross-culturally we see the social recognition of sexual maturity 
through initiation ceremonies aimed at adolescents in a community 
(See Schlegel et al 1980). In societies where it is crucial that 
adolescent boys for instance acquire an acute understanding of their 
role within a sexual division of labor there is prevalence of initiation 
rituals such as circumcision utilized in defining the sexual role of a 
male during his transition to adulthood (see Young 1980). In societies 
where male solidarity is critical to the management of cooperation 
within a division of labor, young males are typically marked for 
symbolic purposes. Yet it is important that a young male not only be 
recognized publicly for his sex-role (i.e. the extrinsic value of symbolic 
demarcation), but also that the adolescent male recognize an implicit 
sense of selfhood-as-symbol within a larger codified system of 
beliefs. Frank Young (1980) better describes this dynamic in his 
paper “The Function of Male Initiation Ceremonies”: 
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“Identification requires first that the identifier have 
sufficient skill in symbolic interaction (usually not acquired 
until early adolescence) to comprehend the symbolic 
environment and, second, that he recognize that his 
society requires him to learn certain specific clusters of 
social meanings, such as those involved in one's sex role. 
Strength of identification is determined by the degree to 
which the identifier co-operates in creating and maintaining 
the definition of the situation and by the degree of clarity 
given the social meanings by the group or person 
generating them” (Young 1962:382). 
 
The male initiate gains an entrenched understanding of his role 
within a society as a result of these initiation rites. The individual is 
defined by these cultural norms. Commitment is thus established 
within a collective via these socially defined norms and roles. In 
contrast to what the SM researchers have suggested, religiosity may 
indeed be an adaptive trait at the group level for supporting social 
cohesion and not merely a cognitive by-product of other adaptive 
features (Bulbulia 2004; Sosis and Aclorta 2003; Wilson 2004). 
Indeed religious beliefs and practices act as a social regulating 
system for groups (Wilson 2002). Individualistic behaviour or 
behaviour that transgresses group coordination can be culled through 
the doctrinal modes of conduct.  
 
The individual costs of membership then are outweighed by the 
benefits received from belonging to a collective. Since trust becomes 
a critical aspect for forming bonds between individuals commitment is 
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established via policing - by others’ or by a perceived supernatural 
entity – or by commitments that are merely implicit via enculturation. 
Hence the social environment becomes easier to navigate when 
individuals are conditioned to recognize and operate within the 
symbolically marked features of a particular context (Sterelny 2006). 
Social environments are made more transparent if agents can 
recognize the association between the symbolic and the institution. A 
symbolically marked social organization offers unambiguous 
information to those who can read these signs. Consequently, agents 
can better track their social world.  
 
7.2.3. Motivation and Context 
 
In contrast to the signaling tradition, others have argued that 
religious creeds pollute the epistemic environment far too effectively, 
whereby cultural practices become incompatible with physical 
environment constraints - thus leading to maladaptive trends (Boyd 
and Richerson 1985; Dawkins 1976; Diamond 2005). There is no 
simple answer to this problem, only because religions do not function 
uniformly across all cultures and societies (Richerson & Newson 
2008). Indeed religions often appear to develop maladaptive 
outcomes in circumstances whereby certain cultural practices that 
were adaptive – such as costly displays of commitment for 
recognizing membership in a group – can begin a runaway selection 
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process akin to sexual selection leading to “exaggerated” trends 
(Richerson & Boyd 1989; Richerson & Newson 2008:77).  
 
Thus if the perceived rewards of a certain cultural practice on a 
micro-level (i.e. within short-term goals) are seemingly outweighed by 
the costs, then this can generate disastrous long-term consequences 
at the macro-level (i.e. at the group level overtime). Groups may 
engage in costly practices which potentially lead to a reduced level of 
fitness overall (e.g. in the case of female circumcision or foot-binding 
customs [Sterelny 2008]; or the Easter Island construction of moai 
statues which evidently led to their socio-ecological demise). So the 
reinforcement of a collective fiction as a reliable context is both 
helpful for establishing group-level coordination, while harmful as a 
short-range and potentially maladaptive strategy.   
 
Despite these concerns, costly religious practices are still 
perpetuated in most, if not all cultures. So in light of the costs, why 
has religion prevailed so? This thesis does not wish to entertain a 
functionalist explanation for human religiosity within an evolutionary 
context. However, I do think that it is necessary to identify the 
informational constraints that govern the expression of costly 
practices. Certainly it is true that epistemic environments - constituted 
by religious ‘fictions’ - could be construed as maladaptive (fictions 
aren’t ‘fuels for success’). However these environments, though 
epistemically “noisy” are nevertheless not maximally costly. As 
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Bulbulia (2007) has noted, religious information flow rarely impinges - 
nor pollutes - more practically relevant perceptual states and 
motivations. Thus religious inferences appear to be informationally 
encapsulated from our more adaptive, common-sense inferences.  
 
Hence, individuals may believe in falsehoods such as “the gods 
will provide”, yet this will not generate runaway maladaptive trends – 
e.g. a false expectation that the gods will indeed provide the material 
resources required for survival, such as food (Bulbulia 2006). Indeed 
a prayer before hunting may bring about a belief for favorable results, 
but the hunters still proceed in their expedition. It appears to Bulbulia 
(2007) then that the capacity to engage in “counterfactual” worlds is 
subject to scope syntactic structures within our cognitive architecture 
(See also Cosmides and Tooby 2000). These dedicated scope 
operators thus regulate and manage religious information flow in 
order to control the “inferential hemorrhaging” of religious 
representations into other perceptual categories that register the 
world accurately.  
 
Religious belief and behaviour must be context-dependent 
motivationally. One cannot act on their beliefs in causally irrelevant 
domains (e.g. one cannot revert to prayer to kill a pig –blades do a 
better job; though one may pray to the gods for a successful hunt). 
Some religious representations appear to be coupled to pro-social 
domains whereby moralistic norms are prescribed to certain types of 
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behaviour. A religious inference appears to generate a specific type 
of content and motivation in these domains (e.g. be charitable or you 
will be punished in the afterlife). However, these motivations are 
nevertheless integrated into a specific cognitive system and become 
causally relevant for the mediation between agents and specific 
problem-solving tasks (i.e. such as moralistic problem-solving). 
Moralistic behaviour within groups enables social cohesion and the 
motivation for this type of pro-social behaviour is context-dependent. 
Trading with your enemies maybe a bad strategy; however, social 
exchanges between members of your own faith is beneficial - 
especially if reciprocity is enforced by the gods.  
 
Thus the motivational salience of religious representations are, to a 
large extent, coupled to certain contexts. If it were the case that 
religions were just a simple fiction (i.e. just a belief in imaginary 
beings), then it wouldn’t explain why people endow these fictions with 
a moralistic content. It appears instead, that the tendency to conceive 
of a moralizing god remains a highly integrated phenomena 
comprised from social reasoning and counterfactual properties (i.e. 
those ‘fictions’ will punish if you copulate with your neighbor’s wife 
[Johnson 2005]). Religious behaviour is constituted by a cross-
networking of cognitive domains. So, it appears as if humans are 
well-suited to engage in moralistic behaviour coupled to a religious 
context.  
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The theory of a cognitive optimum fails to explain why religious 
reasoning remains context-dependent (i.e. couple to moralistic 
behaviour, for instance). Agents tend to employ a great deal of 
emotional/subjective confidence to some domains, but not others. For 
instance agents tend to be motivated to act upon emotionally salient 
(and potentially costly) behaviours in domains that require a degree 
of subjective confidence to be ‘religious’. However, this subjective 
confidence does not impinge upon other behavioural domains where 
it would be irrelevant to behave religiously. It could be assumed then 
that religious representations are evoked in certain contexts but not in 
others.  
 
 This maybe a potentially difficult problem for the SM to reconcile: 
because while the SM recognizes that there is no “natural home for 
religion” in the mind, Bulbulia argues that the evidence suggests that 
there is. Hence the problems and pressures that arise from being 
embedded in a complex social world - problems such cooperation 
and trust amongst conspecifics - can be solved by a dedicated 
cognitive architecture enabling what may be deemed “religious” 
behaviour (Schloss 2008). A cognitive system that integrates both a 
belief in the supernatural and a tendency for moralizing behaviour – 
though costly - can be a useful psychological mechanism for trust and 
cooperation.  A commitment to the gods can generate pro-social 
commitments also 
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7.3. The Religious Cognitive Niche 
 
An alternative may be to suggest that these behavioural traits 
aren’t governed by an inbuilt cognitive system at all. Within a 
wideware mind model our perceptual states and behavioural outputs 
are additionally “anchored” to the material cognitive properties of 
culture (Mithen 1996a). External media or external cognitive tools can 
additionally be utilized to manipulate certain perceptual inferences not 
otherwise availed to our internal cognitive architecture. Conceptual 
reasoning can be additionally simulated with the aid of certain socio-
technological resources. For example, the concept of the numerical 
digit 0 (zero), as a place value, was not utilized consistently until the 
pervasive use of the Hindu-Arabic numeral system (Cajori 1929). Yet 
the concept’s existence was dependent upon the existence of the 
symbol itself. “Zero” doesn’t embody a substantive reality outside of 
the symbol itself.  
 
This is true of religious cognition as well: for the conceptual 
boundaries of thought available can be widened with the use of 
cognitive devices (such as symbols, rituals, myths, artefacts etc). It 
may be true that there exists internal - and subsequently universal - 
cognitive constraints governing the expression of religious belief, yet 
what we also find cross-culturally is the use of material artefacts 
utilized within a religious context also. A concept of what is “sacred” 
say - and subsequently what is not - is frequently coordinated by the 
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placement and collective value of certain external properties within 
the cognitive niche. Agents organize their world for the transmission 
of information via the use of material culture. How we represent the 
world then is at least partially determined by the socio-technological 
resources available to us.  
 
Bulbulia elsewhere has supported this claim, that socio-cultural 
practices involve the active modification of the environment to include 
religious cues: “Agents produce experiential support to back religious 
commitment. They do so by manipulating their environments in 
specific ways” (Bulbulia 2008). On this view, agents construct and 
pass-on artefacts, rituals, and knowledge specific to religious 
behaviour. For instance, ritualized patterns of behaviour, such as 
prayer or meditation, increase the likelihood of experiencing altered 
states. Cultures and societies store and transmit information relevant 
to altering mental states and regulating the neuro-chemical 
composition of the body (Newberg and D’Aquili 2000). Recent studies 
have shown that prayer stimulates the dopaminergic reward system 
in the brain (Schjødt et al 2008). We can view religious beliefs and 
activities then as properties individuals desire to be in their cognitive 
niche.  
 
Societies modify their learning environments to not only support 
the transmission of religious belief systems and rituals; they also 
develop a cosmological (or mythic) understanding of themselves and 
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their world through the use of socio-technological properties. Thus 
the offline reasoning of explicit religious concepts will almost certainly 
depend upon the complex array of distributed knowledge. Indeed 
Whitehouse recognizes that the offline theological reasoning more 
than likely requires the scaffolded support of non-biological properties 
for their expression. The cognitive constraints for modeling these 
difficult-to-learn concepts are indeed necessitated by material culture.  
 
Material culture is not just a “painted spandrel” as Matthew Day 
(2004b) calls it, or just epiphenomena generated via online reasoning 
about the gods. Instead material culture more than likely acts as a 
“flying buttress” for scaffolding the computational limits of the basic 
brain when reasoning about the gods. Day argues that studies such 
as Barrett and Keil’s (see above [1996]) have been utilized to defend 
a position for nativism, undervalued the material culture as being 
cognitively relevant. Thus the SM views the “ornaments” of material 
culture as less relevant to an understanding of how religious concepts 
are represented in the mind. Indeed the focus of examination as a 
result should be the hardware constraints which govern the 
processing of this information. Yet Day (2004) argues that the 
cognitive properties of material culture are a property of the mind.   
 
Hence, Day (2004) adopts an extended mind view of religious 
cognition, focusing primarily on Andy Clark’s model of embedded or 
extended cognition (see above). Day like Clark suggests that external 
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scaffolded culture can be both “context-fixing” and aid as powerful 
“mind-tools” that “guide individual and collaborative thought” (Day 
2004:114 [see Clark 1996]). Indeed Clark has noted that moral 
reasoning is unachievable without the socio-technological resources 
of lexical ability utilized in order to co-ordinate activities with others. 
Clark’s concern with the cognitivist view is that it tends to view moral 
reasoning as the product of individual cognitive processes (i.e. we are 
capable of being “moral” in virtue of human primate cognitive traits).  
 
In addition, Clark points out that moral reasoning is often a 
collaborative process involving collective methods of reasoning. 
Cognitive tools, such as language, enable individuals to establish a 
moral context into which they can interface. Participating in a 
cooperative problem-solving activity such as moral reasoning 
requires a special kind of “knowing” Clark says (Clark 1996:124-125). 
It not only requires that individuals have a conception of other agent’s 
and their perspective via language, but also that agents utilize lexical 
cues to shape the content of a moral discourse in order to establish 
highly cooperative activities with others.  
 
Likewise, Day suggests that material culture enables the content-
fixing of religious cognitive processes. In other words agents employ 
material artefacts to organize and arrange religious thinking. The 
‘content’ of a religious representation is ‘fixed’ to a material cue (i.e. 
artefact). How agents represent their world – religious or otherwise - 
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Day says is not solely the product of internal cognitive constraints, but 
are additionally determined by external representations. The temple 
or alter, for example, embodies a substantive reality in the minds of 
religious agents, because it exists as a symbolic structure within a 
culture. The organization and coordination of material artefacts as 
mental cues function as mental scaffolding for religious thinking.  
 
Day supports Clark’s view that cultural practices and devices help 
us to think and problem-solve. Day suggests then that external 
cognitive scaffolding aids in the offline reasoning about religious 
concepts and supports conceptual problem-solving. Hence it “…could 
put individual human agents in a better position to better utilize their 
basic perceptual, motor, and social cognitive skills” in religious and 
sacred domains (Day 2004:117). Day proposes that our folk religious 
sense can be dramatically augmented and shaped by the cognitive 
niche. Similarly, to Kim Sterelny (2003) and Michael Tomasello 
(1999), Day says that basic perceptual modules can be “ratcheted 
up” to greater precision, Day suggests that external scaffolding can 
open-up the conceptual boundaries of religious cognition making 
‘supernatural’ thinking more manageable (Sterelny 2003:223; see 
also Mithen [1996a]).  
 
Day has made this point clear with a comparison between 
mathematical knowledge and religious knowledge (Day 2005). He 
argues religious concepts are similar to mathematical concepts 
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because they greatly depend upon the development of a symbolic 
culture. As a result, Day contends that religion is less like a natural 
language-use capacity and more like the ability to learn complex 
mathematical models via the use of symbols. Thus, learning the 
concept of π is comparable to learning the concept of Aum, only 
because of complexity involved in grasping these concepts. 
Communicating counterintuitive concepts is difficult precisely 
because the run counter to our intuitive inferences. Religious 
concepts, like mathematical concepts are counter-perceptive and are 
necessitate by culturally evolved practices and invention.  While our 
intuitive reasoning regarding basic supernatural concepts maybe 
constrained by the cognitive optimum (as suggested by the SM), 
external culture makes it easier to establish collaborative belief 
systems supported by theological knowledge.  
 
Similarly the SM doesn’t often credit the learning of rituals and 
practices associated with the sacred. Not only are individuals taught a 
variety of techniques in order to achieve religious states, these 
techniques are taught and viewed as a component of the religious 
belief system itself. Explicit beliefs and practices then have a 
significant role to play in the construction of the religious cognitive 
niche. These cannot be reduced to just the implicit motivations that 
underpin cognitively difficult theologies. Instead individuals and 
societies additionally seek-out explicit religious concepts and ritual 
techniques for achieving certain mental states. Religious belief 
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systems employ elaborate bodily techniques in order to achieve the 
variety physiological states associated with their commitment to their 
system.  
 
A prominent feature of religious belief systems is the active 
manipulation of body for experiential purposes. Subsequently, the 
experiences derived from experiential rituals via the manipulation of 
the body are interpreted within a particular symbolic world. So-called 
mystical visions, meditative and trance states are usually comprised 
of visions typical to the individual’s symbolically structured system of 
beliefs (e.g. Christian mystics see Christian visions, not Krishnic 
ones). Yet despite these subjective symbolic explanations for the 
experience, the experience itself has a very “real” physiological, 
sensory-nervous correlates (Newberg and D’Aquili 2000: 251-267)16.  
 
However there are epistemic correlates to ritual behaviour also 
(Krippner 2000). Mircea Eliade (1972/1951) often referred to the 
“sacred technologies” of ritual (See Krippner 2000:93-118 for 
discussion). This is enabled by the culturally learned techniques of 
self-regulating psychological functions usually referred to as 
                                                 
16
 For instance Newberg and D’ Aquili (Newberg and D’Aquili 2000: 251-267) have examined 
commonalities in phenomenological and observable physiological explanations associated with 
religious or mystical experiences. Religious ritual and its effects are invariably described within two 
dimensions (1) ‘intermittent emotional discharges’ and (2) ‘varying degrees of unitary experience’. Yet 
the subjective phenomena itself has observable neurophysiological correlates. Individuals or groups 
engaging in particular form of ritualized behaviour are able to stimulate regions of brain associated 
with emotion, spatial and temporal awareness. Yet the symbolic structures associated with a religious 
belief system are often recruited in the conceptual understanding of the experience itself. Thus when 
a physiological change is initiated by the cognitive inputs associated with ritual (i.e. bodily postures, 
ceremonial movements, meditation and/or prayer etc), interpretations are arbitrarily communicated or 
phenomenologically interpreted within a particular contextual frame of reference (e.g. Christian 
Mystics usually experience Christic visions, not Krishnic ones). 
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religious/mystical experiences. Customs and ritual are learned and 
transmitted within a symbolic-cultural niche. Ritualized forms of bodily 
postures and movements for instance are invariably associated with a 
culture’s symbolic milieu and like other forms of epistemic capital they 
are usually learned and passed-on from generation to generation. 
However these learned rituals or techniques further stimulate 
physiological/psychological states, thus regulating a sensory-somatic 
experience usually defined as “religious”. This interaction comprises 
the “fuzzy area” where biology and culture meet (Glucklich 2001; See 
Fuller 2007).  
 
7.3.1. Cognitive Archaeology and the Religious Niche 
 
Can these claims for an extended mind hypothesis be convincingly 
supported by physical facts? Has culturally evolved technologies 
enabled the evolution of the religious mind? Archaeologist Steven 
Mithen (1996a) seems to think that there is strong evidence for a co-
evolution of human intelligence and cultural technologies. Mithen 
argues that an extended mind hypothesis can provide a robust 
explanation for the cultural evolution of prehistoric societies and 
subsequently our cognitive expertise. Mithen suggests that the tools 
utilized by modern Homo Sapiens functioned not only as utilitarian 
devices, but also as cognitive technologies in very unique ways. The 
human mind, Mithen argues, is far more flexible than is assumed by 
Evolutionary Psychology. In addition, Mithen argues that the human 
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cognitive processes are integrated and highly confluent with our 
cultural environments. In other words, we not only employ tools for 
subsistence (e.g. resource extraction), but we also employ tools for 
thinking.  
 
However, for Mithen, establishing his own critique of the modularity 
thesis endorsed by EP seems to be a crucial aspect to model. Thus 
while Mithen is sympathetic to the view that human minds are 
comprised of content-rich cognitive domains (the thesis supported by 
EP), he argues that these cognitive mechanisms may not be as 
encapsulated, as is often assumed. Nevertheless Mithen argues that 
human behaviour appears to be determined by a range of cognitive 
constraints. More particularly Mithen is agreement with EP regarding 
human intelligence and some of the inborn competences associated 
with naïve of folk-domain intelligences (i.e. folk psychology, folk 
physics, folk biology [see above in Chapter 2]). Yet Mithen splits 
these innate cognitive competences into three categories which he 
calls Natural History Intelligence, Technical Intelligence and Social 
Intelligence: 
 
Natural History Intelligence (likely associated with EP’s 
conception of folk biology): a template that enables agents 
to respond to certain environmental stimuli connected with 
plants, animals and other biological categories. Humans 
engage in their natural physical environment competently 
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because they possess an innate understanding of some of 
its properties; 
 
Technical Intelligence (likely associated with EP’s conception 
of folk physics): a template that enables agents to respond 
to certain environmental stimuli connected with physical 
dynamics (such as an awareness of length, height, gravity, 
density etc). This enables agents to be ‘novice engineers’ if 
you will, particularly within tool-making domains; 
 
Social Intelligence (likely associated with EP’s conception of 
folk psychology): a template that enables agents to 
respond to certain environmental cues connected with 
social exchanges, agent mentality (such as inferences 
regarding the belief desire states of others) and pro-social 
behaviour such as cooperation. 
 
If anything Mithen suggests humans should be proficient and 
flexible in calculating the demands faced by physical environment 
constraints and social living. However, Mithen is unconvinced that the 
content-rich systems endorsed by EP are as functionally independent 
as they assume. On the contrary, Mithen observes that humans are 
unique in their capacity to cross-network these content-rich domains 
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thus enabling the creative processes and properties associated with 
human primate intelligence within the cognitive niche17.  
 
Mithen has illustrated this class of mental flexibility – which he calls 
“cognitive fluidity” - in a comparative example between human and 
Neanderthal intelligence (See Mithen 1996a:134-149). He points out 
that the archaeological record reveals a notable difference in tool 
innovation between both Neanderthals and Homo Sapiens. The 
evidence suggests that Neanderthal technology was characterized by 
a conservative lack of innovation in tool manufacture. Contrastingly 
human tools exhibited a wider and more inventive use of the local 
natural resources and materials for tool manufacture (including bone 
and antler). Yet despite neighbouring the same geographic region 
with Homo Sapiens - with access to similar resources - Neanderthal 
tools remained relatively simple and static for a longer period. Mithen 
suspects Neanderthals possessed a reasonably in-flexible 
intelligence in comparison to humans. 
 
 Mithen argues that Neanderthal intelligence was probably 
constituted by strictly encapsulated intelligence domains. On Mithen’s 
view their technical intelligence, social intelligence, and natural 
history intelligence were uniformly specialized and operated 
independently of one another. Whereas human intelligence he argues 
arises from an evolved integration of these encapsulated domains. 
                                                 
17
 Hence he is somewhere between the MMH and Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) anti-modularity thesis. See 
Mithen 1996:60-61 for short overview.  
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With the advent of what Mithen calls ‘cognitive fluidity’ in Homo 
Sapiens content-rich systems which had previously been specialized 
at responding to information specific to those fields of intelligence, 
gradually became accessible to one another.  
 
Mithen’s view of cognitive fluidity has been influenced quite 
significantly by Annette Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) notion of 
Representational Redecoration (see above). Indeed Mithen’s 
approach to human cognition is almost certainly similar to Clark’s 
wideware model. On Mithen’s view Homo Sapiens intelligence is 
unique in that information stores in one cognitive domain can be 
shifted to another domain and applied creatively for or novel problem 
solving. For Mithen, because information can be cross-networked 
across multiple domains, humans possess the capacity to apply the 
information about a certain property, to another set of problem solving 
tasks. Thus a tool for digging tubers from the ground can also be 
employed as a tool for scraping or carving. And more unusually, a 
tool can be used a prestige device for its bearer within a social 
domain. The possessor of a handy tool can also find value for 
attracting status.  
 
It is our understanding of the causal properties of the tool 
decoupled from its actual usage that drives technological innovation. 
According to Mithen human creativity and depends greatly on our 
capacity interface cognitive domains (both externally and internally). 
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This merge Mithen argues further generated a wider range of 
cognitive activity that allowed for greater innovation in 
correspondence with material culture. Hence Mithen argues that the 
crucial difference between Neanderthal and human intelligence is 
defined by our capacity to operate effectively with contingent 
informational resources in a wider range of environments. 
 
However Mithen’s is not an argument against domain-specifity as 
such. His skepticism with strictly encapsulated domains is derived 
from the observation of “non-specialized” thinking within human 
primates, whereas the Swiss-army knife analogy for domain-specifity 
seems to imply narrow specialization (i.e. specialized “tools” for 
specialized tasks). For instance, he argues that individuals tend to 
think of the natural world in technical terms as outlined above with the 
Neanderthal example (Mithen 1996a:49). Additionally individuals tend 
to imbue their environment with a humanly significant purpose, for 
which Mithen says is an indication of social intelligence and natural 
world intelligence merging.  
 
As stated, humans throughout history have tended to imbue their 
cultural artefacts with a social currency leading to possessions being 
valued as sexual ornaments or items of prestige. Subsequently 
Mithen’s concern over the EP project is that domain specifity tends to 
entail specialization in specific task-domains. Thus on the EP view we 
should only ‘act social’ in social domains; or be ‘tool-makers’ in 
 178 
technological domains; and reason about biological categories as 
natural history intelligence - yet operate within these task domains 
well as domain-specific “geniuses”. But as Mithen points out, human 
beings conceptualize their worlds in varying, non-specialized ways. 
So while Mithen doesn’t deny that we possess content-rich domains 
specific to certain tasks, these content-rich processors do not 
determine specialized behavioural traits. Indeed they are merely a 
backdrop enabling the integration of powerful representations across 
a variety of domains for greater flexibility.  
 
 Mithen is concerned with the effect that material items (symbols, 
tools etc) would have had on the environment and the agents that 
inhabited them. Put simply, the cultural evolution of materiality 
constitutes a merging between brains and environment. Again Mithen 
differs to the orthodox view of EP, as it is suggested that human 
cognitive fluidity facilitates the cross-networking of external and 
internal cognitive domains. Homo Sapiens has managed to integrate 
both the content-rich domains of their cognitive architecture with the 
external properties of their material world.  
 
Mithen argues that this dynamic has facilitated a co-evolutionary 
process between minds and environments thus producing a human 
cognitive niche. Thus a spear or pot is not just an extrinsic property in 
agents’ world for utilitarian purposes only (i.e. a hunting implement or 
container implies a function to the archaeologist). But such devices 
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contain epistemic information, or more simply a blueprint for the 
construction for further spears or pots. In short Mithen argues that 
material culture would have served a purpose additionally as an 
external memory device for individuals and societies (Mithen 1996a). 
Agents do not depend upon the informational load that comes from 
memorizing how to manufacture these artefacts. The item in the 
world - coupled with Homo Sapiens content-rich multiple intelligences 
- establishes a powerful tool for learning and the transmission of 
valuable knowledge.  
 
Mithen’s model for the co-evolution of human cognition remains 
compelling for it implications alone. Mithen is certain that the 
intensification of material culture is correlated with Homo Sapiens 
cognitive expertise. More specifically material culture in the form of 
cognitive technology (i.e. symbols, tools etc) enabled the capacity to 
integrate intelligence domains that were once quite inaccessible to 
each other. Thus social worlds adopted properties from the 
technological world: for instance the use of something functional, 
such as a pot as a container, might be deemed a prestige item in the 
social worlds of agents. Thus when stylistic properties such as pot 
motifs and designs began to appear on tools, this should additionally 
indicate to archaeologists that utilitarian items were becoming 
integrated into a more abstract (non-utilitarian) contexts. 
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 Archaeologists should then infer that individuals were becoming 
increasingly aware that inert objects could be endowed with meaning 
and significance within a social context. An explanation for this re-
organization of cognitive-knowledge domains is still unclear according 
to Mithen. Safe to say however that is was not the result of any major 
genetic change in human cognitive evolution. Thus a shift from a 
strict domain-specific intelligence to cognitively fluid intelligence 
cannot be the result of any momentous physiological change in 
human evolution. Mithen does say however that a probable 
explanation for this change in intelligence was significantly influenced 
by the appearance of material culture itself. Once external material 
cultural items began to occupy the human cognitive niche, their 
existence influenced the capacity to conceptualize new and 
innovative ways of thinking and behaving.  
 
For example, the appearance of certain symbols coupled with 
human linguistic competence produced the capacity think more 
abstractly about certain cognitive properties. Thus the presence of 
symbolic material artefacts would have coincided with the capacity to 
store and transmit information in a non-biological format (similarly to 
Donald’s view of external symbolic storage [see above]). Hence a co-
evolutionary process took hold, initiating a shift in the way individuals 
conceptualized their world. For example, Upper-Paleolithic cave 
painting in particular images such as the depiction the Bison with 
human legs found in the Chauvet Cave in France should indicate, 
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according to Mithen, an integration between thinking about biological 
categories (i.e. the non-human animal world) and social intelligence 
(i.e. the human psychological world), resulting in the capacity 
symbolize metaphorical associations such as anthropomorphic 
beings (Mithen 1996a:186-190; Srejovic´ 1969).  
 
So for Mithen the external symbolic items of material culture have 
consequently shaped how the internal dynamics of human thinking is 
directed and vice versa. By storing an image within the cognitive 
niche, agents were able to better process difficult concepts such as 
anthropomorphic symbols. The computational limits of our internal 
cognitive machinery are thus better supported by material symbols. 
Thus from what we know about human cognition – plus - how these 
processes interact with material culture, Mithen hopes that cognitive 
archaeologists will be better equipped to understand how material 
culture – and particularly symbolic culture - would have “anchored” 
the development abstract - or non-intuitive - concepts (Mithen 1996a; 
2000).  
 
7.3.2. The Emergence of Symbolic-Religious Behaviour: 
 
Archaeologists are often careful however to not separate fact from 
inference. For instance, a guiding rule could be to assume a non-
collapsible distinction between the functional material items of a 
society’s economy and the non-functional items of a culture’s beliefs 
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and practices (see discussion on Hawkes’ ladder [Hawkes 1954; 
Robb 1998]; Jeffares 2002). Hence the ‘visible’ facts regarding the 
function of particular tool (e.g. a hand-axe) is often relatively easier to 
infer over the ‘invisible’ facts (e.g. the belief of the bearer). Put simply, 
the “hard realities” of economy and environment are supposedly 
much more accessible to the archaeologist than that of symbolic 
interpretations (Robb 1998:330). ‘Meaning’ is potentially an 
inaccessible reality within archaeology, whereas functionality and 
economy can be measured.  
 
Because of this problem of interpretation, the inferences regarding 
the meaning of symbols from long extinct cultures have been openly 
criticized by archaeology. Inferences regarding religious beliefs and 
practices, for instance, can be subjective and open to a variety of 
interpretations. Some have criticized this separation between function 
over meaning however. Archaeologist John Robb (1998), for 
instance, sees this common prejudice within archaeology as a 
fundamental bias which eliminates the potential for a more 
interdisciplinary approach and interpretation: 
 
“The archaeological world is a cultural world, and by 
dividing into a priori categories of material and symbolic, 
we deny the degree to which things like economy are 
fundamentally cultural things like ideas are embodied in 
cultural practices” (Robb 1998:331). 
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Yet archaeologists may argue that these concepts or symbolic 
structures are just representatives of a social reality that exists prior 
to their appearance in a cultural setting. Concepts of value and 
exchange reflect the economic nature of human beings: an extension 
of a fundamental reality. Hence, symbols merely serve as “tokens” or 
“instruments of communication” (Robb 1998:332). Thus a set of 
symbols may be representative of an individual or group’s power and 
prestige. So in the case of a particular type of adornment or burial, an 
archaeologist can assume the social standing of the individual. On 
this view the material artefacts of the examined culture has been 
used to symbolize – or represent - the hierarchical structure inherent 
within the society. Yet there is a problem with this assumption. One 
cannot assume the existence of a social context prior to the symbolic 
concept. As Robb (1998) points out: 
 
“Its most problematic assumption is simply that 
artefacts, actions, and social relations have a meaning or 
existence logically prior to their translation into symbols, 
which serve primarily to represent this perceptual reality” 
(Robb 1998:333). 
 
Archaeologists and ethnographers should not assume a pre-
symbolic reality underpinning the cultural production of concepts and 
representations within a human social context. Symbols aren’t merely 
“projections of antecedent concepts, but in its substantive reality [they 
are] constitutive of the concept” (Renfrew 2001:130). The 
methodological individualist framework that has pervaded 
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archaeology presupposes symbols, representations and - inevitably - 
the complexity of culture, as just a by-product of behavioural traits 
fundamental to human social/economic living. Yet the context in 
which symbolic structures are produced requires that humans be in 
the business of constructing a contextual environment scaffolded by 
material culture. Consequently, the material culture that is derived 
from individuals engaging with these symbolic representations 
reproduces the social practices which constitute a particular 
worldview relative to the cultural and symbolic environment (Barrett 
2001:152).  
 
Thus ‘meaning’ doesn’t exist independently of a cultural and 
symbolic structure. On this view then symbolic structures are highly 
embodied, requiring a substantive reality to be present prior to the 
concept (Renfrew 2001; 2008). As archaeologist Colin Renfrew 
(2001) points out, though these cultural structures certainly serve a 
function, the symbol itself shouldn’t be viewed as an inactive referent 
to an already existing concept. Nor should a ‘context’ be presumed 
prior to the reality of the symbol. Instead, for Renfrew, social realities 
are constituted by symbolic structures: the symbol precedes the 
concept (Renfrew 2001). The symbol of ‘wealth’ for instance in a 
particular society is coupled to a substantive reality: someone with 
lots of stuff. Wealth is enabled by a substantive reality of individuals 
who are symbolized as wealthy in virtue of their private capital. 
Likewise, with religious belief we cannot assume the religious nature 
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of individuals prior to its expression in a culture. The symbolic 
structures comprising religious behaviour (e.g. alters, rituals, beliefs 
etc), constitute the social reality of religion itself.  
 
Renfrew (2008) also notes that societies consign value to objects, 
materials and locales independently of utilitarian value.  He gives the 
example of the intrinsic value of gold. What is found in the 
archaeological record, however, is a complete lack of value assigned 
to this material before 1000 years ago. Renfrew notes an obvious 
fact, that: “The intrinsic value of gold, is of course, culturally ascribed” 
(Renfrew 2008:2044). But what is of importance here, Renfrew 
asserts, is the “very notion of value itself” (2008:2044). In religions, 
cultures the attribute value to ‘sacred’ material items and our ability to 
coordinate our niche into a system of representational properties with 
intrinsic value is apparent. The intrinsic value ‘sacred’ materials are 
not only endowed with meaning, but they are also motivationally 
salient to adherents.  
 
Mithen (1996a; 1996b) takes a similar approach to Renfrew’s with 
regard to the transmission of religious beliefs. Material artefacts and 
symbols play “a role similar to that of language in terms of creating 
networks of minds, disembodying minds, and exponentially 
increasing the range of conceptual spaces available for exploration 
and the manner in which this could be undertaken” (Mithen 
1996a:181). Mithen suggests then that religious-symbolic structures 
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are essentially ‘consubstantial’ with human cognitive architecture (see 
also Malafouris 2004). Thus, the existence of religious symbolic 
structures in a cultural milieu essentially “anchors” the perceptual 
categories of an agent’s social reality in regards to religious belief 
producing concepts that would not normally be possible without 
material symbols: 
 
“Hence, rather than having a shared biologically based 
anchor in our brains that allows for the persistence and 
transmission of religious ideas, we have adopted material 
anchors in the form of either abstract or naturalistic 
depictions. The mind has simply been extended into the 
material world to extend the range of concepts that it can 
think about – to explore new conceptual spaces” (Mithen 
2001:110). 
 
Thus while Mithen maintains that Boyer’s picture of religion is 
compatible with his picture of the mind being cognitively fluid, Mithen 
argues that counterintuitive representations are in fact dependent on 
our capacity for cognitive fluidity (see above), without which human 
cognition could not deploy such powerful representations. Since 
cognitive fluidity allows individuals to “[bring] together knowledge and 
ideas from different cognitive domains” (Mithen 1996b:101)], we can 
engage in the counterintuitive representations that Boyer deems as 
important to the transmission of religious beliefs. However Mithen 
holds that the transmission of religious ideas is considerably 
dependent upon material culture. Hence, the appeal of 
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counterintuitive concepts cannot be explained in virtue of internal 
resources alone.  Neither can their transmission. Environments are 
difference makers, not merely prompts and triggers. 
 
In addition, because our cognitive architecture is not well-suited to 
the transmission of these ideas – due to their counter-intuitive 
features - the spread of religious representations requires a robust 
concentration of religious material artefacts in the world to make them 
more memorable. Thus religious counterintuitive representations “do 
not relate to an evolved feature of [our] mental architecture. In an 
evolutionary context they do not ‘fit’ into the domain specific cognitive 
domains, and in a developmental context they do not ‘fit’ into a 
domain of intuitive knowledge” (Mithen 1996b:102). So Mithen is 
saying that counter-intuitive concepts are far too cognitively intensive 
to process via our cognitive architecture alone. He argues that 
religious concepts, in particular, require support from material 
symbols in order for them to be transmitted.  
 
Thus religious belief is not just ‘evoked’ necessarily, as Boyer 
suggests, instead Mithen argues that there exists a natural co-
dependence between both our external cognitive domain (stuff in the 
world) and the internal one (our content-rich and cognitively fluid 
hardware). The generation of supernatural cognition is dependent on 
the cultural niche to ‘anchor’ it as much as it is dependent on 
cognitive fluidity. Indeed it requires the existence cues present within 
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our external environment in the form of symbolic representations 
(such as rituals and idols etc).  
 
A ‘religiously’ imbued symbolic marker thus acts as an anchor for 
the human mind and supports the biological limitations of our basic 
brain for cultural transmission. For Mithen then this remains an 
important development for human cognition in the emergence of 
religious belief.  As stated, without the capacity to merge cognitive 
domains, with the meta-representational abilities associated with 
cognitive fluidity Homo Religiosis would not have evolved. It is the 
substantive reality of symbolic culture within the human cognitive 
niche that would have initiated this trend towards the supernatural. 
Put simply the internal dynamics of pan-human cognitive architecture 
is insufficient to facilitate the spread of religious ideas in the wild. 
 
7.4. Summary and Conclusion 
 
A problem for the SM is that not all religious representations 
conform to a cognitive optimum. Thus (a) societies tend to favor a 
preference for cognitively costly concepts and rituals: hence the 
theological complexity embodied by many religious beliefs and 
practices often exert large demands upon their adherents to secure 
and transmit. Also (b) the SM is at odds to explain the context-
dependent nature of religious representations. If religions are 
constituted by cognitively optimal supernatural concepts then why do 
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the gods not just look, but also behave the way they do. For instance, 
as many observe, religious representations are often evoked within a 
pro-social or moralizing context. However while some concepts 
remain coupled to certain culturally relevant qualities (such as an 
authoritative agent who governs social norms and moral behaviour), 
there are also those supernatural concepts that are not revered in a 
similar way i.e. those “fairy” supernatural concepts, which are more 
benign. Counterintuitive concepts seem to vary in complexity and 
costs.  
 
Thus one way to think of the theological “distortion” that pollutes an 
epistemic environment is to conclude that it is of no concern. Despite 
the elaborate theological systems that are produced within the 
cognitive niche, cognitive processes are always regulated by the 
optimum when reasoning online. Thus despite the propensity to 
remain “theologically correct” within a religious context, agents 
always employ folk religious inferences regarding the gods.  
 
However this does not explain the ‘costs’ involved in believing in 
some supernatural concepts. Offline theologies are distortions par 
excellence. People exert a great deal of individual and collective 
energy in order to commit to them. Thus explicit concepts are just as 
motivationally salient as implicit inferences regarding the gods. This 
gap between online and offline reasoning about supernatural 
concepts may need to be closed if the SM is to make any advances 
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in explaining the qualitative differences between folk religious 
concepts and theological correctness. Indeed as Donald proposed 
(see above), with the advent of a technologically supported theoretic 
culture societies often function within a shared code of “theologically 
correct” belief structures (Barrett 1999; Pyysiäinen 2004). This is 
where Whitehouse’s reading on the processes and properties 
associated with the doctrinal mode is helpful in interpreting how the 
distribution of knowledge within a society supports religious 
transmission.  
 
Social and cultural structures, he argues, enable a robust collective 
knowledge-base and the interpretation of publicly represented 
symbols. Because the doctrinal mode exploits semantic memory, 
according Whitehouse, agents learn and are conditioned to respond 
tacitly to a variety of external symbolic cues. Yet these tacit 
responses are learnt, not genetically embedded. Indeed, a Catholic 
cannot remember how they learned the representational qualities 
associated with the Crucifixion, yet there remains an unspoken 
commitment to this symbolic reference. Thus the integration of 
symbols and its cognitive comprehension remains the product of the 
deliberate and gradual process characterized by indoctrination.  
 
 Cognitive archaeology raises some valid points and Renfrew’s 
argument against the more traditional (or processual) archaeology 
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should be iterated18. Instead of symbols being the derivative of a 
fundamental reality (i.e. a general law of human behaviour), they view 
symbolic material culture as cognitive properties in their own right. 
Mithen and Renfrew support the view then that symbolic material 
culture constitutes a specific environment that would have not existed 
without socio-technological artefacts. In particular, a symbolic reality 
precedes the conceptual reality of a particular culture. Thus specific 
worldviews and creeds for example would not have existed 
independently of these mind tools. The symbolic cognitive niche 
scaffolds the mythic and theoretic culture of a society. Since religions 
– particularly their theologies - are founded upon a conceptual reality 
unique to a specific belief system, then we can also conclude that 
material symbols support modes of transmission within the religious 
cognitive niche.  
 
The spread of any theological concepts require socio-technological 
modes of communication (such as language, writing skills, parchment 
technology, ink and the invention of the printing press to name just a 
few) to facilitate their spread. The concepts inherent within any 
specific religious worldview do not appear to be governed by an 
instinctive disposition towards a particular belief or concept. Nor can it 
be assumed that the success of such theological concepts can be 
facilitated by the content of the representations (i.e. their 
anthropological properties etc). Thus, the prediction that the cognitive 
                                                 
18
 See Lewis Binford, Archaeology as anthropology. In Contemporary Archaeology, ed by M. Leone, pp. 
93-101, 1962; Or Bruce Trigger’s A History of Archaeological Thought. Cambridge University Press: 
New York, 1989 for an excellent overview of the development of archaeological theories. 
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optimum enables for the transmissive frequency of minimally 
counterintuitive beliefs falls short of the ethnographic and 
archeological data. Cognitive archaeology has set-out to highlight this 
point also: that cultural transmission, in general, is greatly determined 
by the epistemic properties of material culture.  
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Chapter 8:   Conclusion 
 
 
8.1.1. Overview: 
 
The cognitive science of religion is a multi-disciplinary approach to 
the study of religion and psychology. However at its core the 
cognitive science of religion emphasizes the importance of empirical 
research. A scientific approach has subsequently been applied in 
order to determine testable methods and theories for examining the 
causes of a particular cultural phenomenon. The concern that 
researchers of religion had initially was that more traditional 
approaches offered poor explanations for the psychological factors 
surrounding human religious behaviour. Traditional anthropological 
approaches, for instance, are an interpretive enterprise, thus the 
methods employed often depend upon non-testable processes of 
examination. The cognitive science of religion has been concerned 
more notably with: a) how religious representations are produced; b) 
how these representations are transmitted; and c) how it is that we 
have the kind of evolved cognitive architecture capable of doing both 
a) and b).  
 
However, how religious representations are produced have nothing 
to do with a particular feature of our brain devoted to religious 
reasoning. On the contrary, common features of the brain devoted to 
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doing other tasks may indeed be susceptible to or generate religious 
ideas. For instance, according to the Standard Model, religion is a by-
product of a variety of other cognitive systems in the brain specialized 
for doing other tasks (see Chapter 3). The SM is founded upon the 
notion that our cognitive systems can instinctively recognize certain 
ontological types such as physical, psychological and biological 
categories in the world, consequently the SM argues then that 
religious ideas hijack our perceptual categories because they are 
‘counterintuitive’ to these ontological types. According to this view 
religious ideas excite our understanding of what is considered 
‘natural’. In this case, cognitive systems that are functional in one 
sense, are non-functional or operate in a non-standard fashion within 
a ‘religious’ context.  
 
Chapter 4 offered some of the alternatives to the more orthodox 
perspectives within Evolutionary Psychology. I began with Merlin 
Donald’s argument against Evolutionary Psychology’s notion of 
domain specific systems in the brain. Human intelligence, Donald 
argues, can only be partly recognized as the result of genetically 
evolved traits. Evolutionary Psychology, according to Donald, 
overlooks the integrated features of our brains with our cultural 
environment. The neurological evidence he says does not 
demonstrate the existence of specialised sub-computers in the brain, 
instead the most recent neurological development in Homo Sapiens is 
the enlargement of the pre-frontal area which is functionally plastic. In 
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addition, the neuro-constructivist account for learning development 
(Quartz & Sejnowski 1997; Quartz 1999) - in which the structuring of 
some neural circuitry is shaped by environmental factors - supports 
the argument for plasticity also.  
 
Donald proposes that it is this combination of brains and cultural 
environment that has made us smarter. This dynamic he dubs the 
‘hybrid mind’ which he says has emerged due to co-evolutionary 
processes. It is this cognitive flexibility that remains a unique feature 
of human beings, not inbuilt specialized or content-rich systems. It is 
this connection between our ‘internal’ cognitive domains and our 
‘external’ cultural domains which constitutes a ‘scaffolded’ 
intelligence. Indeed we inhabit a cognitive niche comprised of non-
genetic resources that support our cognitive expertise. And because 
human beings are ecological engineers – in that we shape and 
reshape our environments – we are niche construction agents who 
inherit and pass on these scaffolded environments to each 
generation.  
 
I argued that the hybrid mind, niche construction and extended 
mind models offer compatible theoretical challenges to the EP model; 
each shared components which I felt suited Andy Clark’s notion of a 
‘wideware’ of human cognitive model (Clark 2001). Clark‘s wideware 
model illustrates that cognition is an emergent property arising out of 
an interface between brain, body and environment. Our everyday 
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practices involve the use of ‘cognitive technologies’ such as 
language, pens, paper and computers. These are not only artefacts in 
the world, but our interface with them requires the transmission of 
socio-cultural practices such as reading, writing and the use of well-
trained motor-skills. We are nothing without the voluntary control of 
our bodily movements, just as the printing press is function-less 
without general literacy.  A cultural environment is crucial for this kind 
of learning and development, just as it was important in the training of 
Kanzi the chimpanzee to use symbols to communicate. With the 
appropriate training, in the right environment, Kanzi learned to make 
associations between real world cues and symbolic representations. 
Enculturation is vital to our cognitive expertise and a wideware 
understanding of human cognition provides an appropriate 
examination of how we interact with our cultural niche.   
 
More importantly to hominine evolution, however, was the 
development of symbolic culture. A symbolic culture has enabled the 
capacity to not only pass-on valuable information from one generation 
to the next, but it also supported the development for learning ‘higher-
order’ representations such as abstract supernatural concepts. Thus 
in Chapter 5 Merlin Donald’s co-evolutionary model was then further 
elaborated. I focused on Donald’s theory for hominine cognitive 
evolution, which splits the development of hominine intelligence into 
three major transitional periods in our cultural evolutionary history 
(mimetic, mythic and technologically supported culture). It is hominine 
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activity (or niche construction as I viewed it) that has driven the 
evolution of cognitive traits. As hominines shaped their environment, 
so in turn their environment shaped their intelligence (Sterelny 2003). 
It has been the capacity to engage in collective communication and 
the distribution of symbolic cognitive tools which has supported the 
development of representational thinking in our hominine ancestry. 
This first began with the ability to utilise the body as a public 
representational device, which led to a spoken language, further 
leading to the evolution of a ‘technologically supported’ symbolic 
material culture. And it is this third stage of development identified by 
Donald which has been the focus of this thesis.  
 
Because theological complexity within religious beliefs systems is 
the cause and result of a symbolic culture, the cognitive demands 
associated with the transmission of these concepts depends greatly 
upon the development of technologically supported cultural traits (e.g. 
religious texts are a good example of this). This actively external 
dynamic in the evolution of human cognition would have allowed for 
the processing of cognitively difficult beliefs and practices, particularly 
with the development of complex theological concepts.  
 
Chapter 6 presented some of the problems surrounding the 
Standard Model’s conception of human cognition and religiosity. The 
Standard Model researchers covered in this thesis were prepared to 
categorize certain cognitive traits, which they suggested were stable 
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features of human cognition, prior to an examination of religiosity. 
This I argued was a questionable approach, as the cognitive system 
itself had only been partially explained on the outset. In addition their 
operational definition of religion was insufficient. As Harvey 
Whitehouse illustrated in this section, religious belief systems are 
constituted by much more than universally identifiable features such 
as agency (i.e. anthropomorphic representations), or minimally 
counterintuitive concepts. Belief systems are additionally comprised 
of socio-political arrangements and ritual norms. Thus the focus on 
Whitehouse was intended to illustrate a growing dissatisfaction with 
the SM approach. It was important to examine here Whitehouse’s 
critique of the SM and particularly his argument against the cognitive 
optimum. Whitehouse was skeptical of the so-called universal 
properties identified by the SM within religions. In other words, 
Whitehouse is critical of accounts for which innate features of our 
cognitive architecture regulate particular religious representations and 
govern the expression religious behaviour.  
 
Whitehouse urges that religiosity is much more context-dependent 
than is readily assumed by the SM. The religious mind he argues is 
constituted additionally by socio-political arrangements and the 
differing modes of ritual specific to the social, material and ecological 
constraints of a particular culture. Put simply, a religious belief system 
is adapted to the circumstances of a particular context. I intended to 
establish correlations between Whitehouse’s modes theory and 
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distributed cognition models. Here Whitehouse has offered a unique 
solution to a troubling question within the cognitive science of religion: 
why do religions look the way they do? Belief systems, Whitehouse 
argues, are subject to the selection pressures of particular socio-
ecology. I argued that Whitehouse’s theory is similar to a distributed 
cognition model as religious transmission is shaped by external 
dynamics not just internal cognitive regularities. The distribution and 
arrangement of socio-technological properties thus support the flow 
of religious information within cultures.  
 
In response, I argued that this conjecture supports the evidence for 
a wideware model, because the transmission of explicit or cognitively 
difficult religious concepts will subsequently depend upon the 
development of cultural tools (e.g. symbolic artefacts, texts, ritual 
etc). Further, I also argued that the cognitive science of religion 
shouldn’t underestimate the commitment that adherents have 
towards these explicit representations. On the contrary, explicit 
religious concepts, or ‘theologically correct’ concepts (though 
dependent upon cultural learning), have been found to be just as 
motivationally salient as the innate processes which guide implicit 
religious inferences. The costs that are required for engaging in these 
beliefs and practices are apparent and suggest that individual 
commitment is guided by something more than intuitive inferences. 
Explicit religious representations have more value to religious 
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adherents than the cognitively optimal supernatural concepts 
identified by the SM.  
 
Though religious concepts congest an epistemic environment, a 
religious cognitive niche also supports cooperation between agents 
within in groups. Social transparency then is context-dependent only 
because those individuals who adhere to a particular belief system 
can indeed make successful social exchanges via commitment. As 
stated, religious beliefs and practices can be a powerful culturally 
evolved mechanism for social cohesion. The pro-social aspect of 
religiosity in part explains why the religious cognitive niche contains 
representations that are pro-social or moralizing in their scope. The 
common pro-social aspects associated with religious behaviour (i.e. 
such as moralistic norms) however don’t imply that there are internal 
cognitive systems specifically coupled to religious inferences. Instead 
the content of religious representations – whether they are moralizing 
or not - relates to the capacity to shape cultural properties within their 
environment in order to influence the behaviour of its inhabitants. In 
order to examine religious behaviour a more comprehensive model of 
the religious mind should focus to the intersection between brains 
and material culture. 
 
While sympathetic to Mithen’s view, I observed that the data 
remains insufficient. Archaeological ‘facts’ do not exist independently 
of interpretation. Evidence is critically dependent upon interpretation 
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of scarce material evidence. A potential setback then for the 
theoretical models supported by Mithen’s thesis is the need for more 
archaeological data. But this of course is a problem for archaeological 
models of interpretation: a shortage of details. Mithen has avoided 
this problem however by employing facts regarding our cognitive 
architecture to the interpretation of archaeological finds. This is a 
crucial step in the right direction, because archaeologists can at least 
attempt to make stronger inferences regarding the thoughts and 
beliefs of agents - i.e. those ‘invisible facts’ - from these long-lost 
cultures. By deducing some cognitive regularities and how they 
function in concert with material culture, Mithen is surmising that we 
can build a better picture of how material culture influenced our 
cognitive skills and vice versa. Inferences regarding material culture 
can be turned upon ancestral thinking and human cognition. 
Subsequently, facts regarding human cognition can be turned upon 
inferences regarding material culture.  
 
However, because a wideware model implies a correspondence 
between ‘culturally’ evolved traits and ‘biologically’ evolved traits, it is 
archaeological data that will be able to offer sound inferences 
regarding the evolution of the human cognitive niche. There is little 
that can be said on this matter, not only due to the ‘lack of data,’ but 
also because archaeologists have yet to agree upon their 
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interpretations19. Nevertheless, since the cognitive sciences applied 
to human religiosity and archaeology is still a relatively new emerging 
field, there is indeed a great deal that we may be able to understand 
if we can successfully integrate these fields of research. What we 
should be looking for – in conjunction with perhaps Whitehouse’s 
doctrinal modes theory – is a greater concentration of religious 
material culture emerging alongside an increased level of social 
organization. Social complexity should produces cultural complexity 
and vice versa. Archaeological interpretations should provide a clue 
as to whether or not this is accurate in the case of religious activities.  
 
8.1.2. Where is ‘religion’? 
 
The central point of this thesis has been to explain why religious 
behaviour is coupled tightly to the cultural properties of the human 
cognitive niche. Explicit representations within religions are often 
uniquely associated with cultural learning, while theological concepts 
are highly valued as costly commodities. Yet the Standard Model 
predicts a greater prevalence of less-costly representations (those 
representations which conform to the cognitive optimum), while 
overlooking the challenge of theological complexity. However, 
religious information is constituted by conceptual knowledge that is, in 
large part, learned by cultural actors. While the Standard Model 
allows for the importance of cultural learning, they labor under an 
                                                 
19
 See Ben Jeffares’ The Scope and Limits of Biological Explanations in Archaeology (2002) for an 
excellent overview of this debate. 
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incomplete picture: that the properties of religious representations are 
founded upon context-independent causal influences. Though 
environments are important, for the Standard Model it is our innate 
cognitive systems that govern the expression of religion. However, as 
we have seen, theological knowledge is often comprised of concepts 
that would be cognitively difficult to process without use of symbolic 
artefacts.  
 
Religious agents seek out this kind of engagement also: they 
regularly interface with computationally heavy concepts by way of 
religious material culture. This makes theological complexity 
interesting because it embodies an informational load that makes 
transmission difficult. The Standard Model on the other hand argues 
that human cognitive systems are susceptible to supernatural ideas 
(especially Boyer and McCauley), when it is not obvious that we are 
somehow predisposed to religious ideas – especially when they are 
so costly to acquire. Again, religious information is costly to acquire. 
Yet, human societies and cultures appear to be satisfied with not only 
absorbing these costs, but seeking them out also. We exert a great 
deal of effort in the construction of our religious niches.  
 
My central claim has been that complex bodies of theological 
knowledge require the use of symbolic artefacts for transmission. By 
this I mean that conceptual reasoning is enabled by symbolic 
communication (as Colin Renfrew states: ‘the symbol precedes the 
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concept’ [Renfrew 2001:130]). As concepts become more complex – 
in the case of religious representations – material symbols are 
required in order to support their transmission. This provides a 
suitable explanation for why religious belief systems are founded 
upon external media devices, and why the ‘sacred’ is 
characteristically represented in societies in the form of collectively 
valued material symbols.  
 
However, though it is important to recognize the psychological 
preconditions for human religiosity - those genetically endowed 
resources - material culture remains a psychological foundation for 
religious thought. Further, the material basis of thought requires us to 
rethink the role of evolution in shaping the religious mind. Societies 
and cultures adjust and adapt to their religious cognitive niche via the 
transmission of cultural properties which essentially augment 
conceptual thinking within a religious context. The ‘sacred’ then 
should be viewed as the content-fixing of concepts through the use of 
religious ‘mind tools’ (see discussion on Matthew Day and Andy Clark 
in Chapter 7; also Day 2004b; Clark 1996).  
 
Because explicit conceptual reasoning depends on our capacity for 
offline thinking, external symbolic media remains crucial to the 
processing of religious information. Moreover that thinking is affected 
by contextual as well as developmental factors. Indeed cultural 
artefacts are essential for collaborating religious collectives as they 
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allow for the organization and the transmission of the ‘sacred’. Thus 
explicit beliefs represented in the cognitive niche as artefact should 
not be overlooked. As Matthew Day points out here: 
 
“By treating cognition as something that happens inside 
the head, we run the risk of habitually overestimating the 
biological brain’s natural computational prowess and 
underestimating the consequences of non-neural cognitive 
resources. More devilishly, we may also end up with a 
skewed portrait of the mind’s evolved design.” (Matthew 
Day 2004b:106)  
 
 It is indeed these “non-neural cognitive resources” that this thesis 
has chosen to focus on here. Moreover, I have highlighted research 
that offers new approaches within the cognitive science of religion 
outside of the representationalist paradigm. Symbolic artefacts thus 
should be viewed here then as non-neural cognitive resources that 
scaffold the biological limitations of our religious thinking. This 
subsequently warrants an examination of culture as being causally 
relevant to an understanding of human cognition.  
 
Contrary to McCauley’s claim (see Chapter 3), religion is a lot 
more like science, than it is a ‘natural’ cognitive disposition. Like 
science religious belief systems establish causal explanations for the 
world and subsequently perpetuate a rich lineage of material cultural 
artefacts to transmit these worldviews. For the religious practitioner 
there exists a similar informational load comprised of theoretically 
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challenging concepts which exist outside the boundaries of our 
‘native’ intelligence. Religion is not for ‘dummies’, as so implied by 
McCauley’s comparison. On the contrary, religious belief systems are 
comprised of highly complex systems of knowledge.  I have argued 
that if the cognitive science of religion is to make any headway it 
should view the study of culture as a level of organization that affects 
individual behaviour – particularly our religious beliefs and activities. 
As religious scholar Gabriel Levy states:  
 
“Since the brain develops in the context of non-cognitive 
physiological and network processes, and concepts and 
actions in the world depend on non-cognitive physiological 
and network processes, we can say that these processes 
are just as important to understanding religion as those 
processes that take place in individual heads” (Levy 
2005:194).  
 
Certainly the research which has attempted to isolate 
psychological features - outside of the cultural context - as a causal 
explanation for religiosity has been helpful. But it shouldn’t let us 
inform our definition of ‘religion’. As we have seen, human religiosity 
is not just a belief in anthropomorphized supernatural beings, nor is it 
solely rituals. Instead religion (whatever it is), appears to be a highly 
integrated phenomena encompassing these things plus the 
institutional, political, cosmological and the material properties of a 
particular cultural. We can isolate these properties, but it would be 
foolish to consider them purely the result of our neurological 
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characteristics. This thesis has argued that ‘human religiosity’ 
(whatever it is) extends beyond the cranium. We can argue then that 
since cognition functions at differing levels of organization (e.g. 
brains, body and environment), then human religiosity similarly 
operates at differing, yet compatible, levels of organization within the 
cognitive niche. A wideware interpretation of religious behaviour 
means that there is no simple way to view the larger whole from just 
its distinguishable parts. Instead, we should begin to identify how the 
parts interact and are coordinated within a ‘religious’ network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 208 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 209 
Bibliography: 
 
Alcorta, C. and Sosis, R., (2005) Ritual, Emotion, and Sacred Symbols: The 
Evolution of Religion as an Adaptive Complex, Human Nature 16:323-359 
 
Atran, S. (1998) Folk biology and the anthropology of science: cognitive 
universals and cultural particulars. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 21: 547–
609. 
 
Atran, S. (2002) In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion, 
Oxford University Press, New York. 
 
Baldwin, M. J. (1896) A New Factor in Evolution. The American Naturalist, Vol. 
30, No. 354, 441-451.  
 
Balfe, J. H. (1985) Sociology and the Sublime. New Literary History, Vol. 16, 
No. 2, The Sublime and the Beautiful: Reconsiderations. pp. 237-249. 
 
Barkow, J., Cosmides. L. & Tooby J. (eds.), (1992) The Adapted Mind: 
Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Baron-Cohen, S., Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (1997) Mindblindness: An essay 
on autism and theory of mind. Bradford. 
 
Baron-Cohen, S., Tager-Flusberg, H. & Cohen, D. (2000) Understanding other 
minds: Perspectives from developmental neuroscience. Oxford University 
press.  
 
Barrett, J. C. (2001). Agency, the duality of structure, and the problem of the 
archaeological record. In Hodder, I. (ed.), Archaeological Theory Today, Polity 
Press, Cambridge, pp. 141–164. 
 
Barrett, J. L. (1998) Cognitive constraints on Hindu concepts of the divine. 
Journal for Scientific Study of Religion 37:608–19. 
 
Barrett, J. L. (1999). Theological correctness: Cognitive constraints and the 
study of religion. Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, 11, 325–339. 
 
Barrett J. L. (2000) "Exploring the Natural Foundations of Religion," Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 4: 29-34. 
 
Barrett, J. L. (2007) Cognitive Science of Religion: What Is It and Why Is It? 
Religion Compass, Vol 1(6): p. 768-786 
 
Barrett, J. L. and Keil, F. C. (1996). Conceptualizing a nonnatural entity: 
Anthropomorphism in God concepts. Cognitive Psychology, 31:219-247 
 
 210 
Barsalou, L.W., Barbey, A.K., Simmons, W.K., & Santos, A. (2005). 
Embodiment in religious knowledge. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 5, 14-
57.  
 
Bateson, G. (1973) Steps to an Ecology of Mind. London: Granada. 
 
Bering, J. M. & Johnson, D. D. P. (2005) “O Lord . . . you perceive my thoughts 
from afar”: Recursiveness and the evolution of supernatural agency. Journal of 
Cognition and Culture 5:118–42. 
 
Binford, L. (1962) Archaeology as anthropology. In Contemporary 
Archaeology, (ed.) by M. Leone, pp. 93-101. Southern Illinois University. 
 
Boyd, R., and. Richerson. P. (1985) Culture and the Evolutionary Process. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. (2002) Solving the puzzle of human cooperation. 
In: Levinson, S. (Ed.), Evolution and Culture. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Boyer, P. (1994) The Naturalness of Religious Ideas: A Cognitive Theory of 
Religion, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. 
 
Boyer, P. (2001). Religion explained: The evolutionary origins of religious 
thought. Basic Books. 
 
Boyer P. (2003) Religious thought and behaviour as by-products of brain 
function. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7(3): p. 119-124.  
 
Boyer, P. (2005) A reductionistic model of distinct modes of religious 
transmission. In Harvey Whitehouse & Robert N. McCauley (eds.), Mind and 
religion: Psychological and cognitive foundations of religiosity, 3–29. Walnut 
Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. 
 
Boyer, P. & Ramble, C. (2001) Cognitive Templates for Religious Concepts: 
Crosscultural evidence for recall of counter-intuitive representations. Cognitive 
Science 25:535–64. 
 
Boyer, P., & Barrett, H.C. (2005) Evolved Intuitive Ontology: Integrating neural, 
behavioural and developmental aspects of domain-specificity. In Buss, D.M. 
(ed.). Handbook of evolutionary psychology. New York: Wiley 
 
Bulbulia, J. (2004a) Religious Costs as Adaptations that Signal Altruistic 
Intention. Evolution and Cognition, 10 (1): 19-38. 
 
Bulbulia, J. (2005) Are There Any Religions? An Evolutionary Exploration 
Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, Volume 17, No 2: 71-100 
 
 211 
Bulbulia, J. (2006). Nature’s medicine: Religiosity as an adaptation for health 
and cooperation. In P. McNamara (Ed.), Where God and science meet: 
Evolution, genes, and the religious brain (Vol. 1, pp. 87–121). 
 
Bulbulia, J. (2007). Evolution and Religion. In R. I. Dunbar & L. Barrett (Eds.), 
Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology (pp. 621-636). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Bulbulia, J. (2008). Meme Infection or Religious Niche Construction? An 
Adapatationist Alternative to The Cultural Maladaptationist Hypothesis. 
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, 20, 1-42. 
 
Byrne, R. W. & Whiten, A. (1988) Machiavellian Intelligence. Social Expertise 
and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans, Oxford 
University Press, New York  
 
Cajori, F. (1929) A History of Mathematical Notations, Volume II. Open Court 
Publishing Co., La Salle, Illinois. 
 
Chase, P. G. (1994) On symbols and the palaeolithic. Current Anthropology, 
35, 627-629. 
 
Cheney, D. L. & Seyfarth, R. M. (1992) Precis of How monkeys see the world. 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences 15:135-182. 
 
Chomsky, N. (1955 / 1975) Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory. MIT 
Humanities Library. Microfilm. NewYork and London: Plenum Press 
 
Chomsky, N. (1988) Language and Problems of Knowledge. Cambridge MA: 
MIT Press.  
 
Churchland, P. (1989) Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human 
Behaviour. In Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. Pp. 111-128. 
 
Clark, A. (1996) Connectionism, Moral Cognition, and Collaborative Problem 
Solving, in Minds and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics, edited 
by Larry May, Marilyn Friedman and Andy Clark. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Clark, A. (1997) Being There: putting brain, body, and world together again. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Clark, A. (1998) Where Brain, Body and World Collide Daedalus: Journal of 
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Special Issue on The Brain) Vol 
127 (2) p. 257-280 
 
Clark, A. (2001a) Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive 
Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
 212 
Clark, A. (2001b). Reasons, Robots, and the Extended Mind. Mind and 
Language 16, 121-145. 
 
Clark, A. (2003) Natural-Born Cyborgs: minds, technologies, and the future of 
human intelligence. Oxford: Oxford U.P.  
 
Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. (1998) The Extended Mind. Analysis 58, 7-19. 
 
Clark A. and Grush, R. (1995) Towards a cognitive robotics. Adapt. Behav. 7: 
5–16. 
 
Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (1987) From Evolution to Behaviour: Evolutionary 
Psychology as the Missing Link, in J. Dupre, The Latest on the Best, 
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, pp. 277-306.  
 
Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (1994) Origins of Domain Specificity: the Evolution 
of Functional Organization, in L. Hirschfeld and S. Gelman (eds), Mapping the 
Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 85-116.  
 
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2000) Consider the source: The evolution of 
adaptations for decoupling and metarepresentation. In D. Sperber (Ed.), 
Metarepresentations: A multidisciplinary perspective (pp. 53–115). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Dautenhahn, K. (1997) I could be you – The phenomenological dimension of 
social understanding. Cybernetics and Systems, 25(8), 417-453. 
 
Dawkins, R. (1976) The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Dawkins, R. (2003) A Devil’s Chaplain. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London. 
 
Davies, M. & Stone, T. (eds.) (1995) Folk Psychology. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Day, M. (2004a) The Ins and Outs of Religious Cognition, Method and Theory 
in the Study of Religion. Vol. 16, 3: 241-255. 
 
Day, M. (2004b) Religion, Off-Line Cognition and the Extended Mind, Journal 
of Cognition and Culture. Vol. 4, 1:101-121. 
 
Day, M. (2005) Rethinking Naturalness: The Modes of Religiosity and Religion 
in the Round, In Harvey Whitehouse and Robert N. McCauley, eds., Mind and 
Religion: Psychological and Cognitive Foundations of Religion, 207-232. 
Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press. 
 
Deacon, T. W. (1997) The symbolic species: The co-evolution of language and 
the brain. W. W. Norton. 
 
Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 
 
Dennett, D. (1996) Kinds of Minds. New York: Basic Books.  
 213 
 
Dennett, D. (2000) Making Tools for Thinking, in D. Sperber (ed.), 
Metarepresentations (Oxford U.P.). 
 
Diamond, J. (2005) Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. 
Viking, New York. 
 
Donald, Merlin (1991). Origins of the Modern Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
U.P.  
 
Donald, M. (1995) The neurobiology of human consciousness: an evolutionary 
approach. Neuropsychologia, 33:1087-1102.  
 
Donald, Merlin (2001) A Mind So Rare: the evolution of human consciousness. 
New York: W.W. Norton. 
 
Dunbar, R. (1996) Grooming, gossip and the evolution of language. Faber and 
Faber. 
 
Durkheim, Emile (1963) [1915] Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Joseph 
Swain, trans. London: Allen and Unwin. 
 
Eliade, M. (1972) [1951] Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Fodor, J. (1983) The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books / 
MIT Press. 
 
Fuller R. C. (2007) Spirituality in the Flesh: The Role of Discrete Emotions in 
Religious Life. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 75, No. 1, 
pp. 25–51 
 
Galef, B. G. Jr (1996) Social influences on food preferences and feeding 
behaviours of vertebrates. In: Capaldi ED (ed) Why we eat what we eat. 
American Psychological Association, pp 207–231 
 
Geertz, C. (1973) Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture. 
In The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Geertz C.(2005) Shifting Aims, Moving Targets: On the Anthropology of 
Religion. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 11 
 
Glucklich, A. (2001) Sacred Pain. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (1996) Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature. 
Cambridge University Press: New York. 
 
Griffiths, P. and Gray R. (1994) "Developmental Systems and Evolutionary 
Explanation", Journal of Philosophy XCI: 277-304. 
 
 214 
Griffiths, P.E., Stotz, K. (2000) How the mind grows: a developmental 
perspective on the biology of cognition. Synthese 122, 29-51. 
 
Guthrie. S. G. (1993) Faces in the clouds: A new theory of religion. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Hayden, B. (2002) Shamans, Sorcerers, and Saints. Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institution Books.  
 
Hawkes C. (1954) Archaeological method and theory: some suggestions from 
the Old World. Am. Anthropol. 56:155.68. 
 
Hutchins, E. (1995a) Cognition in the Wild. MIT Press 
 
Hutchins, E. (1995b) How a cockpit remembers its speeds. Cognitive Science, 
19, 265-288.  
 
Irons, W. (1996) “Morality, Religion, and Human Nature.” In Religion and 
Science: History, Method, Dialogue, ed. W. Mark Richardson and Wesley 
Wildman, 375–99. New York: Routledge. 
 
Irons, W (2001). “Religion as a Hard-to-Fake Signal of Commitment.”Chapter 
13 in Randolph M. Ness, ed. Evolution and the Capacity for Commitment. New 
York, Russell Sage Foundations Series on Trust. 
 
Jablonka, E. and Lamb, M. J. (2005). Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, 
Epigenetic, Behavioural, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
James, W. (1900) Psychology (American Science Series, Briefer Course), 
New York: Henry Holt and Company. 
 
Jeffares, B. (2002). The Scope and Limits of Biological Explanations in 
Archaeology. M.A. Philosophy. Wellington, Victoria University of Wellington.  
 
Johnson M. and Rohrer, T. (2006) We Are Live Creatures: Embodiment, 
American Pragmatism, and the Cognitive Organism. In Body, Language, and 
Mind, v. 1, 17-54. 
 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992) Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective 
on cognitive science. MIT Press. 
 
Keil, F. C. (1986) The Acquisition of Natural Kind and Artefact Terms. In 
Language Learning and Concept Acquisition. W. Demopoulos and A. Marras, 
eds. Pp. 133-153. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
 
Keleman, D. (2004) Are children “intuitive theists”?: Reasoning about purpose 
and design in nature. Psychological Science 15:295–301. 
 
 215 
Krebs, J. R. & Dawkins, R. (1984) Animal signals: mind-reading and 
manipulati0t In Krebs, J. R. & Davies, N. B. (eds.) Behavioural Ecology: An 
Evolutionary Approach. (2nd edition) Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications: 
380—402. 
 
Knight, C. (1998) Ritual/speech coevolution: A solution to the problem of 
deception. In: Approaches to the evolution of language, (ed.) J. R. Hurford, M. 
Studdert- Kennedy, & C. Knight. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Krippner, S. (2000) The Epistnuology and Technologies of Shamanic States of 
Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(11-12):93-118. 
 
Laland, K. (2004) Extending the Extended Phenotype, Biology and Philosophy 
19: 313–325 
 
Laland, K. & Odling-Smee, J. (2000a) Niche Construction, Biological Evolution 
and Cultural Change. In Behavioural and Brain Sciences 23 (1): 131-175. 
 
Laland, K. N. and Odling-Smee. J. (2000b) The evolution of the meme. In R. 
A. Aunger, (ed.), Darwinizing culture: The status of memetics as a science. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Lawson, E.T. & McCauley, R.N. (1990) Rethinking Religion: Connecting 
Cognition and Culture. Cambridge University Press 
 
Leslie, A.M., (1987) Pretense and representation: the origins of “Theory of 
Mind”. Psychological Review 94:412–426. 
 
Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1987) Metarepresentation and autism: How not to 
lose one's marbles. Cognition, 27, 291-294. 
 
Levy, G. (2005) Religious ‘Cognition’: Between Integrated Physiology and 
Network, Epoché: The University of California Journal for the Study of Religion 
23:2, 193-224 
 
Lewontin, R.C. (1982) Organism and environment. In Learning, Development, 
and Culture, H.C. Plotkin, (ed.), 151-170. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Lewontin, R. C., Rose, S., & Kamin, L. J. (1984) Not in our genes. New York: 
Pantheon. 
 
Mahoney, A. (2008). Theological Expressions as Costly Signals of Religious 
Commitment. In J. Bulbulia, R. Sosis, R. Genet, E. Harris, K. Wyman & C. 
Genet (eds.), The Evolution of Religion: Studies, Theories, and Critiques. 
Santa Margarita, CA: Collins Foundation Press. 
 
Malafouris L (2004), The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement: Where 
Brain, Body and Culture Conflate, in Rethinking Materiality: The Engagement 
 216 
of Mind with the Material World, (eds.) E. DeMarrais, C. Gosden, C. Renfrew, 
Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research: 53-62 
 
McCauley, R.N. (2000) The Naturalness of Religion and the Unnaturalness of 
Science, in F.C.Keil and R.A.Wilson (eds.), Explanation and Cognition, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 61–85. 
 
McBrearty, S. and Brooks, A. S. (2000) The revolution that wasn’t: A new 
interpretation of the origin of modern human behaviour. Journal of Human 
Evolution 39:453–563. 
 
Miller, E. K. (2000) The prefrontal cortex and cognitive control. Nature Rev. 
Neurol. 1: 59–65. 
 
Mithen, S. (1996a) The Prehistory of the Mind: A Search for the Origins of Art, 
Religion, and Science. Thames & Hudson.  
 
Mithen, S. (1996b) The Supernatural Beings of Prehistory and the External 
Storage of Religious Ideas. In (eds.) Colin Renfrew and Christopher Scarre, 
Cognition and Material Culture: 97-106. Cambridge: The McDonald Institute 
for Archaeological Research, University of Cambridge.  
 
Mithen, S. (2001) Archaeological Theory and Theories of Cognitive Evolution. 
In Hodder, I. (ed.), Archaeological Theory Today, Polity Press, Cambridge, pp. 
98-121. 
 
Newberg, A. B. and d’Aquili E. G. (2000). Neuropsychology of religious and 
spiritual experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7 (11/12), pp. 251–
266. 
 
Perner J, Leekam SR, Wimmer H. (1987) Three-year-olds. difficulty with false 
belief: the case for a conceptual deficit. Br. J. Dev. Psychol. 5:125.37 
 
Pinker, S. (1997) How the Mind Works. New York, W. W. Norton & Company.  
 
Povinelli, D. J. (2000) Folk physics for apes: The chimpanzee's theory of how 
the world works. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Pyysiäinen, I. (2004) Intuitive and Explicit in Religious Thought. Journal of 
Cognition and Culture 4(1):123-150 
 
Pyysiäinen, I. (2006) Memories: Religion and Cultural Transmission. 
Anthropological Quarterly 79.2: 341-353. 
 
Quartz, S.R. and Sejnowski, T. J. (1997) The Neural Basis of Cognitive 
Development: Constructivist Manifesto, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 20, 
537–596. 
 
Quartz, S.R.: 1999, The Constructivist Brain, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3, 
48–57. 
 217 
 
Renfrew, C. (2001) Symbol before concept: material engagement and the 
early development of society. In Hodder, I. (ed.), Archaeological Theory 
Today, Polity Press, Cambridge, 122–40. 
 
Renfrew, C. (2008) The factuality of value and the sacred, Phil.Trans. R. Soc. 
B., 363: 2041-2047 
 
Richerson, P.J. and Boyd, R. (1989) A Darwinian Theory for the Evolution of 
Symbolic Cultural Traits. In M. Freilich (ed.), The Relevance of Culture, 124-
147. Bergin and Garvey: Boston, MA 
 
Richerson P.J. and Boyd, R. (2001) The evolution of subjective commitment to 
groups: A tribal instincts hypothesis. In: R.M. Nesse, (ed.), Evolution and the 
capacity for commitment. Russell Sage Foundation series on trust Vol. III, 
Russell Sage Foundation, New York, pp. 186–220. 
 
Richerson, P.J. and Newson, L. (2008) Is religion adaptive? Yes, no, neutral, 
but mostly we don't know. In J. Bulbulia, R. Sosis, E. Harris, R. Genet, C. 
Genet & K. Wyman (Eds.), The Evolution of Religion: Studies, Theories, and 
Critiques. Santa Margarita, CA: Collins Foundation Press. 
 
Robb J. E. (1998) The archaeology of symbols. Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 
27:329–46. 
 
Ross, E. and Rapp, R. (1981) Sex and Society: A Research Note from Social 
History and Anthropology. Comparative Studies in Society and History 23:51-
72. 
 
Samuels, R. (1998) Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity 
hypothesis. The British Journal for the Philosophy Science 49: 575-602.  
 
Savage-Rambaugh, S. and R. Lewin (1994) Kanzi, Doubleday, London. 
 
Savage-Rambaugh, S. (1986) Ape Language: From Conditioned Response to 
Symbol, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Schilling, T., & Clifton, R. (1998) Nine-month-old infants learn about a physical 
event in a single session. Cognitive Development, 13, 165–184. 
 
Schloss, J. (2008). He Who Laughs Best: Involuntary Religious Affect as a 
Solution to Recursive Cooperative Defection. In J. Bulbulia, R. Sosis, E. 
Harris, R. Genet, C. Genet & K. Wyman (Eds.), The Evolution of Religion: 
Studies, Theories, and Critiques. Santa Margarita, CA: Collins Foundation 
Press. 
 
Scholl B. J. and Leslie A. M. (1999) Modularity, development and ‘theory of 
mind’. Mind and Language. 14:131–153. 
 
 218 
Shariff, A.F. & Norenzayan, A. (2007). God is watching you: Priming God 
concepts increases prosocial behaviour in an anonymous economic game. 
Psychological Science, 18(9), 803-809. 
 
Skyrms, B. (2003) The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. 
Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, U.K. 
 
Slone, D. J. (2004) Theological incorrectness: Why religious people believe 
what they shouldn’t. Oxford University Press. 
 
Sosis, R. (2000) Religion and intra-group cooperation: Preliminary results of 
acomparative analysis of utopian communities. Cross-Cultural Research 
34:70–87. 
 
Sosis, R., (2003) Why aren't we all Hutterites? Costly signaling theory and 
religious behaviour, Human Nature 14:91-127 
 
Sosis, R. and C. Alcorta (2003) Signaling, solidarity and the sacred: the 
evolution of religious behaviour. Evolutionary Anthropology, 12: 264-274.  
 
Sosis, R., Kress, H., & Boster, J. (2007). Scars for war: Evaluating alternative 
explanations for cross-cultural variance in ritual costs. Unpublished 
manuscript, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT.  
 
Spelke, E. S. (1998) Nativism, empiricism, and the origins of knowledge. Infant 
Behaviour and Development, 21, 181–200. Wechsler, D. (1974).Wechsler 
 
Spelke, E. S. (1990) Principles of Object Perception. Cognitive Science, 14: 
29-56. 
 
Sperber, D. (1985) Anthropology and Psychology: Towards an Epidemiology 
of Representations, Man, New Series, Vol. 20, No. 1. pp. 73-89. 
 
Sperber, Dan. (1996) Explaining culture: A naturalistic approach. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
 
Sperber D. and Hirschfeld, L. A. (2004) The cognitive foundations of cultural 
stability and diversity. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8: 40–46. 
 
Srejovic´ D. (1969) Lepenski vir. Nova praistorijska kultura u Podunavlju. SKZ: 
Belgrade. 
 
Stich, S. & Nichols, S. (1992): Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory?. 
Mind and Language, 7: 35-71 
 
Sterelny, K. (2003). Thought in a hostile world: The evolution of human 
cognition. Oxford : Blackwell.  
 
Sterelny, K. (2004) The Baldwin Effect and Its Significance: A Review of Bruce 
Weber and David Depew (eds) Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect 
 219 
Reconsidered; MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass 2003, pp x, 341. To appear in: 
Evolution and Development. 
 
Sterelny K. (2006) The evolution and evolvability of culture. Mind Lang. 21(2): 
137–165. 
 
Sterelny, K (2007) Social intelligence, human intelligence and niche 
construction. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Series B. 
Volume 362 
 
Sterelny, K. (2008) SNAFUS, Biological Theory. Vol. 2, No. 3. 
 
Teske, John A. (2001) The Genesis of Mind and Spirit. Zygon: Journal of 
Religion and Science, 36:93-104. 
 
Tomasello, M. (1999) The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Tomasello, M., Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. & Kruger, A. C. (1993) Imitative 
learning of actions on objects by children, chimpanzees, and enculturated 
chimpanzees. Child Development 64:1688–1705. 
 
Tooby J. and DeVore, I. (1987) The reconstruction of hominid behavioural 
evolution through strategic modeling. In: Primate Models of Hominid 
Behaviour, W. Kinzey (Ed.). New York: SUNY Press 
 
Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. (1992) The psychological foundations of culture. 
In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: 
Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Turner, J.S. (2000)The Extended Organism: The Physiology of Animal-Built 
Structures, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Schjødt, U., Stødkilde-Jørgensen, H., Geertz, A., Roepstorff, A., (2008) 
Rewarding prayers. Neuroscience Letters, 443:165–168 
 
White, R. (1993). Technological and social dimensions of “Aurignacian Age” 
body ornaments across Europe. In H. Knecht, A. Pike-Tay, and R. White 
(Eds.), Before Lascaux (pp. 277-99). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
 
Whitehouse, H. (2004) Modes of Religiosity: A Cognitive Theory of Religious 
Transmission. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. 
 
Whitehouse, H. (2005) The Cognitive Foundations of Religiosity. In Harvey 
Whitehouse and Robert N. McCauley, eds., Mind and Religion: Psychological 
and Cognitive Foundations of Religion, 207-232. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira 
Press. 
 
Wilson, D. S. (2002) Darwin’s cathedral. University of Chicago Press. 
 220 
 
Young, F. (1962) The Function of Male Initiation Ceremonies: A Cross-Cultural 
Test of an Alternative Hypothesis. American Journal of Sociology 67:379-391. 
 
Zahavi, A. (1987). The theory of signal selection and some of its implications. 
In Delfino, V. P. (ed.) International Symposium of Biological Evolution. Bari 
Adriatic Editrice: 305—327. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
